This post is a reply to an excerpt from James Rachels' book,
The Elements of Moral Philosophy, which was posted on the
Smooinaghey blog for my consideration. Here are my thoughts:
More than one gay writer has said that homosexuality is not about who you have sex with; it’s about who you fall in love with.
Well, I guess you can define yourself however you like, and I don't doubt their need for love and relationship, only how it is channeled. But I have to wonder if the prevailing atmosphere of promiscuity (e.g., one-night stands and a liberal view of "monogamy") is just a matter of desperately looking for "love" or a drive to satiate a compulsion. It seems to me, though, that sex is one of the main differentiators between homosexuality and heterosexuality. If this were not so, then
Jeff and I could qualify as homosexuals, because of our great platonic "love" for one another. (Sorry Jeff, and those bear hugs make me really nervous sometimes ;)
Moreover, individuals do not choose their sexual orientations ... Thus to say that people should not express their homosexuality is, more often than not, to condemn them to unhappy lives.
I don't mean to be trite, but it occurs to me that I have many desires/orientations that I did not choose, but which I must deny. I would like to be a millionaire but I must resist the compulsion to rob. I have the need for power and fame, but I find I must settle for the mediocrity that I deserve. I am married, but I am sexually orientated to the idea of having every attractive woman I see. And I prefer young women, but my wife is aging every day. Am I obligated to actualize every one of my desires? I think it is understood that some desires can be wrong or extreme, and we incarcerate people daily for acting upon these.
It seems to me that the answer to this question lays not in having the desire, as James seems to be arguing, but in whether or not that desire is an acceptable one. If homosexuality is morally neutral (judged by whatever means), then there is no discussion here, go for it; but if not, then no amount of desire for it makes it appropriate.
If it could be shown that gays and lesbians pose some sort of threat to the rest of society, that would be a powerful argument for the other side. . . . Apart from the nature of their sexual relationships, there is no difference between homosexuals and heterosexuals in their moral characters or in their contributions to society.
First of all, it should be pointed out that James neglects the health controversy in favor of the moral and social point. This is unfortunate, since there are some grounds for debating the "threat to the rest of society" from this perspective.
Second, if you get to define your own criteria for "moral character" and "contributions," then you can make anyone look good. I think James would like to confine it to getting an education, holding a good job, and providing some creative output. I certainly have great reservations in claiming that homosexuals are any more "evil" than any other random population group, but from what I have been able to glean, they at least represent a
different kind of culture. This difference seems to include a much higher level of casual sex, recreational drug use, and a raft of psycho-medical ailments. Now, perhaps James denies this, or perhaps he thinks this a morally neutral observation; but if it is true and we think it a shame, then he cannot say that there is no moral difference between the two. The fact that they may make meaningful "contributions" to society in the area of economics, art, and politics would be beside this point.
However, if gay sex were condemned for [functional reasons], a host of other sexual practices would also be condemned: masturbation, oral sex, and even sex by women after menopause.
And so maybe we should think about these things as well, I dunno. But James simply assumes that it is ridiculous to even go there, and uses that presupposition as a form of evidence for his case. So, is he arguing from our moral intuitions that these things are okay, or is he simply leveraging some sacred cows to make his point? Either way, he's got a problem.
The “purpose” of the eyes is to see; is it therefore wrong to use one’s eyes for flirting or for giving a signal? Again, the “purpose” of the fingers may be grasping and poking; is it therefore wrong to snap one’s fingers to keep time with music?
I find these to be very bad examples. Flirting and signaling involves more than the eye and a corruption of "sight" to accomplish, and it's difficult to flirt with what you cannot see. And as to the hand, he makes a spurious assertion that it is
merely for "grasping and poking."
James' argument at this point misses the larger concept of sexual/gender teleology. It is not just that the penis and vagina are instruments for reproduction, it is all the things that are implied by that fact, i.e., that the owners of those instruments are made for each other and that reproduction leads to family, which has certain social ramifications. The state has always understood this — especially that the state itself is dependent on the family, which is the whole reason that the state would have any concern at all about this kind of private relationship.
The word unnatural has a sinister sound, it might be understood simply as a term of evaluation. Perhaps it means something like “contrary to what a person ought to be.” But if that is what “unnatural” means, then to say that something is wrong because it is unnatural would be vacuous. It would be like saying thus-and-so is wrong because it is wrong.
Either I don't get this argument, or it's a bad one, or he's just trying to dodge the larger question of teleology. Seems like he's got the distillation of the idea wrong. I think it would more accurately be stated as this: "Thus-and-so is wrong because it is contrary to what a person ought to be." And if we "ought" to be some way, then not being that way is ipso facto wrong. Of course, he can always argue that there is no particular way that we "ought" to be (because there's no God or objective moral order in the universe), but he hasn't even stated that assertion, much less defended it. Indeed, his whole essay appears to presuppose relativism, which would, ironically, mean that it's not "wrong" to suppress homosexuality.
The problem is that you cannot conclude that homosexuality is an abomination simply because it says so in Leviticus unless you are willing to conclude, also, that these other instructions are moral requirements; and in the 21st century anyone who tried to live according to all those rules would go crazy.
It is way too early for you and I to have a theological discussion on this, but it is clear that James is not familiar with the Christian response to this. Now, a Jew, not having the lens of the Messiah through which to see the Old Testament, has a much more difficult road in answering these kinds of theological objections. However, it is interesting to note that James chooses to quote from the Old Testament vs. the New Testament condemnations of homosexuality. And I might also point out that the Leviticus passage is sandwiched between the prohibitions against bestiality and child sacrifice. Yeah, let's just throw it all out categorically.
In any case, nothing can be morally right or wrong simply because an authority says so. If the precepts in a scared text are not arbitrary, there must be some reason for them—we should be able to ask why the Bible condemns homosexuality, and expect an answer.
Maybe he'd like to step up to the throne of God and demand an accounting on this one. I can see him now: "God, you need to explain to me why homosexuality is wrong before I'll change my moral position. Why must I assume that just because men and women are anatomically and psychosocially constructed in a complementary fashion that we are obligated to behave in a way consistent with that fact? And make it a good reason, because if it doesn't jive with my own higher moral standards I am honor-bound to reject it."
But the main point here is not about homosexuality. The main point concerns the nature of moral thinking. Moral thinking and moral conduct are a matter of weighing reasons and being guided by them. But being guided by reason is very different from following one’s feelings. When we have strong feelings, we may be tempted to ignore reason and go with the feelings. But in doing so, we would be opting out of moral thinking altogether. That is why, in focusing on attitudes and feelings, Ethical Subjectivism seems to be going in the wrong direction.
That's weird: this closing paragraph seems to work more in my favor than his, especially since he begins the essay by grounding the whole issue on the homosexual's "strong feelings." Observe:
The most pertinent fact is that homosexuals are pursuing the only way of life that affords them a chance of happiness. Sex is a particularly strong urge—it isn’t hard to understand why—and few people are able to fashion a happy life without satisfying their sexual needs.
I think what he would be forced to argue is that the homosexual's strong feelings trump the strong feelings of their objectors. Unfortunately, there are more objectors than homosexuals.
Labels: Sexuality