Pensées

The false parallel between interracial and same-sex marriage

2011-12-04T18:34:00.001-06:00

One of the chief tactics in the advocacy of same-sexmarriage legalization is to point out the supposed parallel with interracialmarriage bans. I recently had twoseparate exchanges on the topic and this argument was the centerpiece of thediscussion. The argument is basicallythat discriminating based upon racial preference is really no different than discriminatingbased upon gender preference, and since we all now agree that interracialmarriage is morally acceptable and should be legal, then there is really nomoral or legal precedent for denying same-sex marriage.

Perhaps the argument has merit, but it depends upon thepremise that race and gender are categorically the same – that there is nosubstantive difference between them in matters of love, marital covenant, and family. I’d like to show now that this is a falsepremise and that the parallel between race and gender is only superficial, ignoringthe profound categorical difference between the two.

For my purposes I’ll take the liberty of distilling the featuraldifferences between the races down to color, which seems uncontroversial sinceit is a common way of characterizing race. This should be satisfactory unless one holds to the notion that theraces are fundamentally different in some way other than superficial variationsin appearance. To disagree would seem toput one on the road of racism.

Let me begin with an analogy. If I have avariety of black & white bolts and nuts, which is more meaningful to thenature of nuts and bolts: pairing two of the same color or pairing a nut and abolt, no matter what the color? In otherwords, is it really comparable to say that mixing colors in my nut/bolt sets isequivalent to mixing what two objects I make a set out of, e.g., two bolts? We may certainly choose to make sets basedupon color, but this is only done at the expense of the basic design purpose andthe functional difference between nuts and bolts.

This analogy seeks toillustrate the categorical difference between appearance (color) and physicaldesign. Yes, gender is more complicatedthan nuts and bolts, and marriage is more than just fitting them together, butthe argument being made by same-sex advocates is specifically making a parallelbetween color and gender, so any meaningful physical differences between thegenders would seem to erode the argument.

There is indeed a fundamentaldifference between the sexes that transcends the superficiality of colordifferences – a difference upon which the very human species depends. If yourparents were black and white (or any other color combination) they could stillhave had you, but if they did not have nuts and bolts (so to speak), and hadnot employed them as designed, then that would have been the end of it (and of you). Of course, there is always adoption or artificialinsemination for those who insist on pairing “bolt” with “bolts” or “nut” with “nuts,”but these ultimately depend upon the intervention and services of the othergender. By contrast, interracial coupleslacked for nothing but acceptance.

Color is a functionally meaningless attributes,whereas there is no more fundamental differentiator among humans thangender. In fact, you cannot even claimto represent humanity without offering an example of each as was done with the PioneerPlaque. If race were indeedequivalent to gender, then they could just as well have chosen to depict twomen of different colors; or if gender were as inconsequential as race, thenthey could simply have presented a man on the plaque and left it at that.

To disagree with mycategorical distinction is to suggest that color is just as important to sexualdesire as gender. But who has heard aheterosexual man say that he would rather have another man of the same racethan a woman of a different race? Andthe criterion for homosexuality seems to be a preference for the same gender no matter the color. Gays themselves affirm that gender is the mainthing – it is what defineshomosexuality. I have never heard ofsuch a thing, but perhaps there is the odd fetishist out there who prefers someparticular race above all gender considerations, but I think it is safe to saythat gender is in a categorically different place from color. Scientists seem to agree with me, since they rankcolor considerations as the least important factor in defining species, genus,family, etc. Just image how absurd itwould be to claim that grouping cardinals, tomatoes, and rubies because ofcolor is just as meaningful as grouping them by animal, vegetable, and mineral.

The upshot is that race andgender are categorically different things, where the categories are ofdifferent consequence and relevance to the institution of marriage. Color is a mere cosmetic property whereasgender relates to a physical distinction that has always been the prerequisite ofmarital unions and is necessary for the families that result. Interracial marriage bans were primarilyabout maintaining racial purity, which presupposes the success of a traditionalmarriage that is based upon the foundation of gender distinctions. Traditional marriage is about bringing thetwo distinct genders into a committed, loving relationship resulting in anunparalleled union that is truly and fully human.

“Have you not read that He who created them from the beginning MADE THEMMALE AND FEMALE, and said, ‘FOR THIS REASON A MAN SHALL LEAVE HIS FATHER ANDMOTHER AND BE JOINED TO HIS WIFE, AND THE TWO SHALL BECOME ONE FLESH’?” (Jesus,quoting Genesis 2:24, from Matthew 19:4-5)

Was the Norway gunman, Anders Behring Breivik, a "fundamentalist Christian"?

2011-07-26T07:27:00.003-05:00

Many have been as quick to label Breivik a "fundamentalist Christan" as they have been to distance Islam from countless other acts of terrorism. Given that a "fundamentalist" is one who holds his particular religion and its founding documents to be accurate, authoritative and imperative (not just a "stupid sumbitch whose theological opinions are considerably to the right of mine"{1}), then one must wonder in what way Breivik qualifies. Most "fundamentalist" Christians would balk at his ideas that Christianity is merely a useful cultural banner, or that an atheistic cultural Christian is as good as a religious Christian, or that Jesus Christ would make any place at all for Odin and Norse mythology. I submit the following excerpts from Breivik's manifesto and ask you to consider whether these sound comparable to the sentiments of your average "Bible-thumping" Christian.

As long as there is separation between religion and state, those of us who don't have any religious belief should prefer religions which tend to create reasonable and prosperous communities. Our traditional Judeo-Christian religions have proven this capability.
If you have a personal relationship with Jesus Christ and God then you are a religious Christian. Myself and many more like me do not necessarily have a personal relationship with Jesus Christ and God. We do however believe in Christianity as a cultural, social, identity and moral platform. This makes us Christian.
Being a Christian can mean many things … That you believe in and want to protect Europe’s Christian cultural heritage.
So no, you don’t need to have a personal relationship with God or Jesus to fight for our Christian cultural heritage. It is enough that you are a Christian-agnostic or a Christian-atheist (an atheist who wants to preserve at least the basics of the European Christian cultural legacy (Christian holidays, Christmas and Easter)).
The cultural factors are more important than your personal relationship with God, Jesus or the holy spirit.
I have studied Norse Mythology and have a lot of respect for the Odinist traditions. I consider myself to be a Christian, but Odinism is still and will always be an important part of my culture and identity.
The Church I love doesn’t exist anymore because it has been deconstructed. However, I know that it can be reformed and that it again will embrace and propagate principles of strength, honour and self defense. Instead of abandoning the Church we will save it and re-create it as a nationalistic Church which will tolerate and allow (to a very large degree) native cultures/heritage/thought systems such as Odinism.
Choosing a local/national group would be counterproductive as all the groups I am familiar with are Odinist orientated and not Christian identity groups. It is essential that we choose a banner that has the potential to appeal towards central and southern Europeans as well.
Religion: Christian, Protestant but I support a reformation of Protestantism leading to it being absorbed by Catholicism. The typical “Protestant Labour Church” has to be deconstructed as its creation was an attempt to abolish the Church
Religious: I went from moderately to agnostic to moderately religious
As for the Church and science, it is essential that science takes an undisputed precedence over biblical teachings.
“Logic” and rationalist thought (a certain degree of national Darwinism) should be the fundament of our societies.
Regarding my personal relationship with God, I guess I’m not an excessively religious man. I am first and foremost a man of logic. However, I am a supporter of a monocultural Christian Europe.
If there is a God I will be allowed to enter heaven as all other martyrs for the Church in the past.

{1} Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: 2000), pg. 245.

A Question of Life

2010-05-12T19:32:00.003-05:00

This is part 3 of a 10 part series. The introduction can be found here, and the prior post can be found here.

Now, with a universe coming into existence that just happens to be fit for stars, planets, and complex chemistry, we have the question of how those biochemically complex systems (that we call life) came about. Even if an environment is perfectly suitable for habitation, it does not mean that it will automatically and necessarily produce the inhabitants. The arrival of such inhabitants is a separate marvel to be explained.

3. Abiogenesis
The problem of abiogenesis (the origin of the first lifeform) is one of the thorniest and most intractable issues in chemistry. Our increasing knowledge of microbiology and earth history has only added to the complexity of what needs to be explained. The simplest life is equivalent to modern bacteria, which is loaded with complex activity, information, and molecular "machines." The fossil record does not give evidence that there was a "prebiotic soup," or that there were any biological precursors to the first organisms, or that the atmosphere was the ideal mix to yield the necessary molecules, or that there was the expected long period of time between when the Earth could support life and when it actually appeared. Evolutionists regularly segregate the abiogenesis problem from the issue of evolution because (1) it is a challenge they'd rather not be saddled with, or (2) it is the most logical point for possible divine intervention. However, for the atheist there is no escaping this issue; they are obliged to seek out some purely natural explanation.
What hope for an explanation do you have? Are you satisfied to have problems like this that are unanswered, or even unanswerable?
In telling the tale of life on earth science writers often unconsciously use the word "miracle" for the appearance of the first organisms.
What kind of evidence is needed before we are to actually accept that something like this really is a miracle?

Randall starts us off by rejecting the idea that this is even a significant scientific challenge.

I don't know that [abiogenesis] is a thorny issue. Scientists see this as a fascinating issue; it's no thorn in anyone's side.

I think that any scientific issue that has been the victim of 150 years of unrequited investigation has the right to be called something like "thorny"; and if this issue does not qualify for such a label, then all of science must consist of simple and "fascinating" problems.

Faithlessgod thinks that I have overestimated the problem and that solutions are just around the corner.

Now is it the thorniest and most intractable problem, I don't think so. The fact that Pruett asks this is indicative that he really does not comprehend the nature of the work in this field. . . . it is not like we have no idea of the origins of life, indeed it is the opposite, we already have too many theories! . . . Of course we do not know which one is correct and all the current ones have some shortcomings . . . It most certainly is not at all intractable.

I do indeed comprehend the nature of the work in this field. It's not a naïve idea that everyone is just sitting around shrugging their shoulders that makes me call this an "intractable" problem; it's the knowledge of the issues relating to such work that leads me to use the term. The very fact that we have "too many theories" is a case in point. We only have competing theories because there is not a promising candidate bereft of difficulties. Faithlessgod admits that "all the current ones have some shortcomings," but a more accurate word than "shortcomings" would be "showstoppers."

I'll take the time here to review some of the technical roadblocks generally encountered by origin of life researchers. Later we’ll look at more specifics.

Life requires water, but the very presence of water prevents many of the chemical reactions required to build molecules necessary for life.
Certain conditions sufficient to form necessary molecules are just as likely to destroy them once created, like heat or UV rays.
The conditions sufficient to yield certain molecules are hostile to other necessary molecules. But those independent components of life must be able to coexist and survive before they can hope to form into units.
No matter how interesting a thing might be produced by chance, it is meaningless if it cannot reliably reproduce itself.
Even if a self-replicating molecule could manage to form by chance it is a quantum leap between that and the next theoretical level, which is something that can produce other molecules (like proteins) for its own functional entourage and also reproduce itself.
The simplest life that we know of or can even conceive of as a functional package is epitomized by interdependent systems that must come about as a group, with none of the parts serving any isolated function. There is a huge void between independent molecules (of any complexity) and life.
Any meager gains in theorizing how some part of a cell might come to form are continually outdistanced by the increase in knowledge of what it is that is to be explained.
Even where some mechanism might be theorized to form essential molecules, the statistical problem of fortuitous assembly of those molecules still remains, e.g., how you build a functional polypeptide chain (protein) from loose amino acids.
The time for chance to do its work is shrinking. By many estimates, life's appearance is now in the 3.8 to 3.5 billion year range, and this may only be because we have difficulty detecting it prior to these dates (note: Earth is alleged to be 4.5 billion years old, and would not have been suitable for life for hundreds of millions of years after that time).

Randall waxes nostalgic about some work from the 50's, which offered the first real experimental encouragement for origin of life researchers. She responds, "There are hundreds of theories of life's origins. The fact is, since the 50's, we've been improving on the Urey-Miller experiment." She then goes on to give a summary of the Urey-Miller experiment (extended by Carl Sagan), which produced some of the building blocks of life. She concludes by saying, "So we know it can happen."

First, I should point out that it is a long way between making a few building blocks of life to saying that you know that abiogenesis can happen! One might just as well claim that observing that stone can erode in block shapes means we know that the natural formation of Egyptian pyramids can happen by chance alone.

Second, let's go ahead and take a look at this experiment to get an idea of the specific kinds of problems associated with abiogenesis.

This experiment is dependent upon the assumption that early Earth's atmosphere was "reducing," and could thus form biologically significant molecules. That assumption is debatable (reference, reference, reference).
It was also important that the experimental environment be free of oxygen, which would be fatal to the formation of the desired molecules. Unfortunately, the date for the existence of free oxygen is being pushed back earlier and earlier in Earth's history, back to the time in which life was thought to have first appeared (reference, reference, reference).
The primary, significant molecular output of this experiment was amino acids, which are the building blocks of proteins. But only about half of the simpler amino acids used by life were produced.
All life is comprised of left-hand amino acids, but this experiment (and every other process known) produces both left and right-hand versions without discrimination. Peptide bonding has no preference for linking one form over the other, though advanced functionality depends upon them all being one handedness (known as homochirality).
Remember that this is a controlled experiment — intelligently designed, if you will. It contains a mechanism (a trap) to preserve the synthesized molecules from being destroyed once again by the two energy points and the water within the system. For this reason, the yield is certainly higher and more persistent than anything that might be found in nature.
Of the molecules that were produced and captured, the vast majority were biologically meaningless. The largest percentage was a tarry polymer, which would be evidenced in the geological record if amino acids in desirable quantities were produced by similar means on the early earth.
Given the limitations of the last few points, the overall yield of such an actual process in nature would have produced a very dilute prebiotic "soup." The thinner the broth, the less would be the chances for the right mix of molecules to find each other in order to combine. And remember, the combination of these molecules into meaningful systems is a matter of astronomical chance, which depend upon mass quantities to overcome statistical improbability. This is why oceans full of prebiotic molecules have long been the great hope and assumption of researchers in this field.

Francois doesn't deny that abiogenesis is a tough issue, only that it counts against materialism.

The fact that an issue is intractable does not indicate anything about that issue. It is only a statement about ourselves. We may not have enough evidence to get to the solution. There may even be limits on what human intelligence can comprehend, and a problem may remain intractable forever.

It's not what we don't know about chemistry that leads to the conclusion that this is a problem; it's what we do know. In fact, it was our past ignorance that led some to conclude that it wasn't a problem at all. Darwin's idea of life arising out of some warm little pond sounded plausible when it was thought that the cell was nothing more than a simple blob of protoplasm. And if you were to challenge scientists at that time for a solution they would be far more justified in saying, "Give us some time. We've only just begun to study the protoplasm to know what we're up against."

Today we understand much of the cell all the way down to the molecular makeup. In fact, we understand it and the problem so well that scientists no longer can fathom that the first organism would have been a complete cell; there supposedly must have been a series of proto-cellular entities leading up to even the simplest of the cells that we observe. (Francois affirms this modern adjustment to the theory when he says, "No abiogenesis hypothesis actually states that the simplest life is as complex as modern bacteria, and if it did, it wouldn’t be a very good hypothesis at all.") Never mind that the progression is totally speculative, it includes huge leaps, there is no evidence of such things, and that the existence of complete cells has been pushed so far back in history that the time for chance to build the cell by degree is vanishingly small.

For the committed materialist, this should be an answerable question in principle; chemistry is a fairly straightforward and empirical science. We should at least be able to show the chemical pathways to life even if we have difficulty in connecting those steps to actual geological history. If life indeed formed by natural means, then this has every hope of being experimentally repeatable. Unfortunately, decades of research have offered only a few token victories. I wonder how long we are to wait before applying any skepticism toward the materialist's story. 150 more years? 500 years?

Francois appears to think that we should wait forever; that it is unwarranted to ever plug God into any of our equations:

[This] is merely a modern iteration of the "god of the gaps" argument: "we can't figure out how abiogenesis actually happened, there is no hope to ever explain it, therefore God did it."

It is not as though science is annually filling gaps that Christians have tried to reserve for God. In fact, I'm struggling to think of any such gaps in recent history where God has been banished by science. On the contrary, modern science has revealed many "gaps" for which divine intervention is a neat and consistent fit. This issue of the origin of life and the need of a transcendent cause is a perennial one, which predates Christianity itself. The insistence that the cause is, nay, must be, a materialistic one is a historical newcomer (or at least was the minority report).

Darwin came along and offered us an alternate story. Why must we accept that story by default unless there is compelling reason to do so? Why should we accept "science" of the gaps in all matters? Richard Dawkins has famously said that "biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose." If this is so, then it seems reasonable to assume that biology really is designed for a purpose unless and until it is demonstrated not to be. Materialism not only denies the burden of proof but any need at all to prove its own case. Crying "god of the gaps" is a stall tactic that has begun to ring hollow. In its echo I hear only, "we don't know." And “we don’t know” surely does not qualify as proof.

Here is another interesting problem for those who demand a material, unguided cause for life. There have been some who have honestly proposed that life might have come by way of directed panspermia. But how could we ever know if life were seeded by extraterrestrials if we are forced to rule out causal agents? Certainly, that would be a "natural" cause for life (since aliens are part of nature), but detecting the signs (or need) of such an intervention will be ruled out just the same by the prevailing methodology of naturalism.

One thing on which all my critics were united is the belief that I have mistaken what the fossil record is capable of revealing about early life.

Francois says:

The assertion that "the fossil record" does not contain evidence of the origins of life [is extremely problematic]. How in the hell could there be? Fossils form from hard structures like bones or the imprint of organisms in soft soil.

Anath says:

And why exactly would one think the FOSSIL record would say anything about atmospheric conditions or non-organic matter? Only organic matter is fossilized, which means there would be NO fossils until after complex life was formed.

And Faithlessgod says:

Really, how on earth does the fossil record tell us anything about the prebiotic soup? In saying this Pruett displays a deep ignorance of this topic.

To avoid this confusion, perhaps I should have used "geological" in place of "fossil" record. However, it is not at all uncommon to see the word "fossil" actually used in relation to phenomena surrounding life rather than just the remains of life itself. Terms like "molecular fossil," "geochemical fossil," and "fossil biomarkers" can often be found in the scientific literature. Some specific examples of early formations that are considered fossils, but are not themselves the direct remains of life are stromatolites and oncolites.

Beyond the quibble over my use of the word "fossil," the larger issue is whether or not we can detect much evidence for the state of the early earth and the earliest life forms by looking at the geological strata. Judging by the numerous studies and scientific papers, the answer to that question seems to be "yes." Some of the biochemical signatures of life or early life conditions would include banded iron formations, carbon isotope data, and other chemical biomarkers.

Additionally, it is not just bones and hard body structures of life that may be found in the fossil record, but even simple cellular life. Such "microfossils" have helped us to date the appearance of life (in forms that still exists today) to a time shortly after our planet was stable, but have not yet given evidence for the existence of any precursors to life. For instance, if an ocean rich in amino and nucleic acids had existed, which are necessary precursors of life, this would have left large deposits of nitrogen-rich minerals (nitrogenous cokes). Such finds are conspicuously absent from the early geological record.

Anath offers up a popular solution, and one that I, frankly, find to be the least absurd:

My current favorite theory is the RNA world theory but I understand that it is not without its difficulties. The reason I like it primarily has to do with the fact that I can visualize how it might occur and it seems like a logical explanation of how complex life could arise through simple enzymes and inorganic material. However, I also freely admit that my knowledge of biochemistry is pretty weak

That is part of the problem with this whole issue: it is easy to devise and believe just-so stories about how life came into existence. It is when these stories are examined in detail that we find the deep technical problems. Some may easily visualize how we could ultimately travel to the stars by going faster and faster with advanced spacecraft, or using worm holes, but any amateur astronomer or physicist can burst that bubble with a little dose of reality.

Here's a quick rundown of some of the issues with the RNA-first theory:

The same kinds of problems as with amino acids apply here, e.g., being able to create all necessary components, low yields, assumptions about earth conditions, homochirality issues (left/right-handedness).
RNA is chemically fragile (especially so at higher temperatures) and difficult to synthesize abiotically.
The fortuitous assembly of a catalyzing RNA chain is improbable enough, much more so one which could copy itself.
The known range of RNA's catalytic activities is rather narrow. Self-replicating capabilities are unknown, though a "cross-catalytic system involving two RNA enzymes" has been engineered. But that only compounds the probability issue, since chance would now have to provide two complementary RNA ribozymes at the same time and place.
Even assuming nature could produce the various necessary molecules in the same locale and in sufficient quantities for chance to do its work, it is no guarantee that other chemicals would not be present to interfere with the assembly of RNA chains.
If an RNA world actually thrived for the millions of years it would surely take to yield the DNA world, then it is odd that nothing of it remains. We certainly have every other flavor of lower organism still on display in modern times, e.g., when the eukaryotes came on the scene, the prokaryotes did not perish.
It is still a monstrous, inexplicable leap from RNA to the interdependent DNA-RNA-protein system (among other functions) of cellular life.

In a 2006 article in Commentary magazine, David Berlinski wrote a thorough essay outlining the problems and critiquing the proposed solutions. Organic chemist, Robert Shapiro (himself a supporter of evolutionary theory), says of Berlinski's essay, "the case against an 'RNA world' is even stronger than the one Mr. Berlinski presents. Not only were cytosine and ribose unlikely to have been present in any quantity on the early earth, but the same can also be said of adenine and guanine. Moreover, no adequate explanation of the manner in which these parts (and others) could connect together spontaneously to form RNA has ever been presented."

Long is not to be discouraged by such pesky details. He hangs his hope on a general confidence in the power of nature:

Scientists are constantly discovering new forms of spontaneous order, and I fully expect that trend to continue.

I recently read a sneering article which imagined that it refuted intelligent design by pointing out the "spontaneous order" that can naturally arise in the world of free market economics. I am not at all clear on how a system of conscious agents working in willful synergy serves as a good analog for mindless chemical reactions. On the other hand, there are indeed things in nature that naturally form into orderly chemical arrangements, like crystals, carbon fullerenes, and nanotubes. The problem is that order alone is not enough. Neither is complexity. Life is made up of molecules that contain specified complexity — they are in a specific, meaningful order.

A large crystal is very orderly; however, it is nothing but repeating patterns that form up according to natural, chemical laws — a reliable and reproducible process. On the other hand, the proteins, RNA, and DNA molecules in life are not comprised of repeating patterns. They are also not comprised of patterns that arise due to any natural affinities that one molecule might have for another. They are comprised of unique, specific arrangements of molecules that confer functionality to the system. In the case of DNA it is like hardware and software. Perhaps some natural process could be found that would make DNA strands — the hardware — but the arrangement of the nucleotides upon that strand is the software that drives life, and there are no chemical or electrical laws that cause nucleotides to naturally form into information-laden arrangements.

The arrangement of DNA is often compared to language, so let me end with this analogy. Even if we could find some way of spilling alphabet cereal that caused the letters to form into strings and columns (all right-side up), it still would not mean that they would make meaningful words and sentences. There is a quantum leap difference between discovering order in nature and discovering information.

Several of the responders objected to my use of the word "miracle" to characterize the reaction of scientists to this problem.

Self has this to say:

I cannot help that some writers use the word "miracle" to describe something. Some scientists may, indeed, believe that a miracle did occur; but others do not and may have just used sloppy language to state their case.

DB0 goes further to accuse me of outright dishonesty:

When a Scientist says "Miracle," he may actually mean something with a probability so low, that it's amazing that it even happened. Of course if one considers the sheer size of the universe, the possibility of anything like that not happening is what starts to get low.

However to take a word in general, claim that science writers use it, while not providing a context, and then use that as some kind of subconscious belief is nothing more than equivocation and very intellectually dishonest.

I mention the word "miracle" because it is a testimony to the fact that the scientific community does indeed recognize the scope of the problem and the shortcomings of the proposed theories. This word is seldom employed by science commentators; there is a reason it is used in this case.

Due to the intentional brevity of my original article I was necessarily constrained from offering quotes and detailed context for my questions. It is unfortunate that this should be received as "intellectual dishonesty." My context is that the word "miracle" has been used too many times to count in scientific exhibits and documentaries to which I have been exposed, as well as its direct use by the scientific community. Since my reply is anything but brief, I'll now reference just a few such cases where the word is used by academics in relation to life.

One of the miracles of life, to my mind, is the accuracy with which DNA gets itself replicated in the cell. It has to be that unbelievably accurate, otherwise we'd all die out in no time. (Alexander Graham Cairns-Smith)
As far as we've looked, there's only one place in the entire universe where the miracle of life exists: our own planet Earth. (Carl Sagan)
An honest man, armed with all the knowledge available to us now, could only state that in some sense, the origin life appears at the moment to be almost a miracle, so many are the conditions which would have had to have been satisfied to get it going. (Francis Crick)
The de novo appearance of oligonucleotides [i.e., specifically sequenced RNA bases] on the primitive Earth would have been a near miracle. (Orgel and Joyce)

Even I am willing to forgive these materialists for their "sloppy language," but the fact that there exist such vacuums into which the word "miracle" can readily slip tells us something about the nature of the problem. I can't remember the last time I've heard a mathematician, geologist, or chemical engineer employ the word. It seems that those who study life and its origins must be a particularly "sloppy" group, or there is something else going on here.

Is the appearance of life a "miracle" simply because it is a hard problem to solve, or because it is a matter of vanishingly small probability that it should have appeared? I would argue, and I think I have argued, that it is both. Nobel Laureate Christian de Duve has called for "a rejection of improbabilities so incommensurably high that they can only be called miracles, phenomena that fall outside the scope of scientific inquiry." The chance appearance of functional DNA, RNA, proteins and other elaborate large molecules qualify as such.

Some of my responders think it doesn't really make a difference if this is a problem for materialism that may never be solved. Francois offers this challenge:

If we accept the statement that the origins of life is a "miracle," the question remains unchanged: how did it happen? Even if Christianity was true, the Creationist would be no closer to an answer.

Self adds the following:

I'm very comfortable saying that any given problem can be unanswered. I'm not sure why xians feel that everything they can possibly imagine must be answered and if our current capability doesn't permit an answer then we must posit some sort of god intervention.

The point is not that all questions must be answered. There are some questions that by their very nature may not be answerable because there is a categorical disconnect between the cause and effect, like what caused the Big Bang. This is especially true when involving causal agents. For instance, we may never know the motive for the JFK shooting (why it was done), but we certainly can know how he was killed.

In principle, we should be able to say whether or not abiogenesis is possible. If such processes are part of the flow of the present material, observable world, then there is every reason to think that we could discover them. There is no practical veil between the cause and effect except our current ignorance.

If one is suggesting a natural mechanism or law, then one has something particular which could be exhaustively tested. But how do we know that something happened by natural means unless we can demonstrate that nature is capable of producing such a thing? The devil is entirely in the details in this case. Philosophical materialism seems to get a pass on this, unlike other theories that must offer evidences before warranting conclusions.

On the other hand, if life is the product of divine intervention, then there is a break of continuity with nature that we cannot push past with our theories and experiments. We cannot say precisely how God did it unless He tells us Himself, i.e., did He create from scratch, did He shepherd molecules together with secondary causes, etc. It is more a historical question than an experimental one. The best we can do, in principle, is to observe the evidence that life appeared without precursor and despite insurmountable improbability. We could find the various fingerprints on nature, at particular historical points, but not know the precise means of the handling.

It is not necessary to know the exact means by which an action is taken in order for it to be reasonable to believe that it did happen. If I find a fort standing where I left a pile of wood the night before, then I may not know how it was assembled or who did it, but I will surely be justified in my skepticism toward theories of natural causes.

Christianity is happy to live with open questions since it believes that God has reserved some mysteries to Himself. But some questions are relevant to the debate over His very existence. Materialists assure us that there is no evidence or need of a creator in the biological realm due to alleged natural processes for which they will someday find concrete support. Is it so unusual that theists should require evidence of such a thing before accepting its validity?

Regarding my observation that the issues of evolution and abiogenesis are so commonly segregated, Faithlessgod says this:

Some evolutionary biologists do separate origins from the evolution of life but simply because their specialty is the evolution of life, abiogenesis is not what they study. . . . Pruett seeks to manufacture a problem or an issue which does not really exist here.

Anath adds the following:

"Evolutionists" segregate abiogenesis because abiogenesis is a separate field of study. The Theory of Evolution deals only with the events AFTER abiogenesis, and cannot explain the origin.

Admittedly, it is two parts of a larger puzzle. In fact, it must be, because evolution only acts upon what is already alive and capable of reproducing. This makes it all the more difficult for origin of life researchers, since the gulf to be bridged is between simple chemistry and a complex self-replicating assembly rather than just "simple" mutations on existing DNA molecules. As Lynn Margulis has said, "To go from a bacterium to people is less of a step than to go from a mixture of amino acids to a bacterium."

However, I find it curious that the separation is so often and quickly pointed out in debates I have seen and had myself. It seems less for the sake of technical precision than for the sake of insulating evolution from collateral damage. At a metaphysical level, one may compartmentalize these two issues for distinct explanations. For instance, one could be driven purely by nature and the other require some transcendent involvement. However, the atheist does not have this luxury; He is saddled with a purely natural explanation for both. If one cannot be explained, then the entire atheistic project is failed.

To my question of what kind of evidence is needed to prove that the appearance of life is, in fact, miraculous, Anath replies:

A crocoduck. Something COMPLETELY impossible and unexplainable. Life rising from non-life is NOT a crocoduck. It is unusual and potentially quite improbable, but it is not unexplainable.

How can one dogmatically assert that abiogenesis is not unexplainable when it has for so long defied explanation and suffers all the practical roadblocks that I have presented here and more? This is merely the expression of a dogmatic faith in materialism.

Life from non-life cannot be like a crocoduck, in principle. As affirmed by you previously, evolution, which a crocoduck would supposedly confound, is a physically distinct issue from abiogenesis. Even if a crocoduck were discovered it would, at most, refute the theory of evolution. That is, unless you want to embrace the idea that they are indeed bound as one issue.

It seems to me that there is nothing analogous to this for abiogenesis that could be discovered, or that is not already known. The indisputable data we have is that it is simple chemistry on the one side and complete cellular life on the other. Discoveries of “crocoducks” in between the two might only serve to give confidence in the power of material causes, not refute it.

As it happens, neither the ongoing problems with each theory of essential molecule formation nor the increased understanding of the complexity of what is to be explained have served in any way to dampen the spirits of the committed materialists (with notable exceptions). What more could be discovered to disprove the materialists creation story? It is the incorrigible nature of the lack of supporting evidence for it that has any hope to stand as proof against it. But if “we’re looking into it” may eternally serve as justification for materialism, then any statistical improbability may be put into play.

As to the fate of evolution upon finding a "crocoduck," I am confident that belief in it would soldier on. The model would merely see a descriptive adjustment or make yet another place on its shelf for a future explanation. I have seen it happen many times before. The foundations may shudder and crack, but no one ever seems to question whether they have built their temple upon the wrong frame.

Some examples of “crocoducks”:

Biological classifications based on various markers (e.g., morphology and specific gene sequences) often do not align as expected. (reference, reference)
The meager accumulated evidence (since Darwin’s time) for the predicted gradualism as witnessed by 1) events like the Cambrian explosion, and 2) the discovery that the fossil record is most often characterized by patterns of stasis and punctuation.
The discovery that the fundamental cellular domains of bacteria, archaea, and eukaryotes are found not to fit into the classical tree of life model (i.e., there is no clear line of descent either before them or between them). (reference, reference)
The discovery that the cell not only contains unfathomably complex molecules, but information-laden molecules.
The discovery that cells consist predominately of molecular machines, many of which are analogous to macro-scale human-designed machines. (reference, reference)
Even the genetic approximate of a "crocoduck" does nothing to phase the theory.

After effectively deflating the various theories of abiogenesis in his book, Origins: A Skeptic’s Guide to the Creation of Life in the Universe, Robert Shapiro makes the following interesting statement.

Some future day may yet arrive when all reasonable chemical experiments run to discover a probable origin of life have failed unequivocally. Further, new geological evidence may yet indicate a sudden appearance of life on the earth. Finally, we may have explored the universe and found no trace of life, or processes leading to life, elsewhere. Some scientists might choose to turn to religion for an answer. Others, however, myself included, would attempt to sort out the surviving less probable scientific explanations in the hope of selecting one that was still more likely than the remainder.

The materialist is free to continue seeking his alternative explanations, but it is unfair to demand that all explanations must always be "natural" even if they elude us for eternity. This is tantamount to saying that atheism wins, game over, and no further issues or anomalies will ever be considered as strikes against it. This seems a presumptive stance in a historically god-soaked world that, to use Dawkins' language, is full of "complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose." Perhaps it appears that way because it actually turns out to be true. It is certainly consistent with the story that theism has been telling all along. Scientists may determine among themselves that all explanations must be by way of mindless, natural causes, but I am less interested in following the doctrines of "science," as defined by its secular high priests, than I am in discovering truth.

A Question of Order

2009-05-12T13:00:00.000-05:00

This is part 2 of a 10 part series. The introduction can be found here, and the prior post can be found here. I will add two more blog responders at this point in the discussion. They are from:

The next question relates to the kind of universe that was produced by the creation event discussed in the first question.

2. Order
The past several decades have added profoundly to our knowledge of chemistry, physics, and cosmology. It has become increasingly clear that we live in a universe finely tuned for the support of complex life. This fact is so universally acknowledged that even secular scientists have coined the term "Anthropic Principle" to describe it.
How is it that we live in such an exquisitely fine-tuned universe? Even assuming that the universe could have popped out of nothingness, why should it have been such an orderly and hospitable one? Is there a scientific, testable answer for this question that does not simply appeal to imagination?

Faithlessgod offers this objection to the very idea of fine-tuning:

I disagree with Pruett's supposition here, it certainly does not look like an orderly and hospitable universe, since as far we can tell the range where the type of life we know could occur and survive is an incredibly minute portion of the universe.

Randall says it this way:

I don't think the universe is fine tuned for life at all. As far as we know there is only one planet in this one little solar system that can sustain complex life.... most of what's out there is space.

I wouldn't expect to have to go into great detail on this, since it has already been so heavily addressed by cosmologists. Those like Barrow & Tipler, Rees, Davies, Susskind, Bostrom, Smolin, and others have written volumes on this issue. The fine-tuning of the laws of physics (or Anthropic Coincidences) that permit the support of life in the universe is largely undisputed data. It is the conclusions drawn from that data where the true controversy lies.

Since there appears to be a misunderstanding of what I mean by finely tuned for the support of complex life I'll try to clarify the point. I do not simply mean that our own little planet happens to be hospitable to us, and I don't mean that the whole universe is a tropical paradise. I mean that the very laws of physics make things like galaxies, stars, and warm little planets possible at all.

Just two examples:

1) The electrostatic force repels protons (each being positively charged) while the strong nuclear force binds them together. The strong force is stronger than the electrostatic force, but only at short range, while the electrostatic force dominates at larger range. So, in order for nuclear fusion to occur, as it does in stars, there must be a certain amount of energy applied to propel one proton against another in order for it to overcome the electrostatic charge and stick via the strong force. I liken it to putting superglue on two plus-ended magnets and then forcing them together.

Since the universe originally consisted almost entirely of hydrogen, we would not have the abundance of heavier elements if it were not for the ability of stars to fuse atoms (and then spew them out in explosions). But if the strong force were too strong or the electrostatic force too weak, then fusion would be too efficient. Matter would more easily ignite and we would have fewer planets and more stars. Stars would burn out much faster and the lighter elements (being just as desirable as the heavier ones for molecule building) would be quickly depleted. Conversely, if the strong force were weaker or the electrostatic force stronger, then we would have fewer and larger stars, and less of the heavy elements. In fact, if fusion were too inefficient, then the large masses that might otherwise form stars could actually collapse into black holes before they would even have a chance to ignite.

2) The quantity, expansion rate, and distribution of the material of the primordial universe all have a part in determining the nature of its resulting cosmology. If there were not such a mysteriously large imbalance of matter over anti-matter, we would not have the material to form cosmological structures. Various factors seem to work together (e.g., inflation rate and dark energy) to determine the expansion of the universe. Minute differences in these factors would affect a number of things, including whether the universe recollapsed upon itself before anything interesting could be produced or whether it expanded too rapidly for the material to coalesce into structures like galaxies and stars.

It seems to me that a universe that survives its genesis, forms complex structures, and supports the generation and assembly of complex, diverse molecules is something we might even objectively value over a hiccup universe, or one that was filled with nothing but diffuse hydrogen gas. And even though there are more empty, hot, or cold places in the overall universe than there are just-right stars and just-right planets, it takes this kind of universe to be able to support such things.

If I were to accept the substance of Faithlessgod and Randall's complaint, I might just as well say that even our planet is not so great for humans because of all the hot, frigid, or wet places it contains. All these are either necessary for a life-sustaining climate/ecology (like an abundance of water) or they are simply byproducts of physics and geometry (like cold polar regions).

Tremblay takes issue with the idea that the Anthropic Principle has any relationship to the fine-tuning point that I raise:

LifeWay apparently does not know what the anthropic principle actually is. The anthropic principle does not support the fine-tuning argument at all. What the anthropic principle actually says is this: we live in a universe compatible with our own existence.

Yes, "LifeWay" understands the Anthropic Principle and its various permutations, such as the Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP), which will be discussed later. The very fact that there are even flavors of it is witness to my point that there is something of interest being discussed in the scientific community.

Of course the materialist would think the fine-tuning question does not support the role of a designer (else he would not be a materialist), but the Anthropic Principle is certainly born of the observation that the Anthropic Coincidences are necessary to the existence of observers. If the Anthropic Principle were nothing more than a tautological statement, like saying that coldwater fish are found in cold water, then I would not expect to find so many physicists and cosmologists writing books for the purpose of wrestling with its implications. Why try to explain away or rationalize an entirely meaningless observation?

A common rejoinder I've heard is that we shouldn't be so presumptuous as to think the universe is designed for us; it might have been some different way that would result in another species asking the same question. Self offers a form of this argument as follows:

To say the universe was fine-tuned just to permit life is backwards; what is more nearly true is that life is fine tuned to exist in the universe as it is today.

Anath makes the point this way:

It's like claiming your life is somehow miraculous and special because YOU were the specific result of your parent's copulation. Had a different sperm reached the egg first, or had something interrupted your parents before transfer that particular time, a totally different person would be saying the EXACT same thing.

It should be understood that I am not simply arguing for an egocentric view that the universe is fine tuned for humans or even for "life as we know it." If some member of a nebular squid species were to ask the same question, then I would grant his right to do so, because the Anthropic Coincidences would apply equally to him. I am arguing that the laws of physics are fine tuned for the support of life of any kind, which depends upon things like a universe, diverse materials, and the ability to form complex chemical structures.

Since there are so many other ways that the universe might have been that would not support life, stars, or even a persistent universe, and if there is anything noteworthy about complex, sentient, biochemical systems, then it seems that the least we can say is that this kind of universe is remarkably improbable.

At this point I have often heard the comment made: "Well, you wouldn't be here to wonder about it if it hadn't happened!" This is a hackneyed paraphrase of the Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP). To all my responders credit, I didn't see this voiced (in so many words). However, I think it is worth addressing, which I will do by simply paraphrasing the Swinburne/Leslie parable:

Suppose you are dragged before a firing squad. There are 100 trained marksmen all intent upon your demise. The command to fire is given. The guns blaze, but a moment later you discover that you are still alive, untouched by the bullets. You laugh out loud and marvel at your good fortune, but an annoyed captain of the guard simply growls at you, "There's nothing remarkable here, fool. You wouldn't be alive to remark about it if hadn't happened." And then he executes you himself with his own sword.

Even if the captain had killed you before you could ask the question, "How did I survive that?" it still would be legitimate for some observer to ask it. The WAP seeks to negate the observer's question by depending upon his existence. If he exists, he can't ask the question because he wouldn't be here to ask it otherwise. If he weren't here, then there's no one to ask questions so the problem is forfeit. It seems a hollow victory for the materialist to win on a technicality, but surely it is a more remarkable thing to have observers who ask questions than to have cold, dead space. I guess it is like a 3D stereogram. You either see it or you don't.

Faithlessgod goes on to raise a good point about other possible universes:

We have no idea what type of universes could occur with different constants, only that they would be radically different from ours, but this tells us nothing about whether the equivalent of life is more or less likely in those other universes.

The Anthropic Coincidences applicable to this universe suggest that of the kind of laws and materials that we are dealt, this particular arrangement adds up to something special. Perhaps some other dramatically different mix could add up to a recipe for success, but that would be another island in a vast sea of improbability as well.

To use a card analogy, which one of my responders employed, our universe's order may be compared to throwing a deck of cards up in the air and having them all come down in neat, numerically sequenced stacks by suit. There are certainly a large number of other ordered ways that the cards may come down, like numerically sequenced stacks of four-of-a-kinds, but they would be no less probable than the nearly infinite number of other chaotic arrangements that might result.

And to suggest that other radically different universes might help us here is to suggest that there might be a way that any old arrangement of its materials would yield order. This is like saying that in another universe made of dice instead of cards, that most rolls of the dice will come up all sixes, or in stacks. Perhaps there could be some universe where the laws are so rudimentary that there's no possible "variation," or any variation would yield the same assembly capability, but even that kind of universe surely would be less probable than all the other more dependent kinds, like the one we happen to occupy.

Interestingly, Tremblay makes an objection that would call this into question:

Implicit in this argument is the belief that the parameters of the universe could take any quantity. . . .
Just because we can imagine the gravitational constant being, not 6.674×10^-11 m^3 kg^-1 s^-2, but rather 6.252×10^-11 m^3 kg^-1 s^-2, does not mean that it can actually be 6.252×10^-11 m^3 kg^-1 s^-2. Just because we can write it down and make calculations based on it doesn’t mean it’s actually possible.

This is certainly a valid argument, but why think that the values could not be different? What meta-laws exist to constrain the amount of matter over anti-matter or the expansion dynamics entailed in the Big Bang? Even if the laws and events inherent in this universe where somehow necessary or predetermined, then this only pushes the question back a level. Why should the "necessary" laws be so remarkably configured? Why would the brute laws of physics have to favor order? How very fortuitous!

A popular theory among cosmologists involves the idea that we exist in just one of a number of bubble universes. While I will not attempt to psychoanalyze the motivation for such a theory, I will note that I have usually seen the theory employed as a response to the Anthropic Coincidences. As the argument goes, we just happen to live in a jackpot universe that is just right for life. Unlike Tremblay, these cosmologists don't seem to have a problem with the idea that the universe-barfing device may have different settings. Nor do they seem to agree with those who argue that there just isn't anything special to be explained or they would not make appeal to infinite universes for that explanation.

Tremblay closes with this conversation stopper:

As for the question "why should [the universe] have been such an orderly and hospitable one?", it should be obvious that the use of "why" presupposes teleology, and therefore a Creator. So this question is entirely circular. There is no purpose for the universe to be the way it is, any more than there is a purpose for the sky to be blue instead of green. We can explain how it came to be hospitable, or how the sky gets to be blue, but there is no "why."

Perhaps we should break the news to those like cosmologists Bernard Carr and Martin Rees, who once stated in the journal Nature, "Nature does exhibit remarkable coincidences and these do warrant some explanation." Perhaps we should simply think of them as philosophically naïve to require explanations, but it seems to me that science is all about the "whys."

Tremblay suggests that explanations should extend only to the reason for the physical condition (like, the sky is blue because of short wavelength light diffusion), but not to any deeper meanings (like, why should physics have to work in such a way that it yields lovely blue skies?). Perhaps this is a good rule of thumb for science proper, but it is a castration of the human spirit, which, for some strange reason always wants to go the extra mile in its understanding.

Materialists would apparently say to us, "Just get over it! There's no meaning to this or any other aspect of existence. Everything just is what it is." For my point in question, this means that even if it actually is the case that the universe is fine tuned for complex life (of any kind), and it is a genuine statistical improbability, then we are disqualified from having stray thoughts of wonder because they presume something to wonder about that does not exist: teleology (purpose/design/meaning).

It is true that this, and many of my questions, depend upon teleology. In fact, teleology is part-and-parcel to the worldview I am advocating. But surely teleology cannot be ruled out a priori any more than we could meaninglessness. I might just as well claim, "the atheist can't say the universe just is what it is, because that's a circular argument: it presupposes that there actually is no meaning to the universe." How, then, is one to demonstrate the need of a designer if one cannot point to anything as evidence merely and precisely because it supports his thesis!

A Question of Cosmic Origins

2009-04-27T20:45:00.001-05:00

This is part 1 of a 10 part series. The introduction can be found here.

The first topic relates to the great historical question of origins and trades on concepts found in the Cosmological Argument for the existence of God.

1. Creation
The overwhelming consensus of science is that the entire cosmos (including space and time) came into existence at a finite point in the past. All of our observations, equations, and physical laws testify to a point of origin for this universe.
In light of the troubling evidence for a beginning, and that we may not even be able to find a natural cause in principle, what explanation is given to the questions, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" and "Where did it all come from?"

Francois Tremblay proceeds to take issue primarily with the logical composition of my question.

Asking "why is there something rather than nothing" is a fallacious question since "is" implies existence and "nothing" implies non-existence. It's a question that Christians like to ask because it's by definition unanswerable, not because atheists have no ready answer but because the question itself is contradictory.

Roderick T. Long further elaborates the objection.

It makes no sense to ask for an explanation of the whole of existence – whether that whole includes a God or not. Any attempt to explain existence has to appeal either to something in existence or something not in existence. If it appeals to something that’s already in existence (be it God, quarks, or whatever you like), then you’re not explaining all of existence; and if it appeals to something not in existence, then you’ve offered no explanation at all.

My point was not to ask a trick question, but to seek a reaction to the fact that this universe gives evidence of a beginning. When I speak of something and nothing I am speaking from the materialist's perspective. Of course, as a theist, I believe that "something" has always existed; I have a "first cause" or "prime mover."

Long basically understands this, as he continues:

The concept of explanation applies only within the realm of existence; that’s why both theists and atheists agree that chains of explanation stop with something whose existence has (and needs) no explanation beyond itself – whether it’s God or energy.

This is a good observation, and actually is the kernel of the response I would make to George Self when he asks, "If a xian wants to take the beginnings back to some god that made it all, I would ask, 'but who made god?'" Something has to eternally exist or there would be nothing right now. Something cannot come from nothing. We suggest that this something is God, whose very definition includes the idea of self-existence and eternality. If the atheist will not allow an eternal God to stand as an acceptable first cause, even in theory, then the atheist has no grounds to lean upon an eternal universe (or energy) either.

The problem that I point out with this question is that even if it might be conceptually possible to have an eternal universe (which I could argue against as well), by all indications this one had a beginning. I am not asking for an explanation for the universe, which might lead to the counter-question of why there is a God; I am asking the atheist what he (or she) does with the evidence for an origin to the universe.

Alison Randall takes (in my mind) the sensible position that "nothing does not and has never existed . . . because you can't have anything come into existence from nothing."{1} This serves to underscore the problem of our current observation that all space, time, matter, and energy burst onto the scene at a finite point in history. If it can ever be said to have come from "nothing," or no prior state can be identified, then materialism will have hit a dead end in one of its most important avenues of justification.

Randall then goes on to postulate that "everything always existed . . . as a dense singularity of energy-matter." Here's where we could get into an arcane scientific discussion and I could ask things like, how "infinitely small" (as the singularity is often described) is distinguishable from "nothing," how something natural could exist prior to the space-time continuum in which existence is defined, and why a gravity well isn't happy eternally staying that way.

But I don't need to go here, because there is not even agreement on the idea of the origin of the singularity. For instance, inflationary theory, which is the prevailing big bang model, says that the singularity was generated by something like a "quantum fluctuation." Membrane theory doesn't even have a place for a singularity, and one of its advantages is the very fact that it doesn't have to wrestle with the difficulties associated with one. As this physics article explains about one of the big bang models that require a singularity,

The problem with the Big Crunch/Big Bang model is that the mathematical laws of classical general relativity do not work at a singularity. And if scientists cannot mathematically understand the singularity, they cannot, in theory, fully understand the geometry of spacetime, either before the Big Crunch or after the Big Bang.

Randall continues her response:

I don't pretend to know a lot about it, but [the Singularity/Big Bang model] seems to be one of the best explanations we have right now, along with other ideas . . . like string theory, multiverses, and such.

Umm, which theory was it that is the "best explanation?" She lists these other things because there is NOT an explanation right now, only theories, else we wouldn't have other contenders vying for dominance. I think Randall knows this, but she adds this parting shot to show where her preferences lie:

The theories that are made from observable evidence are a lot more juicy and intriguing than ancient mythologies.

Unfortunately, the only observations and evidences we have say nothing more than that there was a beginning to this universe. There are not so much theories made from observable evidence as there are only theories seeking evidences as to how that happened by "natural" means. This is exactly why there is so much excitement over things like the Large Hadron Collider and Planck satellite, which are hoped to offer supporting evidence for one or another idea (though how we can prove the nature and events of something "outside" this universe using observations born of the laws contained within it I do not know).{2}

The bottom line is that there's really not an explanation for the origin of the universe, and naturalistic explanations are simply occasions to engage in sci-fi narratives. As Leon Lederman (Nobel Prize winner in physics) says in his book, The God Particle:

A story logically begins at the beginning. But this story is about the universe and unfortunately there are no data for the very beginning. None, zero! We don't know anything about the universe until it reaches the mature age of a billionth of a trillionth of a second — that is, some very short time after the creation in the Big Bang. When you read or hear anything about the birth of the universe, someone is making it up. We are in the realm of philosophy.

This is where the discussion must ultimately end. As George Self concludes, "I'm quite comfortable saying, 'I don't know, and neither does anyone else.'" And one blog commenter summed up the responses by saying, "I don't know, but science is looking into it."

Fine. That is an honest and somewhat acceptable answer. Every worldview must be permitted some mysteries. But if this is a satisfactory response for all the intractable problems of materialism, then atheists shall forever be free to think themselves rational, since science will always be "looking into it." However, I doubt they would be so kind as to allow us to reply to their tough questions with, "I don't know, but our theologians are looking into it."

Without overstating my case, it seems reasonable to say that evidence for a beginning to this universe is at least problematic for materialistic atheism. And even while atheists can avoid a proof for God by eternally leaving the question open to scientific investigation, we should be able to say that a cosmic origin is at least consistent with theism, particularly classical Christian theism.{3}

After offering his shrug to the problem of cosmic origins, Self adds this addendum:

Even if I wanted to assume that time had a beginning at some point in the distant past that still does not prove that the xian "god" created that point. Perhaps the cosmos was started by a unicorn or a magic genie.

Unfortunately, this does not at all avoid the problem for the atheist. A magic genie or unicorn with the power and knowledge to create our universe would still be a god, for all practical purposes. What Self does do is touch on the fact that the Cosmological Argument is limited in the work that it can accomplish. Even if the atheist were to concede the need of a creator, it is another thing to demonstrate the nature of that creator. For this reason, the Cosmological Argument can never be more than an argument for theism in general{4}, and must work in conjunction with other arguments to arrive at the God of Christian theism.

~~~~~~~~~~~~

Notes:

There are some who disagree with Alison and are bold enough to accept the premise that there once indeed was nothing. Dr. Peter W. Atkins (himself an atheist) holds that the "nothing" managed to split itself into the positively and negatively charged universe that we enjoy today. Tada! The Force stays in balance, since "nothing" has yielded a universe with a net charge of nothing, and may return to such in the future. It's all virtual nothingness with no gross explanation required. It all sounds rather artful as a high level theory, but explaining exactly how "nothing" managed to send itself on an extended holiday is where it begins to unravel.
I might conversely say to Randall, "Theories with a long philosophical pedigree are a lot more juicy and intriguing than ideas from sci-fi movies."
You can expect this to emerge as a recurring theme in each of my questions.
In fact, cosmological arguments have been in play since long before Christianity was founded.

Part 2 can be found here.

10 Replies to the Atheists

2009-04-27T20:00:00.001-05:00

A while back I wrote the article, 10 Questions for the Atheist. It has elicited a number of responses since that time, particularly on some recent blogs. I thought it might be time to do a follow-up series to deal with replies to each "question" in my article. I'll proceed by taking each question in turn — one per post — and addressing some of the responses I've encountered.

I began the article with this statement:

Atheism, by definition, holds that there is no God and nothing beyond this world of matter, space, time, and energy. Consistent with this viewpoint come a large number of necessary truths and the problems relating to them. Atheism is not made rational merely by the rejection of the evidences for God; it has its own wares to sell and difficulties to overcome. Here is a sampling of the kinds of issues which atheism is obliged to address.

By this, I mean to point out that atheism is more than just a rejection of the God proposition. It is its own proposition. It makes its own worldview claim and is saddled with certain questions and mysteries that still emerge and must be answered in a way consistent with atheism. Theists are often charged with having a too-easy answer for life's mysteries: Goddunnit. Questions of origins, design, morality, and consciousness may be "conveniently" dispatched by appeal to the Deity, but they are left on the table for the atheist to address. And if the atheist has no solid answer to life's most compelling and fundamental questions, then exactly what is it that justifies atheism as a rational contender? Why believe atheism to be true apart from compelling answers to such questions? Why not be agnostic at most?

One atheist responds to my opening statement as follows:

We already have another word for that, it’s called "materialist." Atheists are not beholden to hold to any positive claim about whether there is something "beyond this world" (whatever that means exactly). There are atheists who believe in supernatural things like souls, ghosts, weird energies, and so on. So we have to assume that [the] whole set of questions here is not actually about atheists at all, but rather about materialists. (Francois Tremblay)

I will have to agree that "materialist" is probably a better word for what I describe here, and that this represents a subset of the "atheist" population. However, it is the largest subset, the most vocal, and in my mind it is what most reasonably follows from the concept of atheism. I am not, here, concerned with atheists who make room for spiritual elements, and apparently Tremblay does indeed know what I mean by "beyond this world," since he continues on to list several fine examples of otherworldly things, like souls and ghosts. It seems to me that if one is comfortable with the idea of immaterial beings, then there isn't any principled difficulty with the idea that one Being might be greater than us and precede even the material world that we inhabit.

Next I'll move on to my "questions." Each one is presented with a bit of contextual setup, followed by one or more actual questions to the atheist that relate to the topic. The setup is unfortunately brief, of necessity, but is itself food for discussion.

The responses I'll be addressing come from the following persons:

This is the introduction to a 10 part series. Part one can be found here.

Change We Can Be Leavin'

2009-01-23T12:52:00.001-06:00

A coworker of mine (I'll call him "Jack") had a conversation with a family member ("Joe") over Christmas that went something like this.

Joe: "Who did you vote for?"
Jack: "McCain."
Joe: "Oh... You don't like Obama?"
Jack: "Why do you like him?"
Joe: "Because he's for change."
Jack: "Change, huh? Can you give me something specific that he wants to change, and can you tell me what he wants to change it to?"
[crickets chirping]

Now, I don't mean to suggest that an informed Democrat (or just Obama supporter) cannot give a meaningful reply to such a question, but I have indeed seen this kind of sweeping ignorance displayed — sometimes from high-level media or political figures — about the man Obama and his policy initiatives. I think also that there was an intentional campaign waged to ride the wave of excitement that optimistic, yet nebulous, slogans like "change" and "hope" could provide. If one does not define such words, then unsatisfied people are free to inject them with whatever meaning best suites their hopes and dreams. Obama proved himself to be a master of generalities in his campaign, and people have always been restless with their lot and disappointed with their leaders. There is no human utopia, though we ever seek to achieve it through "change." It was a winning strategy and Obama won fairly with it, though I like to think that our leadership should be called to a higher purpose than simply employing the best campaign tactics that money can buy.

Now, "change" is a fine word in the right circumstances if we are clear what this means. But at the Obama rallies the word itself seemed to carry the day, and the Democrats rarely condescended to get more specific than to imply that it was to be a departure from "the failed policies of the Bush administration." This is not enough. As my preteen son observed, "Gee, I guess communism would be a 'change,' wouldn't it?" As a sunny day may change to a rain shower, and a rain shower may change to a thunderstorm, "change" does not always equal "better."

Perhaps the response may be given that we are presently in a thunderstorm, and so any change is likely to be for the better. Well, that may be so, and that may be debated, but it suggests to me another observation I'd like to make here (and I'd like to credit Dennis Prager for the way he clarified this for me).

I have heard many of those on the Left, who most enthusiastically carry the banner of "change," complain that they are unjustly charged with being unpatriotic. "Patriotism can entail criticizing your country and its leadership," they will often say. First I will observe that I have heard their complaints far more than I have heard the charge actually leveled. In any case, let's think for a minute about what these champions of change are trying to say about their country.

Patriotism is generally defined as the love and devotion of one's country. But what does it mean for that love if one desires to "change" his country? In Obama's case, we're not talking about a little change here or there. As he has said numerous times, he wants to "fundamentally change America." But do you "change" what you claim to love? Imagine turning to your spouse and saying, "Honey, I sure do love you. However, I would be happier if I could fundamentally change you." If you try this, be sure to duck, and especially don't mention the gorgeous celebrity you'd like to change them into.

Do we really change what we love? Perhaps we might "fix," "heal," or "improve" what we love, but "fundamentally change" it? This sounds like someone who loves his country only because it is his country (like a college student roots loudest for the sports team of his own school), and then simply desires it to be something that suits his own imagination.

But it's not enough to want to change the current course of the country; the Left wants to go so far as to change its history and the vision of its founders as well. (You know, the founding fathers were all secular {or Deists at worst}, same-sex marriage and abortion are rights consistent with the spirit of the Constitution, and our finest hours were inspired by liberal-left ideals.) This way they can both say they want change, but also claim to be restoring the country to its original state.

Brilliant! Well played American Left, you've won the White House! If this were just an episode of the reality game show Survivor my hat would be off to you. But if the end one hopes to achieve has moral gravity, then the means one uses to achieve it should be morally prudent. It would be refreshing if we could be up front about our intentions and clear in our language so that the people could make truly informed decisions about its leadership.

I would think better of the Left if they'd just come right out and say they don't much like the country and the prudish, outdated sensibilities of its founders, and they want to craft a new one to suit their vision. This is very much the message they relay when they're not busy insisting otherwise. The problem is, that kind of honesty would alienate the majority of the voting public, who also rather like this country and are so optimistic as to imagine that ill-defined words like "change" can mean something good but fairly moderate, not really fundamental. And we mustn't frighten the voters.

So, Mr. President, if you are really serious about this business of fundamental change for the country, patterned after a Leftist ideology (which we have seen hints of all along), I suggest you slip it to those who believe in you slow and subtly. Otherwise a voting majority may wake up and conclude that yours is the kind of change we can be leavin'.

Ghost in the Machine

2008-10-08T13:04:00.002-05:00

Sobbing, shaking and knowing death was imminent, [Nancy Reagan] held her husband's hand about 1 p.m. Saturday as he inhaled deeply and opened his eyes for the first time in five days.
While most thought Alzheimer's disease had robbed former President Reagan of all his memory, the last look he gave his wife was one of deep acknowledgment, [his daughter Patty Davis] writes for People magazine.
"At the last moment when his breathing told us this was it, he opened his eyes and looked straight at my mother. Eyes that had not opened for days did, and they weren't chalky or vague," Davis recalls. "They were clear and blue and full of life. If a death can be lovely, his was."
Davis and her brother Ron were standing next to their father's bed when the astonishing interchange between their parents took place.
(Source. Other sources.)

After Ronald Reagan's death I watched a television interview where Ron Jr. recounted this story himself. He was very emotional as he spoke, and it was clear that he believed that something profound had transpired. His father had apparently burst forth through a broken body to bid farewell to his beloved wife. This kind of story is not unique in my experience, but what makes it interesting is whom it is that is telling it here and how it fits into his overall view of human nature.

Ron Reagan Jr. is a self-described atheist. Consistent with, and common to, atheism is the philosophy of materialism. Materialism is the idea that all things that exist can be explained in purely material terms, and there are no entities such as gods, angels, or human souls which exist beyond the boundaries of the physical universe. This means that the "mind" is simply an emergent property of the physical brain — without a brain, there is no mind. It also implies that a malfunctioning brain will yield a malfunctioning mind. Given a materialistic outlook, how does an atheist like Ron Reagan process his father's last moments of life?

Alzheimer's is a degenerative disease, which affects the brain cells and the connections between them. A brain at the fatal end of this illness is a devastated organ from which an identifiable "mind" should not hope to emerge. In the case of Ronald Reagan, he had not even opened his eyes in days, and had not been alert for years before this. From where, then, does a clear-eyed Reagan suddenly surface?

At the very moment when his body was so far gone as to yield to death, Ronald Reagan became animated — himself again. If a body is broken, why does it not naturally and successively proceed from almost dead to actually dead? If we flatten the tires on a car, drain its oil, and pull half it spark plugs, do we expect it to have one last burst of blazing performance before it finally sputters and dies?

Perhaps it is like the runner, who after exhausting all resources at the end of the race finds in himself one final burst of speed for the finish line. But this is not an accurate analogy, because the racer does indeed have something left to give. He is simply very low on carbohydrates and is inhibited by the pain of lactic acid buildup in his muscles, which makes him pace himself to the end. In that last burst, he is drawing on the remainder of his resources but could not hope to continue long in this. To be an accurate analogy, we would first have to sever some tendons and break some bones. No matter how brave or determined one is he cannot get far or fast on broken legs.

The other problem with this analogy is that a runner can will to briefly overcome his fatigue. But here we are speaking about the very thing from which something like a will is supposed to originate: the brain. In the materialist paradigm there could be no Ronald "in there" to triumph over his failing brain — a brain so destroyed that it could no longer even support life itself.

So what happened that night: one final power surge resulting in the shutdown of a fragile system, or a man rising from his broken body to say farewell before passing on? Ron Reagan Jr's heart is urging the latter. But how can he maintain this as an atheist? As most atheists I'm sure that he thinks of himself as an eminently rational creature. But to be consistent, I think he must either give up his materialism or give up his sentimental notion that something extraordinary happened that Saturday afternoon.

The Financial Crisis - Who's Responsible?

2008-10-03T23:33:00.001-05:00

I don't know much about economics, so this whole financial meltdown has not been easy to follow. It would be nice to understand the cause, but there is so much political spin surrounding the issue that it's difficult to trust either side. However, it does seem possible to make some good criticisms even if only on principle alone, and that is exactly how some are assessing blame.

Those on the Left, eager to cast blame on their opponents, have done so in two ways. First, they point out that this is a problem in lack of oversight and the Republicans are the party of deregulation. Second, they claim that Republicans have been the party in power for the last several years, so this happened on their watch. Let's take each of these ideas in turn.

Regulation

The first thing that should be noted is that "regulation" does not necessarily equal "good." Governmental agencies are monuments to regulation, but we almost universally view these things to be models of waste and inefficiency. Even so, one of the biggest financial headaches, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are regulated in a very profound way: they are underwritten by the government! If these organizations did not have such a safety net, then perhaps there would have been more caution in their policies. That certainly makes theoretical sense.

Additionally, as I understand it, there is some measure of oversight for these organizations. If we are to examine guiding principles in assessing blame, then we must determine whose principles would be most likely to lead to a relaxing of fiscally responsible standards in this governmental oversight. Since the Democratic Party is ostensibly the party of charity and compassion, would we not expect that it would seek to do everything in its power to get financial assistance to those who might otherwise not attain it? But granting loans to low-income persons exposes us to certain financial risks. Isn't a big part of the problem that we are saddled with the burden of high-risk loans that never should have been granted in the first place? Where might we be now if qualification for loans had been more difficult to come by, as those heartless Republicans would have it? But to some minds, being heartless and being responsible seem indistinguishable. It is a distinction that often needs to be made to children.

The Party in Power

It is always amusing (and frustrating) to see how blame is assessed based on who is or was in power. It seems to be a no-win situation. If your party is in power in the White House or Congress, then you can take credit for any good thing that comes to pass. But any bad thing can be blamed on the consequences of the last administration, or the fact that you don't control both the legislative and executive branches. So, all the failings of the current Democratic controlled Congress can be blamed either on the fallout of the prior years when it was controlled by the Republicans or on the president himself. But even when the issues in question can be immediately traced to the present term, there is still the option to blame the other party for blocking your efforts. That, in particular, may be the key to answering the charge that while the Republicans controlled Congress they failed to put the needed limits on Freddie and Fannie.

I was curious as to whether or not the Democrat's blame had any true warrant. One suspicion that it had not was found in the fact that most everyone who pointed an accusing finger did so on these general grounds. Usually when someone has the goods they point to specific events or quotes. I have not yet seen this, but I have been hearing some incriminating charges against many Democrats from conservative commentators (interestingly, the liberals are saying things like, "there's enough blame to go around," and "let's not start playing the blame game"). So, I decided to do a quick search of my own to see what I could come up with. Here is just a sampling of what I found.

From Sept 30, 1999: Fannie Mae Eases Credit To Aid Mortgage Lending

Fannie Mae, the nation's biggest underwriter of home mortgages, has been under increasing pressure from the Clinton Administration to expand mortgage loans among low and moderate income people

From Sept 11, 2003: New Agency Proposed to Oversee Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae

The Bush administration today recommended the most significant regulatory overhaul in the housing finance industry since the savings and loan crisis a decade ago.
. . .
Among the groups denouncing the proposal today were the National Association of Home Builders and Congressional Democrats who fear that tighter regulation of the companies could sharply reduce their commitment to financing low-income and affordable housing.
''These two entities -- Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac -- are not facing any kind of financial crisis,'' said Representative Barney Frank of Massachusetts, the ranking Democrat on the Financial Services Committee. ''The more people exaggerate these problems, the more pressure there is on these companies, the less we will see in terms of affordable housing.''
Representative Melvin L. Watt, Democrat of North Carolina, agreed.

From April 2, 2004: Panel Approves Mortgage Company Bill

Legislation giving regulators the power to take over the mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac if they become insolvent narrowly won approval Thursday in a partisan vote by a Senate panel. Prospects for Senate passage appeared dim, however.
. . .
The Republican-written bill was adopted by the Senate Banking Committee, 12 to 9, mostly along party lines.
. . .
But Democrats on the committee warned that creating the possibility of receivership would give excessive power to the regulators that could harm the two companies.
. . .
[T]he minority Democrats would very likely use procedural rules of the Senate to block its passage.

From April 6, 2005: Greenspan Urges Better Regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

Appearing before the Senate Banking Committee, Mr. Greenspan said the enormous portfolios of the companies - nearly a quarter of the home mortgage market - posed significant risks to the nation's financial system should either of the companies face extensive problems.
. . .
The two companies have been formidable lobbying forces and been able to block attempts made by lawmakers
. . .
Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of New York, criticized Mr. Greenspan's recommendation and called it both inconsistent with his other views on regulation and potentially damaging to the housing markets. Without identifying anyone in particular, he also suggested that some people who have advanced tougher regulation of the two housing finance companies are really pushing a broader agenda to eliminate the companies and their mission of providing affordable housing.

From: Federal Housing Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act of 2005

For years I [John McCain] have been concerned about the regulatory structure that governs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac--known as Government-sponsored entities or GSEs--and the sheer magnitude of these companies and the role they play in the housing market. OFHEO's report this week does nothing to ease these concerns. In fact, the report does quite the contrary. OFHEO's report solidifies my view that the GSEs need to be reformed without delay.
I join as a cosponsor of the Federal Housing Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act of 2005, S. 190, to underscore my support for quick passage of GSE regulatory reform legislation. If Congress does not act, American taxpayers will continue to be exposed to the enormous risk that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pose to the housing market, the overall financial system, and the economy as a whole.

And this recent summary article: Blame Fannie Mae and Congress For the Credit Mess

In the wake of Freddie's 2003 accounting scandal, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan became a powerful opponent, and began to call for stricter regulation
. . .
Fannie and Freddie retained the support of many in Congress, particularly Democrats, and they were allowed to continue unrestrained.
. . .
Sen. McCain's criticisms are at least credible, since he has been pointing to systemic risks in the mortgage market and trying to do something about them for years. In contrast, Sen. Obama's conversion as a financial reformer marks a reversal from his actions in previous years, when he did nothing to disturb the status quo.
. . .
Now the Democrats are blaming the financial crisis on "deregulation." This is a canard.
. . .
If the Democrats had let the 2005 legislation come to a vote, the huge growth in the subprime and Alt-A loan portfolios of Fannie and Freddie could not have occurred, and the scale of the financial meltdown would have been substantially less. The same politicians who today decry the lack of intervention to stop excess risk taking in 2005-2006 were the ones who blocked the only legislative effort that could have stopped it.

Why the McCain campaign is not hammering the Dems over this is a mystery to me.

Can Abortion be a Moral Issue and be a Valid Choice?

2008-08-22T14:45:00.007-05:00

I was fortunate enough to be on the right TV channel at the right time and caught the event at Rick Warren's Saddleback Church. What I'm referring to is the Civil Forum on the Presidency in which Warren interviewed both Barack Obama and John McCain in turn. I found it to be a very well done event in that the forum was casual and friendly, the questions were not soft-balls, and each candidate was asked to answer the same set of questions, so relevant comparisons could be made.

It is not my interest here to give a synopsis of the debate and my impression of the candidate's performances. Instead, my intention is to unpack the response given by Obama to one of Warren's questions on the topic of abortion.

Let me begin with the question posed to Obama: "At what point does a baby get human rights in your view?"

Obama's response, interspersed with my commentary, follows.

Well, I think that whether you are looking at it from a theological perspective or a scientific perspective, answering that question with specificity, you know, is above my pay grade.

So, Obama is basically saying that he doesn't know; it's too complex an issue for him to be certain. It should be noted that he can only be undecided if he believes there are compelling arguments on both sides of the debate. If this were not the case, then the decision would be a no-brainer. However, in his politics he has made a decision: he is pro-choice (see his further response for evidence of that).

In light of his agnosticism about the rights and status of the unborn, it is confounding that he should choose to permit its destruction. He is basically saying: "Oh, I'm not quite sure if it's a full, rights-bearing human. But even in case it is, you can go ahead and kill it if you want." Why is it that those who are neutral on this very important issue never err on the side of caution? In reality, I think Obama is not actually undecided on the status of the fetus. He just knows that most of us voters are not comfortable with a thoroughly pro-choice position, and feigned neutrality plays much better than unequivocal support.

One thing that I'm absolutely convinced of is there is a moral and ethical content to this issue. So I think that anybody who tries to deny the moral difficulties and gravity of the abortion issue I think is not paying attention.

This is a very revealing admission, since there must be something of unique value about the unborn in order to suggest a moral component. Would Obama suggest that the choice to remove a tumor or cut one's nails is a moral issue? I think not, since those things have no intrinsic value. But how about the choice to throw out my TV and get a new one, or to keep it? My TV has value, but it's still not a moral decision. I think we know intuitively that the moral value that the unborn child has is something distinct from anything else with which we might seek parallel. And if it does indeed have this kind of moral value, of which Obama seems "absolutely convinced," then he's got some justification for thinking that human rights should apply here.

I believe in Roe v. Wade and come to that conclusion not because I'm pro abortion, but because ultimately I don't think women make these decisions casually. They wrestle with these things in profound ways. In consultation with their pastors or spouses or their doctors and their family members.

But of course he's pro abortion to some degree! I'm not suggesting that he wants to go on a fetus killing spree, but being "pro-choice" for anything implies that the choices being offered are good, valid, or at least morally neutral options. He must, necessarily, think that aborting a baby is an acceptable solution; he's in favor of women doing this; he's pro those abortions.

In spite of his claim that he doesn't like abortions, he gives his justification here for supporting them anyway. In summary, it seems to go like this: "I'm in favor of abortion rights because women don't take the decision to abort lightly." Sounds vacuous on the face of it, doesn't it? So vacuous that I'm sure he'd come up with some other explanation if he were confronted on this, though I've seen him on many other occasions make his primary appeal similarly, on the basis of this being a tough decision for women. So, let us take him seriously.

The inverse of this would seem to be that if women had abortions cavalierly, then Obama would be against Roe v. Wade. Perhaps, then, he'd like to implement a test of apathy for abortion candidates so as to insure that those going through with it have demonstrated the appropriate degree of agonization for this "moral and ethical" issue. Beyond that, perhaps he'd agree to support other troubling choices people make on the grounds that they, too, wrestle with them in profound ways. Choices like, whether or not to shoot a cheating spouse, whether to take up drug dealing or embezzlement as a much-needed source of income, or whether or not bombing abortion clinics is a tactically effective way to end the practice.

Whether or not one labors over a decision has no bearing on the moral status of the choices. I am quite certain that I have labored more earnestly over my choice of ice cream than many of the Nazi overlords did regarding their choices of which Jews to exterminate.

And so for me, the goal right now should be — and this is where I think we can find common ground, and by the way I have now inserted this into the democrat party platform — is how do we reduce the number of abortions, because the fact is that although we've had a president who is opposed to abortions over the last eight years, abortions have not gone down.

I'm not quite sure what he is arguing here. It seems to be this: Bush is pro-life, but that fact has not reduced the abortion statistics. Even assuming those statistics are correct I'm not sure what follows, since Roe v. Wade still stands either way. We could equally say that permitting abortions has not served to reduce them. It certainly seems reasonable to think that making them unlawful would tend to make them less common. I can't imagine that more women would have them simply because they were suddenly illegal. Is no woman law-abiding? And isn't reducing the numbers what Obama wants? Well, I guess not that badly, though.

What Obama is probably trying to say is that we should not focus on the legality of the procedure; we should just deal with the cause of the unwanted pregnancies, and a guy like Bush has his priorities backward. Unfortunately, knowing that it is a legally and socially acceptable option is not a good first step if prevention is honestly the goal. I might just as well discourage the kids from rough-housing in the living room by padding the walls and removing all the breakables. Unfortunately, much of the reduction that those like Obama seek typically amounts to a focus on pregnancy prevention by way of contraceptives. To his credit, he did later mention the need to encourage alternatives to abortion{1}.

But groups, like Crisis Pregnancy Centers, get a bum rap for trying to do just that. It appears that the more favored Planned Parenthood works very hard to keep the abortion option on equal moral footing. Indeed, it seems to be their preferred option, and as their centers are conveniently equipped to do the dirty deed on-site (for a nominal fee, of course), one can easily understand why they would recommend a quick in-and-out abortion over a personally demanding, expensive, long-term solution, like providing aid and support for a pregnancy and its aftermath.

The last thing I would mention is that the very desire to make this procedure less common is once again testimony that there is a moral component to it. But not just a moral component; it is actually not a good thing, thus the desire to reduce its occurrence. Perhaps one might respond that it's morally neutral in the same way that we'd like to reduce the need for removal of other unwanted tissue masses, like warts and tumors. So, what is Obama saying? Does he think that it's bad to terminate unwanted pregnancies or it's just bad to acquire them?

I get the impression here that he would prefer to focus on the prevention of unwanted pregnancies, since that is less controversial; but his moral language, and the fact that his later comments commend alternative solutions{1}, would imply that he's got a problem with the procedure itself. While we may agree on lifestyle guidelines that will help avoid tumors and cancerous growth, we don't dispute the morality of removing them once they develop. We eagerly embrace that! Even if a tumor were a growing pearl of great "potential" value, we still would not be discussing the "morality" of removing it at any stage of its growth. There is a difference between moral obligation and financial speculation.

Pro-choice advocates should be appalled that Obama would suggest that pregnant women have a moral obligation to consider alternatives to abortion. In doing so, he's saying that there may actually be something wrong with the choice to abort. In spite of the naïve claim that "we can't legislate morality," every law begins with the principle that some behaviors are or are not good for society and/or the individual{2}. And we dare to implement those laws even if they mean hardship for some individuals, and even if some individuals may choose to violate those laws and do injury to themselves in their disobedience.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. "What I can do is say are there ways that we can work together to reduce the number of unwanted pregnancies so that we actually are reducing the sense that women are seeking out abortions, and as an example of that, one of the things that I've talked about is how do we provide the resources that allow women to make the choice to keep a child. You know, have we given them the health care that they need? Have we given them the support services that they need? Have we given them the options of adoption that are necessary? That I think can make a genuine difference."

2. I know, there are utilitarian laws, like stop on red, which are amoral (for example, we could have said stop on blue), but there are larger moral principles behind such laws, like the promotion of public safety and order.

What if Barack Obama Loses?

2008-08-14T20:13:00.002-05:00

As much as I do not want an Obama win, I am apprehensive about an Obama loss.

Barack Obama is perhaps the perfect candidate for the new, leftist Democratic leadership. So perfect, that it was willing to throw its former golden children (the Clintons) under the campaign bus in order to insure his ascendancy. He is articulate, he has face appeal, he is Green, he is liberal, he is culturally diverse, and he even has the blessing of Oprah Winfrey. What he doesn't have is much experience, but even that has been forged into a virtue. He is the poster boy for the Far Left, and exactly what they believe the country now wants and needs. How can he possibly lose, especially in an election year where the opposing party has (supposedly) fallen so far out of favor? Anything with a pulse that is not George Bush should be a shoe-in.

An Obama loss would suggest that no matter how much the public might complain about the present Republican leadership, it still finds that party's platform superior to a Far Left alternative. The frightening thing to me is the question of what the Far Left will do if it is thwarted in moving its agenda by way of popular vote (i.e., in playing by the rules). It has already revealed the lengths to which it is willing to go by its use of judicial activism. For example, the maddening fact that the majority of the population will not support same-sex marriage has inspired some of our liberal judges to find rights heretofore invisible in our Constitution.

As Obama's political persuasions become increasingly transparent to the American public, his electability may be (and has been, it seems) called into question. The generalities and obfuscations that characterize the Obama campaign make it clear that the Left knows it is in their best interest to hide their deepest agendas; as the average, commonsense man will not suffer a full-spread banquet of liberal cuisine, but must have it artfully served to him course by course. If the best hope of the Left, at the best time for it, cannot garner our support, then I fear the new and alternative means that will be employed to advance its causes. The shrill and rabid hatred for George Bush and any who would dare to support him, the conspiracy cavalcades and judiciary gymnastics, may only be a foretaste of what's to come.

Now I'm sure that some would say that an Obama loss will simple be evidence of the racism still prevalent in our society. It may lead to a new, though self-imposed, racial tension, and it may close the sale of the Democratic Party to black America (though I know they are not a monolithic group). But in reality, I think for every genuinely bigoted person who may withhold a vote for Obama because of his race, there will be at least two who will vote for him merely and precisely because of it.

I believe that America is more than ready for a black president. Indeed, many hunger for it as a form of historical penance. But I fear that it may not be graciously received if we decide that we are just not ready for this black American to be president. As we push past his race, charm, scripted eloquence, and inspirational slogans, we see an inexperience politician, with questionable friends and associates, who represents the farthest Left candidate yet presented for our consideration.

I hope the Left will not think us wicked if we reject its candidate over principled differences. And I hope our fellow black Americans will understand if we (though "we" does happen to include a good number of them) choose not to spend our votes on token racial appeasement.

~~~~~~~~~~~

Note: I am not even comfortable using us versus them language where it concerns racial differences, but I think that the Left has done more to widen the racial divide than it understands, and it forces us to traffic in racial and cultural distinctions. Indeed, it celebrates them! I almost hope that Obama wins so that we might finally say, "There! Now nothing has not been achieved by (or is "withheld" from) a black man. Can we please now move on and directly focus on our political and moral issues together?"

Fate and Destiny: Jesse Ventura's Secular Superstition

2008-08-07T20:33:00.001-05:00

Among an increasingly secular culture, I've noticed a curious thing. It is quite common to hear talk of fate, destiny, or what was "meant to be." It is an often-visited theme in movies (for instance, Serendipity and Sliding Doors) and can be heard in candid interviews with celebrities. Now, this may make sense under certain spiritual worldviews, but I take this as a meaningless sentiment from those who are opposed to religion in general.

The most recent example of this, in my experience, has come from the mouth of former Minnesota Governor, Jesse Ventura. One of the alleged charms of Mr. Ventura is that he is a tell-it-like-it-is kind of guy. Unfortunately, one of the ways that he believes it is like involves the idea that "organized religion is a sham and a crutch for weak-minded people who need strength in numbers." Given his anti-religious orientation, it struck me as very odd when I recently heard him say that he's always been a big believer in "fate and destiny." With that in mind, he entrusted his final decision regarding a bid for the Senate to the flip of a coin.

Of course, I understand that there is a difference between fatalism and fate in a broader, metaphysical sense. I understand that when some use the term "fate" they are simply speaking of what chance deals out. That's not what I have in mind, nor is it how others, like Jesse Ventura, speak of it. Jesse was not just indecisive about his political aspirations and lazily allowed a coin flip to put the issue to bed; he expected that the coin flip would be a portal to the right decision, the path that he was meant to follow.

I doubt very much that someone like Jesse Ventura would like to be thought of as superstitious, but how could one reconcile his idea that (some or all) things are meant to be with his inclination toward a secular worldview? Perhaps one might say that fate is what we would observe if we could take a time machine and travel into the future. That is, fate is what does and will happen. But you don't flip a coin to get on board with that fate, because you are always making that fate no matter what you do. And it is most certainly not an intended, or morally good, destiny; it is simply an amoral byproduct of random events and human choices.

In order for anything to be fated, there must be a fater. In order for anything to be destined, there must be a designer. In order for anything to be meant, there must be something that can grant meaning. In order for anything to happen for a reason, there must be something which can reason.

I contend that Ventura's substantive view of fate requires a theistic perspective — a God. And not just any God: a God who is involved in the course of history and even individual human lives. It requires a personal God who can plan and purpose. It requires a powerful God who can take the helm in history. It requires a "meddling" God who can influence human agents and even tamper with nature. All these things are required if Mr. Ventura's coin flip is insured to land according to plan — according to a good and meaningful plan — just as it was fated to do.

Unfortunately, this is the very type of God that might intervene in human history in even more profound ways than the subtleties of coin flips and serendipitous events. This is the very type of God explicitly affirmed and revered by those poor, "weak-minded" followers of organized religion. But it would appear that someone like Jesse Ventura much prefers disorganized religion.

MIT Biology Class - Reading Between the Lines (4)

2008-01-15T12:54:00.001-06:00

Lecture Note:

Geneticists have been surprised to discover that some genes actually overlap each other, meaning that the same stretch of DNA can be involved in the code for more than one protein. This is very common in prokaryotes, which have less DNA in which to pack their genetic instructions, but it has also been discovered to occur in eukaryotes, which have a more roomy genome.

My thoughts:

The amino acid arrangement, which makes up the protein polypeptide chain, is coded for by the nucleic acid molecules (nucleotides) in DNA. These nucleotides come in 4 flavors, which are represented by the letters A T G and C. A series of 3 nucleotides (a codon) codes for each individual amino acid. So, for example, TAC codes for tyrosine, while GAA codes for glutamate. It should be noted that there are 64 possible combinations of these sets of 3 nucleotides, while there are only 20 amino acids, so, many of them can be represented by more than one codon, e.g., both TAT and TAC code for tyrosine. Additionally, some combinations represent "start" and "stop" codons¹, which bookend the gene and define a "reading frame" — the gene is contained within the reading frame.

A large molecule known as RNA polymerase reads the DNA and assists the messenger RNA in acquiring a copy of the gene, which will be elsewhere translated into a protein. It reads the DNA in these codon groups, but it is not as though it begins at the start of the DNA molecule and reads along it in groups of 3 nucleotides; it can attach at any point and only begins its transcription work when it encounters an ATG triplet (the start codon). So, in theory, there could be one at the start of the DNA strand, one starting from the 2nd nucleotide in the strand, one starting at the 3rd nucleotide in the strand, etc.

For example, a stretch of DNA might look something like this:

...ATGCATGTCATACCATAGCTAGAG...

The ATG at the beginning would start the gene sequence and it would end once it had reached a stop codon, which in this case is the TAG sequence. So the resulting reading frame and 4 amino acid gene² would look like this:

...ATG CAT GTC ATA CCA TAG CTA GAG...

(Start, Histidine, Valine, Isoleucine, Proline, Stop)

But not so fast: if you look at the original sequence you will notice that ATG can be found a bit further in, and there is another TAG later down the line as well. So if we adjust our starting offset just a tad we can find a whole different gene in this same stretch of DNA, like so:

...A TGC ATG TCA TAC CAT AGC TAG AG...

(Start, Serine, Tyrosine, Histidine, Serine, Stop)

Can you see why this would be a stunner for geneticists to find? This is like discovering that your recipe for chicken pot pie also contained the recipe for laundry detergent if you drop every second letter, or that your favorite song is also the national anthem when played backwards. It is hard enough to explain how new genes can come into existence by random mutations; now we must explain how something so delicately intertwined as this could come about.

It is a problem whether it is claimed to come about gradually or all in one step. If you say that the overlapping genes came into existence together, then you have only increased the statistical improbabilities on already problematic equations. If you say that this happened gradually (first one gene appeared and then tweaks occurred to bring the second into play), then you have added profound constraints upon the process that is proposed to bring genes into existence. It is one thing to say that a functional gene could by chance and degree be constructed upon a stretch of unused DNA, but to say that it can arrive upon the back of a functioning gene without upsetting its vocation stretches credulity on principle alone. I may just as well say that my wife can slowly change her pot pie recipe into a crypto-detergent recipe without making my son vomit at any point that she follows it and served him the product.

~~~~~~~~~~~~

End Notes:

1. The start codon ATG actually codes for the amino acid methionine. The three stop codons, TAA, TAG, and TGA, do not encode an actual amino acid.

2. As you may remember from an earlier lecture note, the average protein consists of at least 150 amino acids.

Sifting Worldviews

2007-12-20T12:45:00.001-06:00

I was once engaged in dialog with a thoroughly postmodern fellow who was insistent on the idea that we could not know objective truth, even if it existed. After arguing the case that it was not a hopeless cause, and that, in reality, his entire life depended upon the assumption of its existence, he finally asked me how one could achieve any sort of confidence regarding worldviews and religious truth claims. Here are 7 basic points that I offered for his consideration.

1) Truth sides with the preponderance of facts. The more clear and indisputable the fact the more heavily it may weigh in our consideration. For example, if all discovered ancient manuscripts fundamentally agree with the Bible we have today, then it is more reasonable to believe that Scripture has been faithfully preserved than that (as some skeptics claim) it has been corrupted by countless copies, translations, and tamperings of the church.

2) Truth must be rational. Truth claims must be internally consistent and non-contradictory. Consistency does not establish truth, but its deficiency surely negates it. It may be fashionable to question the law of non-contradiction these days, but even the most anti-rational eastern mystic looks both ways before he crosses the street; for he knows that it is either him or the bus, but not both.

3) At least some aspect of the truth claim must be verifiable. It may not spring forth ex nihilo from the mind of man with no association to concrete reality. Since many claims of truth are falsifiable we may use negation as a tool to lead us to truth via a back door process of elimination. For example, the book of Mormon claims that the American Indians are the descendants of Israel, and if it can be demonstrated that they are actually of northeastern Asian descent, then the credibility of this book is impugned. (Note: this seems to have been done via DNA analysis.)

4) We may derive truth or truth indicators via credible authority. Credibility manifests itself through subject matter expertise, record of accomplishment, and character. For example, if a religion's founder were found to indulge in immoral¹ pursuits or made counter-factual claims, then it would be reasonable to suspect the religion itself.

5) Truth works. We must be able to use it effectively, build upon it, or live it out. If we must reach outside of a truth system for practical reasons, then it must be considered false or inadequate. For example, if the moral relativist is compelled to moralize then he has surrendered his position.

6) Truth is justified by its explanatory scope. The explanation that accounts for the greatest number of facts and observations is the most likely to be true. For example, with each new epicycle added, the Ptolemaic model of the universe decreased in credibility.

7) Truth has predictive power. A true proposition will not only have present corroborative evidences, but will successfully identify what may be found in its support in the future. For example, the Big Bang theory of cosmology is so compelling exactly because its many predictions have been proved out one by one, while the theory of evolution should be held in suspicion for quite opposite reasons.

~~~~~~~~~~~~

End notes:

1. I know it may be begging the question to call the founder immoral unless we take into account the standard by which he presumes us to judge morality.

Is the Nicene Creed Biblical?

2007-12-09T15:17:00.001-06:00

I was recently dialoging with a liberal Christian who wanted to justify his theological autonomy by pointing out that even conservatives cannot seem to agree with each other. My response was to claim that before one can enter the debate over the fringes and essentials of orthodoxy with Christians of good will, that one must first attend to what they hold in common. I suggested the Nicene Creed as a basic framework of beliefs that was early, broadly affirmed, and is still respected by the most diverse denominations of Christianity. We must start somewhere when attempting to define Christianity. If you cannot put any stakes in the ground, then Christianity is essentially anything you want it to be, which is to say, it is nothing in particular.

As expected, this fellow took exception with the creed and posted his reaction to it on his own blog. I thought it might be worth copying my subsequent response here. The following includes only slight edits of my original reply.

~~~~~~~~~~~~

The first observation I'd make is that this creed seems completely foreign to you. Perhaps it is not, but it should not be alien to any Christian and is actually recited quite often in the liturgies of many denominations, along with the Apostles' Creed and others. Whether one agrees with its content or not, it is a milestone in the theological and liturgical self-understanding of the church. Respect for this creedal statement is still found in the Orthodox Church (Eastern, Russian, American) and the Roman Catholic Church; and even the Magisterial Reformers (Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, etc.) did not take real exception with this creed (or many other things which all share in common).

The council that formulated this creed was the result of a challenge from Arius and his followers, who took Jesus to be a separately created being, like the angels. The Jehovah's Witnesses could be said to be the modern bearers of the Arian position, though not by unbroken succession. This council was the first world church council (other than, perhaps, the Jerusalem council), being attended by the leaders from all the major regions around the empire. To say that it was not representative of mainstream Christianity is to say that something like Gnosticism is the true expression of Christianity. And contrary to what Dan Brown says in The Da Vinci Code, the vote on the divinity of Christ was not "close," nor was it "first proposed" here. All but two of the more than three hundred attendees voted that the Trinitarian view best captured what Scripture and tradition had revealed about the nature of God.

The center of the second line bothers me: "God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God". That phrase sounds very formal, almost poetic or like a ritual statement. The problem is that I can't find anything even remotely like it in the Bible. Is this a translation error? Or are these simply non-Biblical statements that have crept into the creed?

The language of the creed is designed to express the consensus understanding while also serving as a refutation of the Arian view. So, it is intent to make clear that Jesus is of the same essence/substance as the Father (and Spirit) while also preserving the biblical truth that Jesus proceeds (is eternally begotten) from the Father in some way.

Certainly these words are not lifted from Scripture, but neither are words like monotheism, syncretism, soteriology, and nihilism; yet certain content within Scripture can be rightly described by way of such words. The question is not whether this text is found directly in Scripture; the question is whether or not it follows from the teachings of Jesus and the apostles. And the case has well been made that Jesus is described as deity in Scripture: He is ascribed all the attributes of the Father, He exercised all of the Father's prerogatives, and He shares titles which the Father reserved for Himself.

Here and here are some quick Scriptural references for verses making this case for the full deity of Christ, and for a good single verse I would suggest John 1:1: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God."

There are a bunch more statements that I can't really quibble with on Biblical grounds, until we get to "one holy catholic and apostolic Church". Is there actually any place in the New Testament which refers to a "catholic" Church?

I am not Roman "Catholic," so you know I would resist their tendency to make this word play to their favor. The Roman "Catholic" Church, as it came to be known, did not even exist at the time of this council. The word "catholic," as we now denote with a small "c", is best interpreted as "general," "universal," or "pertaining to the whole." In the creed it is a recognition that the church was and will be a dispersed and diverse body bound together by a common theology (some of which is captured in this creed). It is a rejection of sectarian, if not cultic, thinking, which was a problem then as it is today.

If the normal designation in the New Testament for the "whole Church" was "holos ekklēsia" why did the writers of the creed choose to used "catholic" instead?

In effect, they did just that. Catholic is from the two root words "kata," meaning pertaining to, or about, and the word "holos," meaning the whole. It is merely done for grammatical purposes I suppose, otherwise it would say, "One Holy whole and apostolic Church."

One final thing worth mentioning is that although the creed refers to "the Scriptures" and to the Holy Spirit speaking via the prophets, at no place does it specify that the canon of Scriptures is complete and infallible. Isn't that a little odd considering that Paul Pruett was trying to argue that this creed should be the litmus test for whether the squishy liberals or the ramrod conservatives were right?

This creed does not mention many things. You cannot take from it that if it does not mention it then they did not believe it. It was primarily designed to address some of the major concerns relating to the nature of God and what He has done for us. Yet, it was from somewhere that they grounded the beliefs contained in this creed: Scripture. And to be so dogmatic as to produce this creed (and its related anathemas) one would expect that this Source would be held in high esteem. It may or may not be true that words like "infallible" are recent inventions, but it should be noted that the early church did not suffer from the same kind of modern skepticism and redaction of the Scriptures which necessitates the naming and declaration of such a doctrine.

When the authors of this creed mention Scripture, they mean something in particular. It is true that the canon was formally declared after the Council of Nicea, but it is not as though the idea of an authoritative list of books was foreign to them at this time. Indeed, as far back as we have approvingly quoted books from the Church Father's pens and explicit lists of inspired writings we can see the outline of the canon as it would come to be known.

The only real contenders for a modified canon were the Gnostics (who are in a whole other camp); yet even they, other than Marcion, agreed to most of the standard books; they simply wanted to add their own unique works into the mix and considered the mainstream canon to be the revelation for the common man, or at least the literal understanding of it to be.

As far as whether the cannon was "complete," the very methodology behind identifying a N.T. book as Scripture precludes such a thing as new books, since inspiration and authority only applied to Jesus and His apostles. A book (beyond the O.T.) was only considered for canon if it had a solid pedigree of apostolic authority. So, for example, a book like Mark could only be justified as Scripture insofar as it could be traced to the oversight of Peter and/or Paul and reliable tradition proved that it had early authorship.

If anything, more books were ultimately included into the canon than what some had argued for. And since this chapter of God's divine plan appears to be settled (as Scripture itself claims), then no further special revelation is expected until Christ comes to claim His church. God's plan has come to fruition in Christ; we are in the Church Age spreading the Good News, a bride awaiting its bridegroom. Any revelation forthcoming can only affirm what has been accomplished or inaugurate the new age to come.

The text of the creed does mention sins, but only in the context of "remission of sins". It does mention judgment, but only in the context of the Last Judgment.

Remission of sin and final judgment certainly implies that there is such a thing as sin to remit or judge. Of course, what qualifies as sin and what we fellow sinners ought to do about the sin in the world is another matter, but Scripture is most emphatic that we should not ignore it or lull the world into a false sense of security regarding it.

It doesn't mention "love" at all. Perhaps the composers of the creed weren't familiar with John 3:16.

Since even most reasonable atheists agree that we should be loving, and that if there is a God that he/she/it would surely be loving, then this idea is not really a controversial doctrine on which the framers thought to make a stand. (If you want a creed with more "love" mentioned in it, here is a more recent one that most of the church would probably give the nod.)

Of course, the word "love" must be defined. Saying that we must love one another and that God loves the world needs an explanation. When John says that "God so loved the world" he spends many chapters explaining just how it is that God expressed that love. The Nicene Creed captures some of that explanation in saying the following:

"Who, for us men for our salvation, came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Spirit of the virgin Mary, and was made man; and was crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate; He suffered and was buried; and the third day He rose again, according to the Scriptures; and ascended into heaven, and sits on the right hand of the Father."

God does not simply have warm feelings for humanity and look upon our apathy toward Him and His will with a blind eye. He loved us enough to come down among us and make a road home for His fallen creatures. May God grant that we travel it and lead others to do the same!

Evolutionary Morality

2007-12-02T15:03:00.001-06:00

Aaron Snell has offered a good hypothetical pushback for the point made in my last post. The question at hand is: How do selfless human virtues like heroism shoehorn into Darwin's theory of survival-of-the-fittest?

I'll begin by restating Aaron's reply, which I call "hypothetical" because he is not advancing it as his own belief.

Humans are social animals, and as such their social interactions are the context in which morality evolved. When practiced in such a social context, altruism has certain social benefits that ensure a better chance of offspring survival. This then translates into an evolved moral impulse.
As for your objection about the converse "selfish streak", I have seen two counter-arguments offered: 1) this is an evolutionary hold-over from our pre-social past; and 2) individuals sometimes benefit from selfishness in certain social situations, which means both can be present in the behavior of a biologically-programmed human animal.

And here are my thoughts:

When was this pre-social time in our past where anti-social behavior was supposed to be advantageous? All creatures are social creatures to some extent. What is it that makes a prior behavior less valuable to survival simply because we become more verbal and intelligent? I think the unintended implication is that humans are now self-conscious and able to know good from evil — that we have risen to some higher metaphysical plane where we are attuned to true virtue. But as another commenter (Duane) points out, in an amoral, purely material world, there is no good and evil or better and worse in the sense we generally mean those words.

If morality is only evolutionary, then there is no higher morality that stands above whatever evolution delivers. This means that the only thing that could be said to be good is whatever lends a survival advantage. "Good" would be, by definition, whatever successful organisms happen to do. However, we find various creatures acting in many ways, some of which we would think of as very "bad" were it imitated by humans. Consequently, there is no reason to even think of our own behaviors, such as heroism, as objectively more virtuous than the diverse behaviors that we see in other successful creatures.

Evolution only has to do with replication and survival. If it could be said to produce morality it would only be related to what is most advantageous to the survival and dominance of any given species, and it does not care about ethics in its pragmatism. For evolution, any means is justified by the ends. And it seems we could get along just as well by evolution's reckoning if we ate our genetically inferior offspring and killed off our elderly once reaching a certain age. This doesn't fit the model of virtue and heroics as we think of it, since we regard some of the most heroic acts to be on behalf of the weak and defenseless.

Mutations do not appear in communities, which could all share in the benefits of cooperation and heroism; they appear in individuals, and if those individuals do not reproduce, then that characteristic will be lost. Even if heroism may add theoretical value to the community, it still has to be established as a characteristic in that community. Those with the strongest heroic traits would seldom manage to pass their genes on, while those in need of rescue would be perhaps more likely to dilute the gene pool.

We tend to think of some behaviors as being morally superior to others, for example, being heroic, practicing equal human rights, and living in peace and harmony with your neighbors are all considered to be good. But this type of environment is not conducive to allowing the superior genes to dominate. Bacteria are supposed to have evolved by means of the more fit organisms crushing out its competition. It could easily be seen as more advantageous to allow weak and helpless victims to die than to allow the virile gene-carriers to lose their lives in the efforts to save them. Practicing equal rights, welfare, pacifism, and heroism does not seem to be consistent with the spirit of evolutionary progress.

To say that some supposedly bad behaviors are a carryover of primitive times only works if we can say that those behaviors are in a different category from our newer behaviors. For example, we might only be aggressive toward others while we are good toward our own offspring and spouse. Perhaps we can develop the new in one area while retaining the old in some other; like a dolphin is supposed to be a land mammal, which retained its old lungs while developing new swimming apparatus. It seems problematic to the theory to have both the new and the old in the same area, but that is exactly what we find in the area of morality. We find loving parents and abusive parents, heroes and cowards, lovers and rapists, pacifists and warmongers, philanthropists and swindlers.

It might make sense to say that morality can be evolving along a continuum, like legs slowly forming into flippers, but that would imply, for morality, that we were fairly consistent in our moral expressions, wherever we happened to be on the scale. Experience shows that humans exhibit moral behavior along every point of the scale, from heroic to monstrous. Some of us still have legs while others have fully developed flippers, so to speak.

Perhaps moral character could be controlled by something like genetic alleles, which determine eye and hair color, among other things. This would imply that there could be "good" people and "bad" people, just like blondes and brunettes, or at least people who are good and bad in certain areas of morality. This seems a very testable notion, since by this reckoning we should expect to find solid and predictable patterns among kin and, especially, identical twins. But I think it has been difficult enough to establish that things like personalities and preferences are determined by genetics at all; and if not by genetics, then we aren't really talking about evolutionary morality in the first place.

Alleles can also be bred out of the genetic stock, so we might expect to see tribes of incorrigibly noble aboriginals or irreformably wicked savages, as we see blue-eyed Scandinavians and dark-skinned Africans, and their children would be expected to be cut from the same cloth. But we seem to find that there is no race whose infants consistently surprise or disappoint us if we adopt them into our "mainstream" society. And if we claim that this is not so then we can be assured of facing charges of racism.

In the end, this is an idea that sounds good in theory, but it turns out to be circular reasoning: we happen to value certain moral behavior and so we imagine that there is an evolutionary advantage for those who practice it. Unfortunately, it begs the question as to the true source of morality, why we should exalt human morality, and why evolution would have us be repulsed by social practices that would actually improve our genetic stock. If, as Tennyson said, nature is red in tooth and claw, then why should we expect to escape the breeding and discipline of our own Mother?

The Problem of Heroism

2007-11-26T20:30:00.000-06:00

While you wait for me to shake off my post-Thanksgiving lethargy and complete the next MIT biology commentary, I submit this article for your consideration.

It is on the "problem" of heroism, and these excerpts get to the point of the article (which is longish):

Twenty minutes after the crash, the sun was going down, and no one had been able to reach the six survivors. They were doomed...until suddenly, miraculously, a rescue chopper came whisking across the darkening sky. It dropped a life ring right into the hands of one of the survivors and plucked him from the water. Then things turned really strange.
The next person to receive the ring handed it over to someone else. The chopper lofted her to safety, then wheeled back.
The man gave away the ring again.
And again.
He even gave it away when he knew it was his last chance to live. He must have known, because when the chopper thundered back seconds later, he was gone. The man in the water had vanished beneath the ice.
Who was he? But far more perplexing: Why was he? Why would anyone put the lives of strangers ahead of his own? He couldn't even see the faces of the people he was saving, because they were on the opposite side of the wreckage, yet he made a sacrifice for them that their best friends might have refused.
. . .
Even Charles Darwin, that human decoder ring of bizarre behavior, found the idea of saving a stranger's life to be a total head-scratcher.
"He who was ready to sacrifice his life, as many a savage has been, rather than betray his comrades, would often leave no offspring to inherit his noble nature," observed Darwin, who consequently couldn't figure out how to crowbar heroism into his survival-of-the-fittest theory.
Die for your own kids? Perfectly logical. According to Darwin, your only reason to exist is to pass your genes along to the next generation. But to die for a rival's kids? It seems totally counterproductive. No matter how many virile, healthy heroes you bore, it would take just one selfish bastard with a hearty sex drive to spoil the whole species. Selfish Bastard's kids would thrive and multiply, while SuperDad's kids would eventually follow their father's example and sacrifice themselves into extinction.

Even if evolutionists can propose a story to explain how such an altruistic streak could have survived in the gene pool, despite its most dominant carriers' untimely demise, they are still left to explain why we also seem to have an equally strong selfish streak. I do not think I am overplaying my hand here to say that such behavior is a problem for naturalism, which entails that all instincts must be part of the biological programming, whereas seemingly conflicting noble and fallen natures is perfectly consistent with biblical Christianity.

MIT Biology Class - Reading Between the Lines (3)

2007-11-14T22:39:00.001-06:00

Lecture Note:

Many physical characteristics, like eye and hair color, are the direct result of having certain dominant genes. However, there are some genes that may be dominant in an individual yet do not manifest themselves except under certain conditions. I believe that a predisposition to heart disease and diabetes were mentioned as examples, where lifestyle choices can be the deciding factor in appearance.

My thoughts:

My thought here is more social commentary rather than evolution related.

Let's say that researchers did manage to find the elusive "gay gene." There is good reason to think that such a gene would not have a determinative effect, like those for eye color, but would merely provide a susceptibility to the condition. Indeed, this must be the case, since identical twin studies demonstrate that more than 50 percent of homosexual twins have heterosexual siblings. Compare this with 100% parity between twins (as far as I know) for things like eye and hair color. If this condition were actually genetically caused, then twins would always be either both or neither homosexual.

If we would then compare the "gay gene" with the "heart disease gene" we would come to a problematic conclusion. That is because if we think about the actual onset of heart disease, we generally find that it is accompanied by poor diet and exercise. That is to say, the predisposition for heart disease may only manifest itself under adverse conditions. It can clearly be said to be a "bad" thing, in that it is a case of the normal operation of the body gone wrong. In such cases, the related gene is not actually a new and distinct gene from what other healthy persons have; it is due to an alteration (mutation) of an existing gene that serves a valuable purpose.

All this is to say that finding a "gay gene" would not have the desired effect of making homosexuality into a "natural" human variation, like male/female, blonde/brunet, and white/black. At worse, it could be seen as a deleterious mutation of a right-functioning gene (and in Darwinian terms, a non-breeding gene-bearer is clearly at a disadvantage). At best, it is only a gene that may result in homosexuality under certain conditions — conditions which may even be characterized as "unfavorable," meaning something has gone wrong. And any condition which may only be influenced by other factors is a condition which might also be avoided or, perish the thought, reversed. I know, this is all politically incorrect science. But it is a fiction that science is the exclusive domain of white-coated priests of impartiality and truth. Which leads to my next topic.

Lecture Note:

One of the professors recounted several cases of major scientific breakthroughs, some of which were well ahead of their times, that were met with indifference and even rejection by contemporary peers. An example would be the discovery that chromosomes are involved in heredity.

My thoughts:

When I was a young man I had a rather starry-eyed view of science. I imagined that scientists were primarily concerned with truth at all costs and that science dealt with objective concerns that were insulated from the more biased realms of values and religion. I believed that new, paradigm shattering discoveries were welcomed with excitement and that progress was the mutual goal of all. And then I grew up.

Scientists are human, too, and prone to the same biases and mistakes that people make in every other area of life. In fact, there are some ways in which the sciences present unique opportunities for bias. Pet theories must be proved out and ferociously defended if one has hopes for a Nobel Prize. Valuable grants must be courted by way of politically expedient research agendas. Fraternal orthodoxies must be carefully negotiated if one expects to publish in the best journals. I have heard it said that most Nobel laureates had great difficulty getting their original theses past peer reviews and had to publish privately or in minor journals.

But the most troubling (and often most denied) of all are the metaphysical biases that inhibit some ideas from consideration on principle alone. No one is immune to the influence of personal convictions, and some theories have greater ramifications for those convictions than others. The acceptance of big bang theory is one recent example in which personal bias was at work against the mounting evidence and growing consensus in its favor. As Sir Arthur Eddington wrote in 1931, "The notion of a beginning is repugnant to me ... I simply do not believe that the present order of things started off with a bang. ... The expanding Universe is preposterous ... incredible ... it leaves me cold." And more recently, Phillip Morrison of MIT said in a BBC film on cosmology, "I find it hard to accept the Big Bang theory; I would like to reject it."

While atheists have found creative ways to shrug off the implications of a "creation" event, the stakes for a rejection of naturalistic evolution are perhaps even higher; for if nature has not shaped us, then exactly who has? Let me just end here by quoting Harvard geneticist and evolutionary biologist, Richard Lewontin, who publicly summarized the materialistic (and his) bias better than I could ever hope to.

Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.

If Intelligent Design is indeed the cause of biochemistry, then we shall never know it so long as the gatekeepers of "science," like Lewontin, stand guard to insure that only pre-approved ideas are admitted for consideration.

MIT Biology Class - Reading Between the Lines (2)

2007-11-05T12:53:00.001-06:00

(Part 2 in a series)

Lecture Note:

Many proteins that are made by the cell are destined for use outside of the cell. This includes not only those protein assemblies that will serve needs on the outer cell wall (e.g., sensors), but also those which are not even meant for use by the cell that produced them. Particularly, in multi-cellular creatures, proteins are made that are meant to communicate with, or provide services to, other parts of the organism. Examples would be digestive enzymes, hormones, and neurotransmitters. The cell wall is designed to keep the bad out and the good in. Consequently, for each item slated for external use there must be a discriminating mechanism to allow or transport it outside of the cell.

My thoughts:

Let's assume for a moment that we are an organism composed of cells, which has managed a spectacular mutation that codes for a new protein that would be a boon to our survival. Now our cells are busily generating said protein. But we've got a problem: no matter how much of an advantage this protein would give us over our peers, it will do us absolutely no good if it cannot get a hall pass to leave the cell and go to work just where it is needed. In fact, while it waited generation after generation for such a pass (i.e., a new cell portal, or an existing portal change) it would actually be a detriment to us, since its construction would consume valuable resources. Worse, without simultaneously evolving the accompanying regulatory mechanisms our cells — perhaps every one of them — would be busily manufacturing these proteins without end. This is highly reminiscent of viruses, which hijack the machinery of the cell (by inserting their own genes into the DNA) in order to make continual copies of themselves. They do so until they fill the cell and it bursts.

Lecture Note:

Proteins are the workhorses and building materials of the cell. They consist of long (polypeptide) chains of amino acids, which are then folded into intricate shapes fitted to serve specific tasks. The average polypeptide chain is about 150 amino acids in length, and some are well over 3000 in length. Each amino acid could be one out of a variety 20 different amino acids that are used by all living systems. The folding occurs due to various chemical and electrical attractions and repulsions that exist between different parts of the chain, and the final folded form is dependent upon the exact arrangement of amino acids in this chain. The possible arrangements of a polypeptide chain of 150 amino acids in length is 20 to the 150th power (20^150). The enormity of possible configurations for proteins makes computer simulations of protein folding a monumental task. At this time, even with our best supercomputers, it is impossible to predict what the 3D structure of any given polypeptide chain will be from merely knowing the arrangement of the individual amino acids that make up the chain.

My thoughts:

Let me start by driving something home. As I mentioned, the possible arrangements of amino acids in an average protein is 20^150. That roughly equates to 1 with 195 zeros after it! (Remember this 196 digit number for later.) For comparison, the number of atoms in the entire universe is "only" about 1 with 80 zeros after it. Since DNA contains the instructions for these proteins, and DNA instructions are supposedly acquired by way of mutations, this means that coming up with a functional protein is a matter of statistical probabilities. Even if we had an unused stretch of gene-space to work with, and we confined all mutations to just this region of DNA, and we had every generation of every organism that had ever existed on earth pumping out mutations, we would never arrive at any of the perfectly functional proteins that you could name in the average cell.

Not so fast, the skeptic may say. Calculating odds like this is only applicable if we have a hand in mind before we draw the cards. There may be any number of arrangements that could make some kind of useful protein. Life may simply consist of collections of random poker hands. While this might be a good objection in principle, it runs aground for a couple of reasons.

The laws of physics constrain the kinds of functional systems that are available for use in the cell, and the cell itself, once framed out, further constrains its own options. Many features of life (including proteins) in creatures that are widely divergent from one another are similar if not identical in form, and these features are claimed to have been evolved independent of each other (convergent evolution). This suggests that there are certain best or right ways to accomplish certain tasks. And the fact that most life shares many proteins in common, and the most complex life has only 10's of thousands of genes, means that we may have a rather small target set to compare against the astronomical alternate possibilities. Assuming a high estimate of 100 million species on earth, and making a generous assumption that 10,000 genes in every species is unique, this means we get to knock 12 zeros off of our 196 digit number. A statistical drop in the bucket.

Additionally, in systems that are composed of multiple proteins, the design of the proteins is tightly constrained by the other proteins in the system. For instance, if I have a "bolt" protein, and chance is expected to complete the set, only some form of a "nut' protein will do. This all means that for at least some evolutionary outcomes to obtain, there will be certain predefined poker hands that chance must deal.

The skeptic may again object by questioning whether or not all amino acids in the protein are absolutely necessary to form the functional structure. This would be a good objection, because some regions are merely filler and/or connective in nature; and in some cases even functional amino acids may be replaced by another amino acid with similar properties. While this may certainly lessen the odds, it does not ultimately bring them into the realm of the plausible.

Let's be generous and say that only 40 of the amino acids are important to our average protein. Let's further compound our generosity by saying that there are two different amino acids that could work at each point for our essential 40, i.e., 1 in 10 odds rather than 1 in 20. So now our odds of arriving at any specified "average" protein is 10^40. While certainly a better number than 10^195, it is still no help, since this number actually exceeds or equals the estimated number of organisms that have lived on our planet in all of history!

But let's not stop here. Let me up the ante by revisiting one of my earlier generous allowances. Mutations do not confine themselves to, or target, specific genes; mutations are just blind errors that occur in the process that copies the entire DNA package in preparation for cell division. Now, the DNA replication machinery is very efficient, but it does make the occasional mistake. In fact, we are now far enough along in the genetic sciences that we can say that the average mutation rate is about one nucleotide (a "point mutation") out of every 100 million. Since there are 4 possible nucleotides for any given point, this means our odds of arriving at any specified mutation is 1 in 400 million. And because the instruction for a particular amino acid is made up of groups of 3 nucleotides (a "codon"), and because several nucleotide arrangements can code for each of the amino acids, this means that we often need 2 nucleotide changes to get from one amino acid to another. This compounds our odds of getting just one meaningful (and possibly beneficial) change to 1 in 160 quadrillion, i.e., 16 followed by 16 zeros.

While this may be attainable by a large bacterial population in a matter of decades, it is a profound problem for less numerous and slowly reproducing creatures like mammals. For example, the human evolutionary line supposedly diverged from the chimpanzee line around 5 million years ago. Let me be as generous as possible here. If we were to take 10 million years, assume a continuous population of 100 million primates, and allow each to breed by age 10, then we are talking about only 100 trillion mutation candidates, i.e., 1 followed by 14 zeros. (Note: you do not multiply these three values to arrive at this number.) That's 3 orders of magnitude fewer events than what is needed to match the odds for getting just a 2-point mutation! We're talking about the odds for changing just a single amino acid here, and surely there would need to have been thousands of events at least this significant to get from primate to modern human. To go to just 3 specified nucleotide changes, which might get us 2 new amino acids (assuming one of the two needs only a single nucleotide change), we bump our odds up to approximately the total number of mammals that have ever existed on earth!

Another possible objection occurs to me at this point, which is certainly answerable, but I have gone on too long already. I will address it if comes up in comments.

I hope my readers have been able to follow my science, reasoning, and statistic, since I believe I'm addressing an issue that is absolutely devastating to evolutionary theory. In the face of such staggering improbabilities, evolution advocates seem to lean upon their presupposition that evolution is just a "fact," and, consequently, there must be some statistically viable mechanism to drive change that is as yet undiscovered. In my mind it is a case of "evolution of the gaps" thinking. This is not simply a matter of ironing out the details of a theory; this is foundational to the mechanism that is the supposed driver of the evolutionary process (or at least half of it). If one cannot say how something happened, and that it is within the realm of chance, then how can one say that it happened?

MIT Biology Class - Reading Between the Lines (1)

2007-10-24T13:03:00.001-05:00

I discovered last spring that the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) has been putting its courses online at no cost in what it calls its Open Courseware program. For each class this includes things like lecture notes, problem sets, reading assignments, and in some cases, the recorded lectures themselves. Having an interest in the sciences, and most recently, the debates over evolution vs. Intelligent Design, I decided it would be worth the time spent to listen through a course to get an overview of the latest-and-greatest teaching in biology.

This class was just what I was after, since it covered a lot of ground in a good bit of depth, from cellular composition, to cellular systems, to genetics and beyond. I also found it very enjoyable listening, and I was especially fond of the sessions taught by Professor Eric Lander, Director of the Broad Institute at MIT, and a principal leader of the Human Genome Project. His sessions were enthusiastic and often included glimpses into the cutting edge of genetics and medical science.

In fact, the class was handled by 4 different lecturers, and it should be noted that they all gave the nod to evolution. There were really no proofs offered for evolution, and nothing much really came up in the course of the lectures that I would consider implicit support for the theory. However, whenever the question of why any given biological system or behavior existed, it was simply asserted that it had evolved that way.

Of course, it might be argued that the "proofs" where absent for the very reason that this was not an "evolutionary biology" class, where proofs were the order of the day; but it should be noted that for those advocates of evolution, who insist that the science of biology cannot be engaged apart from Darwin's assumption, these professors did quite well in their instruction without dependence upon his theory. Perhaps what these people really mean is that one cannot have emotional satisfaction in this science without some explanatory device to fill the void of curiosity that arises upon witnessing the wonders of cellular biology. And since design is not allowed in "proper" science, one must have Darwin to sooth the restless heart.

What was nice is that in this classroom, isolated from the public debate over the theory of evolution, where rhetoric is thick and the data is selectively underscored, these instructors were completely candid and unguarded in what they shared and in their personal reactions. Of course, as one who is convinced of the truth of Intelligent Design, my radar was tuned to pick up evidence for design and difficulties for evolution. Even though these instructors had no intention of suggesting such things, I found that if I only read between the lines I gleaned a wealth of friendly materials.

While listening through the class I took the time to make notes, hoping to blog on them at some future point. I intend to do so now. Anyone interested in biology and/or Intelligent Design (ID) theory may find this stimulating and may wish to follow along. I aim to present this as a series that will consist of my individual lecture notes (perhaps a few per post) followed by my own thoughts. Each "lecture note" will contain some teaching or comment directly gleaned from the class. It will most often be my own paraphrase of the professor's words, but it will represent objective classroom content that is as free of my own "bias" as I can make it. My own personal reflection and application will follow each note.

So, without further adieu, I present the first collection of my observations on a MIT biology class.

Lecture Note:

In the introductory lecture, the professor reminisces about how different the class is from when he first took it himself, and even how different it is from when he first began to teach it. He points out that this is fairly unique to this field, since, for example, introductory mathematics and physics are based upon pretty much the same foundation knowledge that has been in place for decades or centuries. The main difference in biology is due to the fact that the cell has been discovered to be far more complicated than once realized. And more needs to be taken into account, at the very molecular level, in order to have even a basic understanding of what the cell is about.

My thoughts:

Indeed, in Darwin's time the cell was thought to be a mere blob of protoplasm. With that conception, it is far more understandable how one might image such a thing coming to exist by chance in some primordial, warm little pond, or how it might further evolve with minimal coaxing. However, in the intervening years, discovery after discovery has further unveiled the incredible complexity of what it is that must be explained. Any theoretical gains made in providing those explanations are quickly outpaced by the relentless hail of new discoveries. At some point it would seem reasonable to question the original theory of a chance-driven origin of life, especially when many of the alleged explanations are found to hit roadblocks or have counter-examples. If I show you a mound of miscellaneous bits of metal junk, and then tell you I've stirred it for a month and then found a skateboard in it, you may believe that. How about a unicycle? Maybe. But how about a 747?

Lecture Note:

The professor notes that none of the diagrams of the cell that the class is to see are accurate depictions of the true complexity of any given part of the cell. For instance, the cell wall is often shown as a membrane, perhaps with some embedded objects. In reality, it is a complex structure — with even a skeletal framework in Eukaryotes — packed with portals, pumps, and sensors.

My thoughts:

It should be understood that every structure in the cell is usually made up of numerous interrelated molecules that are precisely fitted for shape and electro-chemical properties. And behind the structures and molecular "machines" found throughout the cell, there is a host of supporting systems required to assemble, transport, power, and service them. The cell is a tightly packed container of super-molecules, which has rightly been compared to a city in its complexity and activity. The small step-wise gains that Darwin proposed would be unable to build most of the integrated systems found in the cell, much less the complex, dependent interactions between them. And since evolution does not "plan" for the future, it cannot accumulate the necessary parts in hopes of one day putting them all together to make an irreducibly complex structure (i.e., one that needs every one of its parts else it does nothing at all).

Some have proposed that simpler, similar systems could have been co-opted in the making of a more complex one, like the bacterial flagellum. But that is like saying that a skateboard could become a bicycle, which could become a motorcycle, which could become a car. While there is a certain functional progression here, there is also a whole lot of reengineering, not just small additions, that need to be done to get from one stage to the next. And remember, every intermediate stage must be operational and of some advantage to the cell, else it would not have come to survive and dominate over its peers. There are no evolutionary rental cars to be had while the motorcycle is in the shop being overhauled and reworked into a car; it must be effective and available for transportation throughout the process.

Lecture Note:

One passing reference to evolution was in a professor's review of the various features of the cell. The functionality was presented as "problems that the cell had to solve" and "solutions that it came up with." This would include things like interacting with the environment, acquiring energy sources, regulating the production of proteins, etc.

My thoughts:

This kind of language of intentionality is extremely common in the world of biology. For the most part, it is unconsciously done, and I'm sure that if I called this professor on it he would backpedal and look for some naturalistic way to express his point.

You see, according to evolutionary theory, the cell is just a sack of diverse chemicals. It does not intend anything and does not spend a moment looking for solutions to problems or improvements to itself. It thrives or perishes, reproduces or doesn't. If it had an insurmountable functional problem, it would simply cease to function. It would not lay around for days and years — certainly not generations — tinkering until it had found its solution. At every turn, at every stage of evolution, it and its peers must be viable creatures or go extinct.

If a problem arose to which the cell must adapt or die — like an environmental change in chemistry or temperature — it would not begin to spawn mutations in the hopes that one member of the colony would come up with the magic solution. No, the "solution" must already be resident in the community, or be miraculously produced in its last dying reproductive efforts. Evolution based on environmental pressure (to which appeal is often made) implies dramatic gains either in short time spans, or dramatic new features simply lying around in the cell for no purpose whatsoever until and in case chance comes to call.

Evolution evokes the idea of fortuitous mutations occurring at just the right time, or to satisfy just the right kind of need. But in reality, even when and if a cell might miraculously get a "good" mutation, it is still no guarantee that it is good in such a way as to satisfy the particular needs of a particular organism. For instance, if a cell were to suddenly acquire the ability to break down cellulose for food (like the bacteria in the stomach of a termite), that would be a good thing if cellulose were present in the environment. But if it were not, then this new ability would be no advantage at all. Indeed, it would be a hindrance, since the manufacture of the necessary enzymes would consume valuable resources that could be better used to help the organism flourish in its real environment. Our new multi-talented little cell would find itself out-competed by its less gifted peers, and would thus drown in the gene pool before it ever met up with a future piece of cellulose.

The order of the day for evolution is to adapt fast or die. There are no Boy Scouts, prepared for anything, in the Darwinian world. Having a backpack and pockets filled with goodies and tools may make you valuable to your fellow scouts, but on the rugged, shortsighted trails of Natural Selection it will only leave you in the dust of those carrying just what is needed to get over the next rise.

Not So Much in Common After All

2007-10-13T21:21:00.001-05:00

"In A Common Word Between Us and You, 138 Muslim scholars, clerics and intellectuals have unanimously come together for the first time since the days of the Prophet to declare the common ground between Christianity and Islam. . . . [T]he signatories to this message come from every denomination and school of thought in Islam. Every major Islamic country or region in the world is represented in this message, which is addressed to the leaders of all the world’s churches, and indeed to all Christians everywhere."

Thus summarizes the official website hosting this unprecedented letter from "Muslims" to "Christians." Having read a couple of articles on this, as well as the document itself, I have the following thoughts.

1) They begin by insisting that "The future of the world depends on peace between Muslims and Christians." This suggests that there is present (or at least potential) strife between the two. In spite of what the military actions against terrorists might be taken to suggest, it is not the case that the West is in a general war against the religion of Islam, much less that Christians are. For this reason, a peace offering may be seen as rather mundane, though comforting for those Christians who see too much "Islam" in terrorist camps. However, this would be a far more momentous letter if its signatories included members of Hamas, al-Qaeda, or any of the other numerous Muslim-run groups who presently believe that peace is not the answer to the differences between us.

2) I notice that the major, traditional Islamic nations are under-represented here, e.g., Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia. In fact, the list of signers largely comes from the more secular and westernized nations, and USA representatives make up a large part of the list. I have to wonder if the signers of this represent the more liberal side of Islam, and what the majority view is within those who are committed to the authority of the Qur'an.

3) This document goes beyond an appeal to mere social and political harmony, it seeks to make a case for some level of theological unity. In the opening page they appeal to Sura 3:64 (in the Qur'an) to say we should "Come to a common word between us and you." Interestingly, if we actually browse this book for ourselves we find the following texts shortly after this:

O people of the Scripture [Jews and Christians], why do you mix truth with falsehood and conceal the truth while you know? (3:71)
And whoever seeks a religion other than Islam, it will never be accepted of him, and in the Hereafter he will be one of the losers. (3:85)

4) One of the primary tenants of our supposed unity is our "love of God." Unfortunately, God is scarcely defined, but therein lays the difference with Christianity. G-O-D is just three consecutive letters of our alphabet. It is the meaning that you pour into them that is important, and Christianity and Islam pour from the apple and orange juice pitchers. I suspect that if "God" has gone to the trouble to give us the very specific information about Himself that we find in the Bible OR Qur'an, then He's likely to get rather cranky if we assume we can worship Him according to the standards of the other contradictory book.

5) In spite of their desire to find unity in God, they do a curious thing. No less than 17 times they quote Qur'anic passages that end by stating that God has no "partner" or "associate." But what is meant by this? Do we just have unity because neither religion is polytheistic? If we are to take the Qur'an seriously, then including these passages undercuts this whole ecumenical project. Let's let the Qur'an speak for itself. Observe Sura 5:72-75:

Certainly they disbelieve who say: Allah, He is the Messiah, son of Mary. And the Messiah said: O Children of Israel, serve Allah, my Lord and your Lord. Surely whoever associates (others) with Allah, Allah has forbidden to him the Garden and his abode is the Fire. And for the wrongdoers there will be no helpers. Certainly they disbelieve who say: Allah is the third of the three. And there is no God but One God. And if they desist not from what they say, a painful chastisement will surely befall such of them as disbelieve. Will they not then turn to Allah and ask His forgiveness? And Allah is Forgiving, Merciful. The Messiah, son of Mary, was only a messenger; messengers before him had indeed passed away. And his mother was a truthful woman. They both used to eat food. See how We make the messages clear to them! then behold, how they are turned away!

It seems they cannot help but jab (consciously or unconsciously) at the primary belief about God that stands between us: Christ as the Second Person of the Trinity.

6) With the "no partner" quotes, they even (gratuitously it seems) include one verse that ends with this text: "Each soul earneth only on its own account, nor doth any laden bear another's load." (Sura 6:164) I take this as a thinly veiled rebuke of the Christian doctrine of the substitutionary atonement of Christ, and probably was meant as such by Muhammad.

7) The Bible is quoted numerous times — both Old and New Testaments — as though it is a valid source of divine authority. Verses from Matthew and Mark are particularly quoted. But these are books that speak of the crucifixion and bodily resurrection of Jesus, which they deny, and that show the Father and Son in an intimate, unique relationship, the thought of which they abhor. Indeed, the very idea that God should have a "son" is explicitly rebuked in the Qur'an. Now, just what has survived the corruption that Muhammad claimed had come to the Gospel of Jesus? Perhaps just the sections they cite? In that event, let's look at the immediately surrounding text of one particular saying of Jesus they cite in both books (Matthew 22:34-40, Mark 12:28-33).

What is interesting is that immediately before the verses they cite we see Jesus echoing the Old Testament refrain, "I Am the God of Abraham Isaac, and Jacob." Why is this significant? Because Ishmael, who they believe themselves to be descendents of, who rivals Isaac in importance in the Qur'an, and is generally listed in this company, is not even mentioned here! And immediately after their cited verses we see Jesus making the case that the Messiah is to be in some way prior to, and Lord over, David. The Qur'an affirms Jesus as Messiah, but reserves Lordship for God alone and does not grant that Jesus, as a mere man, could preexist His own birth.

8) Another appeal to unity is made stating that "Muhammad brought nothing fundamentally or essentially new." This is done by reference to Suras such as the following:

Naught is said to thee (Muhammad) but what already was said to the messengers before thee. (41:43)
I am no new thing among the messengers of God. (46:9)
We revealed the Scripture with the truth, confirming whatever Scripture was before it, and a watcher over it. (5:48)

If this were true, and Muhammad were essentially underscoring the prior revelation, then we might simply put the Qur'an aside and go with the original teachings we already have. Unfortunately, that won't play for Islam, since the unique and conflicting doctrines found in the Qur'an are indispensable parts of the true religion. In practice, for them, it is the Bible that may be set aside, since it must of necessity be a corrupt and/or misunderstood book. In order to sympathize with the Christian apathy towards Muhammad's claim to stand for Judeo-Christian orthodoxy, I would ask them to contemplate their own response to the claim that Baha'i is the true expression of Islam, bringing nothing essentially new to it.

9) When justifying the unique Muslim interpretation of Jesus as Messiah they insert this parenthetical comment: "but Christians themselves anyway have never all agreed with each other on Jesus Christ's nature." So, since Christians differ over Jesus, then why not allow the Muslim view of Him into the pale of orthodoxy? The problem with this is that with all the differences that Christians may have in their theology, none of them comes even close to teaching the purely human view of Jesus that Islam maintains. Even the most challenging disputes from the first few centuries of the church never were based upon the idea that Jesus was "just a messenger" (i.e., just a man). In fact, there is almost universal agreement within Christendom on exactly this point. Rome, Orthodoxy, and Protestants alike can comfortably unite in reciting something like the ancient Nicene Creed, which states:

We believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only Son of God, eternally begotten of the Father, God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, of one Being with the Father. Through him all things were made. For us and for our salvation he came down from heaven: by the power of the Holy Spirit he became incarnate from the Virgin Mary, and was made man. For our sake he was crucified under Pontius Pilate; he suffered death and was buried. On the third day he rose again in accordance with the Scriptures; he ascended into heaven and is seated at the right hand of the Father. He will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead, and his kingdom will have no end.

Pretty specific, and poles apart from the understanding taught in the Qur'an.

10) In the final pages of the letter we read, "As Muslims, we say to Christians that we are not against them and that Islam is not against them — so long as they do not wage war against Muslims on account of their religion, oppress them and drive them out of their homes." Perhaps before they seek to pursue the finer points of theological unity with Christians they should begin by working to stop the Christian persecution in the many countries where their religion dominates. That would be at least one thing about which we could get excited.

Adventures in Missing the Point

2007-10-06T14:13:00.001-05:00

I enjoy watching debates and listening to opposing parties mix it up on news programs. Unfortunately, it can be quite frustrating to watch sometimes, especially if the guy on my side of the issue doesn't think of that perfect response that would be raised "if I were him." The most aggravating thing is when my man allows himself to get bogged down in an argument raised against him (or her), but doesn't even notice that it is entirely beside the main point of the discussion or that it is based upon a flawed assumption. This is such a common thing in the world of debate and advocacy that examples abound. Perhaps discussing a few might give the reader a better sense of what I mean in addition to becoming better equipped to spot this polemical pothole in the future.
Anti-War Rhetoric

Without getting into the politics of whether or not I support the military presence in Iraq, let me just mention a common tactic I see in defense of the idea that we should pull our troops out. Images, stories, and statistics of the dead and injured are regularly employed to show us the horror of this thing. How awful; why would we do something that would cause such misery for ourselves and the civilians of another country? Worse, the occasional moral atrocities of our own people are indiscriminately publicized, as if to suggest that this is what we are all about and what such an occupation amounts to.
But this is not really an argument against this war. If casualties and regrettable abuses were a valid defeater for the idea of going to war, then we should not have joined battle against Nazi Germany, where such things happened in vastly greater numbers. Yet few are so shortsighted as to suggest that the losses were not justified in that conflict. The point is not to lament over the terrible effects of military action; the point is whether or not we should engage in this particular offensive. All outrage over the victims simply assumes that we should not and misses the real point of focus for the discussion.
Pro-Choice Tactics

"Every child should be a wanted child." "It's a private decision between me and my doctor." "It's a matter of conscience between me and my God." "Stop oppressing women." "Don't like abortion, then don't have one."
These are the kinds of statements that are often tossed out by "pro-choice" advocates. Some allow themselves to get caught up in a discussion provoked by such bumper sticker defenses, but they are really nothing so much as chaff from a fighter jet to distract from the real target. The primary point in this debate is whether or not the unborn is a valuable human person who should not be killed over matters of choice and convenience.
One of the ways to drive the point home is to substitute a toddler in place of the fetus. For example, we could revise and expand some of the statements as follows. "Every child should be a wanted child, so I should be free to dispose of my unwanted toddlers." Or, "Don't like killing toddlers, then don't kill yours." Or how about, "It's a private matter between me, my doctor, and my God. If we're okay with killing my toddler, then who are you to get involved?"
If this kind of thinking evokes horror in the mind of the "choice" advocate, then it is clear that he or she does not believe that the unborn is a human person. If the fetus is, then none of these kinds of slogans are justification for murder. But if the fetus is not a valuable human person, then no justification is necessary. The point of focus in this issue, then, is the nature of the unborn.
Gay Advocacy

The topic of same-sex marriage came up on a radio show the other day, and by way of support for it the host shared this observation: "I never even thought about it till my two friends got married. And then I thought, 'Wow, they seem so happy together. I should stay out of the way there.'"
The problem is that there are plenty of things that make people happy of which even most liberal thinkers disapprove. If you haven't already thought of some yourself, here are a few examples I could offer: smoking, alcohol abuse, drug use, dog fighting, pedophilia, rape, and (for our green friends) driving a gas guzzling SUV. The mere fact that someone might like to do these things does not in itself justify them. Support for the behavior must stand upon other grounds.
This roundabout defense is one in a series that includes appeals to consent, human rights, and genetics. But if a behavior turns out to be unacceptable, then no amount of consent is relevant, there are no rights to it, and even genetic predisposition does not apply. Simply replace same-sex relations with pedophilia to see the failure of each of these ploys. It doesn't matter how much happiness, consent, and biological predisposition is involved, it still won't fly (at least not at the time of this writing). There is something deeper at issue that is the point of concern with things like pedophilia and same-sex marriage that washes out the mere subjective defenses.
Christian Skepticism

This summer I had a conversation with a family friend who fancies himself a well-informed atheist. His objections were all of a kind, which included complaints about the crusades, questioning Constantine's motives, and psychoanalyzing believers. While these are all interesting topics that can be exhaustively explored they really miss the important point of whether or not the God of the Bible is real. Constantine could be a scoundrel, Christians could behave miserably in war, and people could be spiritually needy, yet the biblical authors could still have recorded actual events.
And somewhat related, I recently listened to a radio show caller ask the host how to handle a friend of his who refused to recognize his definition of the word "faith." It seems the Christian wanted to define it as trust in what you have good reason to believe, while his skeptical friend wanted to define it as belief in what you have no evidence for. Unfortunately, their bickering over definitions only reflected the really important point of difference between them. The problem is that the skeptic does not believe that there really is any good evidence for Christianity, and so faith must necessarily be blind. Even if this fellow could accept the Christian understanding of faith, for the sake of argument, the conversation would only be stuck on the "good reason to believe" part of the definition.
Intelligent Design Debate

I'm currently listening through an audio book on Intelligent Design (ID), which features various scholars on both sides of the debate. As one of the introductory questions, the host asked each evolution supporter what he thought about Intelligent Design. The answers were remarkable in their consistency, and included such comments as the following: Evolution is well established and silly to argue with. ID is just creationism with a pseudo-scientific façade. ID is not science. ID rejects natural explanations. ID is a religious movement.
But whether or not these charges are accurate is not really the point. So what if it were true that every ID advocate is a fundamentalist Christian? So what if ID ran afoul of the current definition of "science?" The really important question is, Are certain things in the biological world the product of Intelligent Design?
What I did not hear was any kind of substantive response to this bottom-line point, only fussing with semantics, motivations, and implications. No one responded by saying that complex protein systems do not actually resemble existing machinery of human design. No one responded that we actually know the chemical pathways to any molecular machinery. No one responded that mutational statistics have been applied to the problem of gene evolution and found to be within reasonable probabilities.
Conclusion
The point is the point. Learn to identify the crux of the matter and the hinge upon which any given issue turns. Be vigilant for the presuppositions and worldview assumptions underlying someone's arguments. And don't be diverted by non-productive and non-essential side issues. There are a million peripheral concerns to debate, but if the distractions are winnowed you may just be surprised at the fundamental simplicity of many issues. It may not get you any closer to agreement, but you'll at least be riding the point without swirling aimlessly in the wake of the debate.

Santa Claus Morality

2007-09-06T13:13:00.001-05:00

"I think [heaven is] a bad concept to have because then everything you do, you want to do good things in order to get to Heaven. Then everything becomes a selfish act, and I hate that, it creates bad patterns in your mind. I like doing things not as a means to get into Heaven but for the sake of doing it themselves."
Natalie Portman, Actress, Inside the Actors Studio, Episode #11.7 (2004).

"The threat of damnation is designed to be an incentive to right action; but this is a phony morality. Humanists think we should do good for goodness' sake, not for the selfish prospect of reaping individual rewards or avoiding punishment."
Dan Barker, Atheist and Former Pastor, "For Goodness Sake", Freedom From Religion Foundation.

"I believe in goodness for goodness' sake, not because you're getting some reward in the afterlife. If you're being good for an award, then what sort of person are you anyway?"
Bill Maher, Political Satirist, "I'm spreading the anti-gospel", Chicago Sun Times (10/24/04).

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This common objection is meant to be a defeater for the concept of Christian morality, but it really does nothing so much as to demonstrate a deep intuitive knowledge about morality. Claiming that we ought to "be good for goodness' sake" assumes four very important things about the nature of morality.

Morality is Objectively Real

The first thing this claim demonstrates is the belief that good, and by extension, evil, are real things. Indeed, "good" is being held up as some ideal, perhaps even independent of God, which we should strive to pursue for its own pure ontological beauty. For this reason, a moral relativist is not well served by this objection. In his mind, morality is simply behavioral preferences and cultural conventions. Morality is not something "out there," apart from humanity and applicable to all times and places. There is, then, nothing other for the sake of which we might attempt to be good.

If there is no objectively real morality, then we can only be good for our own sakes, that is, for the sake of our own feelings about morality. We might be good for the personal benefits that are achieved by acting in certain ways, but we cannot be good for the sake of an abstract, transient concept. It is not something that we separate from ourselves and put upon a pedestal as though it had an existence apart from us, its maker. You might just as well say we should eat ice cream for the sake of The Favorite Flavor. No, we eat it for the sake of our enjoyment, whatever our favorite happens to be, assuming we even have one.

Even if "good" turns out to be a changing and subjective thing, then the very idea that we should take pains to follow it is itself an objective principle, which would in turn foil moral relativism. If morality is not a real thing with some purpose and value behind it, then what right or meaning is there in a relativist telling us we should bow to the idol of morality? And exactly whose idol should we bow to anyway?

Moral relativism makes it difficult to meaningfully speak in moral terms, but it is the legacy of those who do not allow a God that meddles in human affairs. Consequently, atheists, who employ this objection most often, are admitting far too much in even voicing it, since it requires morality to be tangible and particular to even make sense.

Morality is Personal

The second thing that this claim implies is an understanding that morality has a personal basis. We don't do things "for the sake of" inanimate objects. We do things for the sake of personal beings who we seek to honor, impress, love, protect, appease, etc. It makes sense to say that I should care about hygiene for the sake of my spouse and stay married for the sake of the kids, but it does not make sense to say that I should shower for the sake of the soap and stay married for the sake of the appliances.

To say that we should be good for the sake of goodness is to ascribe a personal nature to morality. But this cannot be done if morality is merely a human, subjective phenomenon. Yet even atheists have a deep sense that we ought to do certain things and that other things simply should not be done. But "should" and "ought" are the language of moral incumbency, which is born of law. And law implies a law giver.

The question is whether we humans are making up these laws ourselves as we go along, or whether the laws have been written for us by someone higher. If by ourselves, then we can only be good for the sake of our own self-interest. But if morality has another author, then we should be good for the sake of that One, not the inanimate thing derived from that One.

The Highest Morality is Selfless

The third thing that this claim demonstrates is the belief that self-serving morality is a parody of true virtue. To say that we should be good for the sake of goodness suggests that we should behave in a way that looks beyond the resulting personal benefits. You aren't thinking about morality in the traditional sense if doing the right thing requires you to first ask, "What's in it for me?"

But if morality is simply a creation of society, then it will surely reflect (at best) the shared self-interests of the individuals which compose that society. And if we are just creatures of nature, then evolution (our supposed creator) is the ultimate master of our moral urges. The problem with this is that evolution is selfish by definition. Its primary focus is the survival and competitive advantage of individual gene carriers. Advantages to broader communities are of concern only insofar as they benefit individual reproducers.

There is really nothing practical about the idea that we should expend our precious resources to care for, and allow reproductive rights to, the unproductive and genetically inferior members of society. The theory of evolution certainly doesn't give cause for such thinking. And there is no sense in the idea that a fit and fertile person should lay down his or her life to save the life of someone else who is weak and impaired. Yet one of the most egregious moral crimes in society is to abuse or neglect the helpless, and one of the noblest acts is to dedicate one's life to their aid. This is self-defeating sentimentalism in a purely material world, but makes perfect sense if there is something higher than self and the survival of the fittest.

Good Works do Not Earn God's Favor

The fourth thing that this claim reveals is the intuitive knowledge that works-based righteousness is a spiritually bankrupt idea. If the Christian God indeed exists, then it would be petty for us to only seek to do good in order to win His favor. The objector is right to see such self-interest as tarnish on all our good works, and just how good would we need to be for a God to whom we owe everything in the first place? Seventy-five percent good? Fifty percent good? Whatever the line, it would mean that both heaven and hell are home to many borderline cases. 'Tis an awfully wide gulf that could separate two souls by one four-letter word.

The irony is that Christianity does not even teach that we win heaven by virtue of our good works. In fact, it may be the only religion that explicitly rejects such an idea. For example, Islam actually teaches that our good deeds must outweigh our bad, and Eastern religions teach that we must work our way to enlightenment through various moral and spiritual practices. By contrast, Christianity teaches that we must put aside our futile thoughts of measuring up to God's perfect standard and throw ourselves upon the mercy of His court. We have but to accept, as spiritual beggars, the provision He has made to cover our sin and win our righteousness in Christ.

Good works come as a result of our love and gratitude toward our creator and redeemer; they are not the cause of our redemption. The Christian ideal is to be good for God's sake, not for the sake of what He can do for us. God is not to be confused with Santa Claus. To think otherwise is to make the mistake that Satan made regarding Job's motivation for righteous living (Job 1:9-11).

Conclusion

The claim that we should "be good for goodness' sake" is problematic at face value for the non-religious and does not even manage to apply to the Christian understanding of God and morality. It assumes a rather more substantial view of morality than atheism has a right to claim; it assumes a higher form of virtue than what evolution would be concerned to impose; and it assumes something about how God ought to view moral effort that Christians have been teaching all along.

Matthew 12:36 says that every idle word will be brought to account in the final judgment. The use of this complaint will surely come back to haunt those who have applied it against Christianity and have not availed themselves of God's mercy, do not think of themselves as being so bad as to deserve hell, and even go so far as to doubt the existence of an Author of morality. The objections of the skeptic often say far too much and contain the seeds of his own destruction.

Radical Objectors of Radical Religion

2007-08-28T22:15:00.001-05:00

Newshound Andrew Breitbart is no Christian, by his own admission. In fact, I recently listened to him fill in for the vacationing Dennis Miller, on Miller's own radio show, and I heard him make several very un-Christian statements about his personal moral views. However, he is, in many ways, what I have come to call a "common-sense conservative." That is one who holds certain conservative views, not because they are logically consistent parts of some larger belief system, but because they just seem to be true and right when the politics are dropped (or before they are acquired) and the real-world observations roll in.

As a Christian, I found one of Breitbart's lucid observations particularly refreshing. It was in response to a thoroughly postmodern caller anxious to keep her religiously pluralistic Tao in balance by claiming that radical Islam was no different or worse than radical Christianity, and that it was no more or less common. Here was his rather unsympathetic reply, which also speaks to why he and many secularists like him have parted company with their peers to the left:

If you can tell me that there are Christians in this country that are as radical, or even in the ballpark as radical, as radical Islam, then we're living in two different worlds.
I am not a Christian. I'm not a practicing Christian. As a matter of fact, I was a trained secularist in college. I was trained to hate Christianity. I no longer do, because they kept telling me that Christianity was this extreme religion, and the evangelicals were going to come over the hill, and they were going to create a Taliban. And the second that the Taliban showed up, the second that radical Islam put its flagpole down on America and decreed us evildoers, the Left has been AWOL. It does not even have a language — a lexicon — to deal with the raw evil that is radical Islam. And to talk about Christianity in the same sentence as it causes my head to spin.

As astonishingly ill-conceived as it seems to be, I have often heard this comparison — from Rosie O'Donnell on The View to Thomas Friedman of The New York Times. But let me ask a very basic question:

What comparison do Christians, by the most generous definition of that term and of the most radical form, have to radical Muslims who are numerous enough to form competing armies; who commonly have their entire holy book memorized; who are often students and teachers of recognized religious schools; who assault their enemies with directly applicable scripture verses on their lips; who have deep historical precedence for their actions after the pattern of their own religion's founder; and whose more moderate peers seldom even bother to speak against them?

At what point may we begin calling the radicals "devout" and the moderates "liberal?" Perhaps the confusion is in the idea that "devout" means holy, peaceful, and self-sacrificing rather than one who is earnestly devoted to a belief or cause. The irony is that the former conception of the term is the legacy of our western Judeo-Christian theological tradition.

If we want to make comparisons between two religious systems let's not be narrow and selective in our comparison; let's compare the character of those who are most sincerely and accurately following the teachings and traditions of that religious system. That being said, and with a little historical knowledge of Islam's roots in hand, let us ask ourselves who would be more likely to help pack a truck full of explosives and send it off into the camp of unbelievers: Jesus or Muhammad? What about the Christians of the first hundred years, who spread their message across the Roman Empire through private evangelism under the heavy thumb of the secular and the Jewish authorities, versus the Muslims who had taken much of the old Roman Empire into possession by the sword within 100 years after Muhammad's death?

We can only pray that all of Islam becomes apostate and the more moderate, liberal version of it prevails.

Keep Your Mitts Off My Meaning

2007-08-06T20:00:00.000-05:00

Though it is often disputed by atheists, it seems to most Christians a self-evident truth that if there is no God there is no meaning to life. There can only be a purpose if there is a planner — someone to establish that purpose and equip us and the creation to that end. Of course, you could always appeal to evolution as our maker, but then you are stuck with only a meaning that chance has wrought: to survive and breed. This is deficient both in its banality and in the nature of its ultimate origin. It is not the kind of answer people have in mind when they ask, "What is the meaning of life?" And if they ask the further question of what meaning there is to reproduction and survival they quickly fall into the pit of nihilism.

The thoughtful atheist's reply, having the all too common allergy to nihilism, is to admit the lack of meaning in any objective sense but to point out our resulting freedom to define life's "meaning" for ourselves. How very glorious! We get to dream up our own answer to the most foundational question of existence. Best of all, since there is no right answer, there is also no wrong answer. Who is to say to another, "No, you have picked the wrong meaning; you must choose some other"? There is no supposed objective standard in play to constrain one in crafting a personal meaning — no principle to demand that it must be according to, say, scientific truth. If there were, then that in itself would suggest some form of objective meaning to our existence.

Even though the atheist's meaning of choice is often some form of secular humanism and scientific triumphalism, it is not to say that this is the correct meaning for all mankind. It may seem preferable to live boldly according to the truth that there is no God and to soldier on for the glory and survival of the human race, but that attitude is not ultimately better than those who think that humanity is a blight on nature and we should permit ourselves to go extinct. We may not like some people's invented meaning, but it is theirs to make nonetheless. That is, if atheism is true.

The problem is that many atheists do not have a live and let live attitude about metaphysical beliefs (though I admit that some do). They feel that religious adherents are wrong, foolish, delusional, or even downright wicked in some cases. Of late, some rather high-profile atheists have even been so bold as to suggest that a war must be waged against religion. It is not enough for atheists to (understandably) seek to partition themselves from religion so that they can be free to follow their own values; they want to disabuse religionists of their wrongheaded metaphysical ideas. They want them to live according to the atheist's own idea of "truth" and how we ought to respond in the face of it. They want to preach it in the schools and from every media pulpit that they can command.

Ironically, it is the atheist's version of truth that entails, at the outset, that there is no truth regarding meaning and moral principles. It is the prerogative of humanity to identify value and meaning for itself, and there are many who are busily doing just that who do not happen to be atheists. At least the theist believes, rightly or wrongly, that his truth is a real Truth that matters for all parties. He may be deluded and bothersome, but he is at least logically consistent in his attempts to proselytize others.

The atheist is like the bully who tells his little sister, enjoying her tea party, that her bear and doll guests are just dumb, stuffed creatures and that she's a silly girl living in a fantasy world. If she does not run off sobbing to her bed she might at least abandon her game, the spell broken and the fun evaporated. You see, it is in the illusion that the fun is to be found. Likewise, it is in the belief that Christianity is actually true that the comfort and meaning lies.

The typical atheist means to purge the Christian of his religion if possible or at least the propositional truth of it. All this in the name of the "truth" as he sees it, cold and hard as it may be. He may just as well tell our little tea party princess that she is a chance byproduct of a meaningless natural process; the only reason her parents appear to love and care for her is because of biochemical mechanisms meant to insure the survival of their own DNA; and when she dies she will return to the nothingness from which she came and no one will remember her in 200 years or so. When she runs off sobbing to her bed he can feel justly satisfied that the truth has been served and that he's made a contribution toward insuring that she does not grow up to continue having juice and crackers with dolls or in memory of imaginary crucified deities.

The evangelizing atheist is a metaphysical bully who presses his own truth upon the religious for his personal amusement and self-interest. He is certainly not doing them any favors, since I am not sure that any atheist has ever gone to the grave with a smile and many have gone by their own hands. The sad dilemma for the atheist is that if he is right, then there is no right, from morality to meaning. He can lobby and vote and whine all he likes for his cause, but the last thing he can do is sell it as the truth to which all the world should submit. In doing so he only compounds his sin of actually being wrong about the existence of God. But that is another discussion.

Moral Atheists - Good by what measure?

2007-07-27T21:31:00.000-05:00

In all my interactions with atheists I have noticed a curious thing: they are very keen to be thought of as "good" people and insist that it does not require a deity in order to seek to act morally. Indeed, they claim that it is nobler to be good for its own sake than to be good for the sake of rewards gained or punishments avoided, which they believe theism entails. There are several problems inherent in this idea, but what I want to explore here is the problem of defining the "good" and considering whether we find atheists, in fact, acting according to such a definition.

(Note: for the purposes of this essay when I use the term "atheist" I mean anyone who builds his or her ethics apart from the idea that moral imperatives find their source outside of nature. I might alternately have chosen a term like "secular humanist," but that is at least a form of functional atheism.)

In my last post there was general agreement by my atheist respondents that morality must reduce to subjective human constructions in a world without anything beyond matter and human minds. Even if our moral urges come to us as a result of evolution or social conditioning it is still up to the individual to determine which, if any, of these urges is to be preferred. If it were to end here an atheist could have little further to say against those, like me, who disagree with them. It would simply be one preference holder against another, and all differences would be settled by sophistry and coercion (the emerging methodologies in our culture, by the way).

As it turns out, most atheists who like to think of themselves as moral do so with a sense that they are saying something particularly meaningful. The implication is that they have access to moral knowledge that they are committed to put into practice. It is something like saying that you are a good baseball player, which refers to a particular game with known rules and objectives that you skillfully follow. If this is not true, then a moral atheist is just asserting that they follow their own desires; they are saying little more than, "I do what I feel like doing, and whatever I do I call 'good.'"

For the atheist who insists on being seen as moral, he is faced with a humanistic version of Euthyphro's Dilemma. Either morality is something imposed upon him by forces outside of his control, or "good" is just whatever he happens to favor and "bad" is just whatever he happens to reject. The buck must stop somewhere, and for the atheist it must be somewhere within nature.

The solution to this dilemma as it applies to deity is not available, since human will and character is not, by nature, a uniform and unchanging thing that morality can be said to describe. The only universally descriptive axiom regarding human behavior is, "Nobody's perfect." Such a statement only begins to make sense if there is some "perfection" to which humans fail to conform. But if humans define the standard, and all humans fail it, from whence comes the impossible scale?

If morality is purely subjective, then it is meaningless to claim to be moral, since everyone is a subject and can be moral by definition. But if morality is not pure subjectivity, then to what external (though non-transcendent) standard could an atheist appeal in order to measure himself as "good?" In my experience, the three most common things offered are "reason," "moral intuition," and "natural constraints." Let's look at each and see where they fail the atheist, or vice versa.

Reason

As the late philosopher James Rachels said, "Morality is, at the very least, the effort to guide one's conduct by reason."

It's fine to be reasonable, and I'm not sure if anyone has ever claimed that their moral system was "unreasonable." Unfortunately, "reason" is not enough; it is no better than a car without fuel and a destination. If I told you to go to Xanadu, and you asked me how to get there, it would not be a helpful answer to say, "By car." Additionally, if you asked why you should care about going to Xanadu, I would have to appeal to something other than the car to make an answer.

As a car is only a tool for comfortable ground travel, reason is only a tool for careful, logical thinking. Tools in themselves do nothing; they must be employed for specific purposes. Someone wishing to use his reason must first be given ideas and objectives to process, like a math problem or a puzzle. And like a math problem, reason needs rules of engagement. For math, these are the laws of mathematics and logic, which may themselves be discovered by reason but are not produced by it. And like a puzzle, reason needs a known goal toward which to work.

Reason itself is not a moral system. It can only help you navigate through the world by way of the constraints and objectives contained within a given moral system. Reason may help to refine an existing system, but it is not the author of the foundations upon which any system rests. That foundation is something prior to the exercise of reason — things like preferences, intuitions, divine revelation, or natural constraints. If I see a woman drowning, I may use reason to assist me in determining the best way to provide aid, but it is something else that tells me that I ought to risk my safety to help her if I am able.

So, reason is not enough. It is only the vehicle between our true moral driver and our behavior destination. It still remains to identify what it is that employs our reason toward its ends.

Moral intuitions

One atheist recently said to me, "I do have objective moral standards. They just happen to be inspired by reason and compassion, not religion." Adding compassion we have gone a step further, but is it enough?

"Compassion" hints at something deep and emotional, which is not simply the product of reason. It is like our love of music, the scent of a rose, and the look of a sunset. These touch our hearts not because we have reasoned that they should, but because of the very mystery of human nature.

This same atheist (and others), when cornered on his grounding for certain moral positions, claimed that he just knew that some things were wrong. If a statement like this is not simply referring to deeply seated preferences, then it must be the case that there are shared human intuitions. A moral atheist might then claim to be a disciple of these intuitions.

If these are indeed human intuitions, then this implies that we are not required to merely introspect upon our own personal feelings on any given matter. Indeed, anyone else's feelings ought to be as good as our own. However, since we observe that there are differences of opinion on certain moral issues it must be the case that some people can be mistaken. They can either mismanage their intuitions, like applying the moral "good" of tolerance to criminal behavior, or they can warp them by way of personal bias, like saying that charity is not "good" because of the love of their own wealth.

Even if moral intuitions are real and universal things, the danger in leaning upon them is that one may easily mistake personal inclinations for actual intuitions. For this reason, a true student of moral intuitions will look to the corporate conscience of humanity to temper his subjectivity. He will also understand that no matter how much he might personally desire to engage in a behavior, or tolerate it in others, that behavior may in fact be contrary to our core intuitions.

In my observation of atheism it appears to be the case that they are primarily social liberals. There are many controversial behaviors that they are perfectly willing to tolerate or even celebrate, and the line is often drawn only where issues of harm and consent are at stake. But surely there is more to our moral intuitions than, "I won't rob and kill you if you don't rob and kill me."

In the process of being inclusive, atheists implicitly affirm as "good," or at least morally neutral, certain behaviors that may well be candidate items for our moral intuitions. I'll use homosexuality and abortion as examples. If our intuitions do not cover matters of sexuality, reproduction, and how we ought to treat our offspring, then I can't imagine that they are very comprehensive and helpful guides to begin with.

In spite of the increasing secularism of society and the continual advocacy for same-sex relationships homosexuals still find themselves victim of a large-scale cultural "homophobia." Even the most liberal states cannot seem to muster the votes to resist same-sex marriage bans. It takes judicial activism to circumvent the popular stance on this issue. And the average person (religious or otherwise) still has a reaction to flamingly effeminate males and struggles to push past the "yuck factor" when confronted with the reality of what homosexual relations actually entail (all jokes about attractive co-ed lesbians aside).

Are the limited gains toward the full acceptance of homosexuality just because society has not yet been fully "enlightened" to the virtues of sexual diversity, or is it that homosexuality actually rides against the current of our moral intuitions? What is it that should fire our intuitions that homosexuality is a morally good lifestyle: That families should consist of non-reproducing units? That penises and colons seem designed for each other? Homosexuality is an anomaly that defies sexual teleology from the most superficial to the deepest social level.

I suggest that it is merely the fact that some people happen to have desires for same-sex relations that causes us to wrestle with our intuitions about what is sexually natural and good. And this subjective bias seems to carry over to supporters of the behavior in that, according to The Journal of NIH Research, the strongest predictor of positive attitudes toward homosexuals is that an individual knows a homosexual. Having a personal investment in a behavior — either first-hand or via friends and family — fosters less objectivity regarding that behavior. And no matter how "nice" homosexuals might be, how much we may love a particular one, or how much pleasure they derive from their behavior, it says nothing about its moral status.

On the matter of abortion, a significant percentage of the population is flatly opposed to the practice. Of those who are "pro-choice," many are personally opposed to abortion. Of those not opposed to it, many say they don't like it and would like to make it rare. And of those who have actually had one, it is common to see them writing goodbye notes to their fetuses or suffering guilt and depression for years afterwards.

There is nothing on the face of it that would make parents killing their own offspring seem morally benign, and there is a reason why abortion centers prefer not to show ultrasounds to their customers, that abortion photos send pro-choice advocates into orbit, and that showing an abortion on TV is a taboo, or at least rare, act. It is an ugly thing that nobody likes and that we'd rather keep shrouded in privacy and ignorance, but that we feel "necessary" because some parents find their offspring's existence to conflict with their own personal desires.

Again, the reason we would override our moral intuitions regarding this nasty issue is merely to accommodate those who happen to want to do it. Indeed, it is murder if someone else kills an unborn baby, but it is just elective surgery if the mother gives consent to the act (remember, they call it "pro-choice," not "pro-abortion"). If no woman chose to terminate her pregnancy we would not intuit that we were missing a valuable maternal rite, just as if no one were compelled toward same-sex relations we would not feel that we were missing an important sexual demographic. Life would go on its merry way.

If one wishes to be considered "good" by measure of human intuitions, then it is not particularly noble to adhere only to those moral principles that one is not tempted to violate. The minimalistic ethic turns a deaf ear to a whole raft of moral intuitions and focuses, instead, primarily on those behaviors that have obvious impact to life and property and are already broadly condemned by all but sociopaths. It is pragmatic and little more. The typical atheist's libertarianism is not the pinnacle of virtue; it is simply an institutionalized apathy toward confronting common vice.

Natural constraint

Another atheist (near and dear to this blog), who is intent on finding an objective basis for his morality, has suggested what I will call "natural constraints." As I understand it, this is the idea that natural law and consequence provides the license and limits for our behavior. Just as gravity and topography guide the flow of water, physics guides the flow of morality. So, drug use and violence are "bad" because they damage body and mind, whereas love and charity are "good" because they contribute to physical and mental health. While this may be helpful input for certain moral equations, it is not adequate to define morality itself.

The funny thing about moral laws is that, unlike physical laws, we can choose to break them. Water has no choice but to flow downhill, just as we have no choice but to fall when tripped. However, no matter what the moral precept and where it originates, humans can manage to violate it. Even if it is true that natural health constraints play against such behaviors as smoking and overeating, it still remains to be argued why one should care about such consequences and curb ones behavior as a result. Nature and its workings are just neutral data and causal systems; one must impose a prior moral theory upon it to say how we ought to respond as a result of its operation. Some other premise must be supplied to make the connection between bad for you and morally bad to do.

While it may seem self-evident to assert that whatever is unhealthy for you and others is to be considered wrong, there are several problems inherent in this foundational idea of natural constraint theory.

First, many people don't concern themselves about consequences and some flat out rebuke them. How many millions of people regularly eat junk food, smoke cigarettes, drink too much, and/or are couch potatoes? The vast majority of these know there are health consequences, but either have made a conscious choice to gamble against them or are committed to take them when they come. A perfect example is one of my friend's responses when I commented on his affinity for meat and carbohydrates to the exclusion of vegetables. "Everybody dies sometime," he said. His own dining pleasure trumps all other considerations.

According to natural constraint theory, then, everyone who knowingly and intentionally embraces unhealthy pursuits is engaging in immoral behavior. From cigarettes to junk food to sunbathing: it's all vice. And since promiscuous sex and homosexuality are bedfellows with many undesirable consequences, then these become morally suspect as well. Merely having the desire — casually or compulsively — toward an unhealthy lifestyle would not change the morality of it, since exceptions to the rule of natural risk and consequence would negate the very system and return the atheist back to the dominance of subjective preference over any other criteria.

Second, in many cases it is not so apparent what is a "good" consequence or result. It is easy enough to say that we should not stab someone for health reasons, but it slightly complicates things to ask if a surgeon is wrong to cut. No problem there, I'm sure we can all agree that the end healing justifies the means in this case, but what about how we should treat the poor? What about our children? Should we just hand them whatever they need and desire? The answer to these questions will ultimately lead to further questions of purpose and ideals: what kinds of people do we want to make of our children and the underprivileged? What end do we have in mind and is it worth the necessary means to achieve it?

There can be diverse answers to such a question that all fit within a natural constraint ethic and which will influence how we arrive at our goals. For instance, if our goal is weighted more toward hard work and virtue than wealth and pleasure we may use distinctly different means in the process of getting there that would not otherwise seem reasonable to us. For this reason many important issues will be driven by philosophies that precede the natural constraint ethic. Where do those come from and how do they not reduce to preferences on par with a bias toward chocolate over vanilla ice cream?

Third, some things we will always insist to be wrong even though they harm nothing at all. For instance, if a doctor fondles a patient under anesthesia, who is "hurt," especially if the patient has no way of finding out? Is it only wrong if the person finds out, thus suffering emotional distress? Is it only wrong because the patient might find out? Nature and her effects cannot give us guidance here; we must appeal to some other more abstract principles of "rights," "privacy," and "consent," which are difficult enough on their own to defend as something other than subjective standards. We would need not only a transcendent standard of human dignity but a god's-eye witness of such "harmless," anonymous thrills to claim any wrong had actually been done.

Even if our responses to natural constraints were uniform and it could be said to be a self-evident basis for morality, I do not find that in practice the limits of nature are given principled deference. By "principled" I mean that the cues of nature are read and taken as the primary drivers of absolute morality. Nature would be said to whisper the ways of virtue and we would be her devoted students. As it turns out, nature is treated more like an overbearing father who is obeyed wherever necessary and evaded wherever possible.

Let's visit our twin issues of homosexuality and abortion again. An unbiased reading of nature suggests that sex is best reserved for long-term relationships between members of the opposite sex. Unwanted pregnancies, communicable diseases, and other related health issues (not to mention psychological issues) are clear consequences of a libertarian sexual ethic.

Someone committed to natural constraint theory would need to consider the idea that homosexuality should be classed as immoral due to the inherent risks involved, and that abortions are simply an ugly remediation for the consequences of bad sexual behavior. Instead, we find the moral status of the causal behaviors left unaddressed — nay, even celebrated — and all attention placed upon artificial preventative and corrective measures. In fact, if one is not on the bandwagon for HIV research, condoms for teens, and unrestricted abortions he is far more likely to be thought of as the immoral one.

Far from being students of natural law, atheists tend to make a practice of bending nature to serve their own wills. Someone declaring himself morally good by natural constraint theory may in fact be saying nothing more than, "I only do what science and nature allow me to get by with." By this measure, every advance of science puts more options on the moral buffet. This is hardly an impressively noble ethic, and I would wager that there are few atheists who would consent to anything close to this characterization of their claim to virtue.

Conclusion

As I've argued, for an atheist to make a claim to virtue he is either just saying that he successfully marches to his own drum or he is saying that he has a fixed standard, common to humanity (at minimum), by which he has held himself to account. Unfortunately, the various systems employed to objectify morality turn out to be inadequate and impotent. There is always something else not contained within the system that drives the application of it, even if it is only to answer the question of why one ought to care about that particular moral system. Additionally, the chosen system is not given preeminence in the atheist's moral thinking. It is trumped wherever it is found personally inconvenient or where it conflicts with ideology not derived from the system itself. I do not mean that atheists simply fail to live up to their own standards at all times, for that would be understandable; I mean that they consciously repudiate things that ought to be a part of those standards.

Even if atheists identify a moral system that they believe to be objective, and which they do in fact use to inform their moral choices, it is still personal desire that has the final say. Their will is king and their moral system is a hand-chosen adviser, to be heard or ignored according to their sovereign pleasure. In the end, they have not escaped a subjective moral relativism, which voids the idea that they can be "good" in a way that is universally meaningful. To repurpose a very old observation, if there is no king in Israel, then everyone will do what is right in his own eyes. Fortunately for the rest of us, the majority of atheists prefer to be liked and to avoid social chaos and poverty, and so they often make reasonably good citizens. But of course I am just assuming those to be good things based upon my own moral framework. I could be mistaken, but only if there is no God to invest us with real moral capital.

A Challenge to Atheists

2007-06-08T22:00:00.000-05:00

Nick is a bright, attractive, and financially successful young man who was raised in a nominally Christian home. He has a wife and a kid on the way. He's not particularly unhappy in his marriage, but it's been 3 years now and the passionate zing has pretty much faded. He's also not thrilled with the thought of a kid intruding on his lifestyle — maybe some day, but not just now. He only agreed to one at his wife's nagging insistence.

His wife is a semi-regular churchgoer and has been getting increasingly religious and domestic, particularly now with the pregnancy. Nick doesn't much care for church these days, especially now that she's gotten so serious about it, and her increasingly conservative attitude has affected their relationship and social life. It seems to Nick that they just don't have any carefree, spontaneous fun anymore and that she thinks his friends are irresponsible and immature.

Nick's been hanging out on the Internet a lot, doing things we won't talk about. But of particular interest is his time spent on a prominent atheist website. With the proverbial "open mind" Nick has absorbed it all. It deeply resonated with his current thinking and he found it just the kind of rational fuel he needed to take his life to the next level, but not before writing the following email to the author of that website.

Dear Sir,
I've been reading your articles with great interest over the past weeks. I must say, you make a strong case for atheism. In fact, I thought you'd be happy to hear that you've finally convinced me that god is just a fiction! I wanted to write and thank you personally because this is a big breakthrough for me. I feel like a great burden has been lifted from my back. Ironically, I feel "born again" as an atheist.
It's a relief to know that there is no god haunting my thoughts and actions, no spiritual quests to waste my time, no church to bore me, and no money to be surrendered. My mind is free and my goals are my own to set. I know now that my conscience, which was my last hurdle toward atheism, is just the product of my Christian upbringing, or perhaps it is an evolutionary instinct meant for my survival. In any case, it doesn't need to trouble me again, since I am free to make my own values and follow my own natural desires.
"Guilt" is as meaningless now as the fictional and repressive concepts of "good" and "evil." I am free to live according to the knowledge that this is my one shot at existence, and I don't want to waste it "storing up treasures" in a mythical place I'll never see. Best of all, there is no hell or judgment, so there are no "wrong" choices to make and no "bad" behaviors to avoid. As long as I'm okay with it, and society allows it, then it's all good!
I've grown so tired of trying to resist my desires and fight my conscience that it feels so liberating to reject the god hypothesis and everything that goes with it. If I want to party and do drugs, or view any kind of pornography, who's to say it's wrong? In fact, if I want to have an affair, so long as my wife doesn't find out, it's no problem with me. Heck, even if she does find out and doesn't like it, divorce is a perfectly acceptable option. For that matter, murder is on the table as well!
I'm a pretty smart guy; I could probably get away with it too. And if not, I'm willing to skip the country. I'd probably be happier in another country anyway. The US is too uptight and morally restrictive. I understand that there are many countries where drugs and prostitution are legal, and the age of consent is quite low in some. If things don't work out for me, I can always take the escape clause. It's my life and I can live it or end it whenever I want.
I realize that your writings haven't tried to convince anyone to go out and kill people or commit suicide. But you know what? The way I see it everything is fair game now. A world without god is a whole new adventure and I plan to live it out.
Thanks again for all your great articles. They really gave me something to think about, but I'm outta here now.
Nick

My question to any atheists who might be reading right now is this: Do you have a problem with Nick's attitude, and if so, what do you say to him?

Imagine No Religion

2007-06-04T13:00:00.000-05:00

One of the insistent claims of the new atheism is that "the world would be a better place without religion." All the atrocities of history are typically laid at the feet of "religion." Consequently, if there were no religion, there would be no problems. There would be no religious extremists to fly planes into buildings; there would be no religious causes to fight wars over; there would be no heretics to persecute; and there would be no dogma to stand in the way of pleasurable pursuits and scientific progress. In the words of John Lennon, if we imagine there's no religion, "all the people" would be "living life in peace" and "the world will be as one."

A reply to this would begin by questioning whether it is indeed true that all, or even most, of the atrocities of history are religiously motivated. As it turns out, an objective survey of history will turn up quite a number of murderous and oppressive examples that are purely secular in nature. A few that come to mind include the Columbine massacre, the eugenics and racial elitism of Margaret Sanger and company, the killing fields of Pol Pot, the systematic purges of Stalin and Mao Zedong, the sadistic and bloody French Revolution, and probably the bulk of the barbarian invasions and national conquests of the ancient world. Only by a definition so broad as to be meaningless could we attribute these things to "religion."

Perhaps it may be argued that these persons and societies were not properly atheistic, or an appeal might be made to examples of virtuous atheists. To the issue of what constitutes a "proper" atheist, I will speak latter, but here I would point out that the same could be said of religious people. Innumerable examples of selfless devotees could be brought to bear, and religious contributions to society could also be referenced, like hospitals, universities, orphanages, emergency aid organizations, youth programs, and soup kitchens. In my own small town alone there are several dozen relief organizations which are founded, staffed, or provisioned primarily by Christians. And I will gamble that it is the same in your own town.

I would argue that the charitable contributions of religion far outweigh any of its real or alleged abuses by orders of magnitude. This could only be denied by attempting to secularize certain key contributors, but it is not fair to selectively secularize only what is flattering and then turn a blind eye to atheism's culpability in the unflattering. Or perhaps it could be denied by defining certain contributions as something other than "good," but that begs the question as to why atheism's standard of good should prevail in arbitrating this dispute. One cannot simply assert that things like proselytizing, opposing abortion, or defending traditional families are strikes against religion without first demonstrating the fiction of such things and the religion(s) that sponsor them.

The atheist's argument begins with the assumption that there is no truth in religion, but then lodges complaint against actions that may be consistent with that religion in order to condemn the religion itself. This means that if one assumes, for the sake of argument, that the religion is true, then any act consistent with that religion is removed as grounds for complaint, and, conversely, any act inconsistent with it is exempt from complaint.

Of course, what the religion actually teaches about humanity and how it ought to behave may offer grounds to question the religion itself if it is contrary to all reason and experience. However, if there is any truth in religion, then there will surely be some hard teachings involved that are distasteful to human preferences, and we must also deal with the question of how we might, outside of a transcendent standard that religion would provide, judge certain doctrines "bad" or against "right" reason.

When asking whether a behavior is caused by a belief system it must first be determined if that behavior is consistent with the beliefs in question. For a religion like Christianity there is some hope of doing so, since it is founded upon certain doctrines and is in possession of a guidebook — the Bible — to which one might appeal in making a ruling. For this reason a strong case can be made that most of what is commonly credited to Christianity is actually a violation of its fundamental principles. It is not consistent with Christianity; it is antithetical to it. And if something is inconsistent with a thing it is hard to make a case that it is caused by that thing.

I once had an atheist insist to me that Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City Bomber, was a Christian, as if to blame Christianity for the bombing itself. To answer such a charge it is not necessary to know anything at all about Timothy or his motivations; you must simply ask yourself if it is reasonable to imagine Jesus helping him pack his truck full of explosives. Since the answer is obviously "no," then even if McVeigh thought of himself as a Christian he must have a very different thing in mind when he uses that word — a thing which no classical Christian would care to defend.

If religious wars, inquisitions, and heretic burnings were in fact consistent with Christianity, then we should expect to have seen such things from its very inception and Christians would be repeating the behaviors even to this day rather than apologizing for them. This is exactly why the events referenced as "Christian atrocities" are generally isolated episodes in history and not things that invariably spring up wherever the Gospel is preached. Christianity has within itself exactly what it needs to be self-reforming. But no matter how divine her doctrines, because the visible church is composed of humans (some of which are only arguably "believers"), it is guaranteed to manifest flaws large and small. If the skeptic is looking for proof of God in the perfection of His followers, then the skeptic is presuming something about human nature that Christianity does not teach.

Of course, I have here been defending Christianity as opposed to "religion" in general. However, most of those arguing against religion train their guns primarily on Christianity and only employ things such as Islamic extremism for the sake of the juicy examples it affords. I will not take pains to defend religion at large, though each group surely has its own defenses to offer. I am only obliged to defend what I believe to be true: classical Christianity. If any who consciously differ from that truth consistently commit offenses, then it is not Christianity's burden to bear, and they "prove" the truth of atheism only as much as they prove Christianity, or anything else in opposition to themselves. The sins of the one, or even the majority, do not categorically invalidate all. If this were not so then we must condemn all thought of government because of the abuses of communists and fascists.

In fact, the rejection of religion would be a bit like the rejection of all formal government. Gone would be any objective moral framework, historical narrative and vision, or idea of absolute justice. But what would take its place in a strictly atheistic world? What ethical theory follows from atheism? John Lennon thought we could all "live as one" if we gave up on religion, but given that atheism's only dogma is the rejection of the supernatural it is impossible to say what such a world would yield.

Many atheists would propose something like secular humanism, but that is merely a broad ethical creed that begs for consensus over details, and it is no more objectively binding on its supporters than a New Year's resolution. And even if its followers were all passionately committed to it and everything derived from it, it is not the case that all atheists are on-board with it. Some atheists are nihilist. Some are anarchists. Some are communists. Some are hedonists. Some are quite sympathetic to religion. And some are just psychopaths. The frightening thing about atheism is that while it is difficult enough to say what is consistent with it, it is quite impossible to say what is inconsistent with it.

Unlike with Christianity, there are no grounds on which to even begin a debate over how atheism is to be lived out. So long as there are no gods and souls being appealed to, then it all equally qualifies as atheism. But worse than that, without a transcendent standard of morality, there are no grounds for saying how atheists ought to behave or why they ought to behave in any proposed way. Along with God goes any idea of fixed and binding moral imperatives. Morality simply becomes whatever humans define it to be at any given time and place. Lennon's imaginary world of brotherhood would be spoiled in the determination of which humans have the power to control the definition of the good and true. And the hunger for power is a very human trait. History has taught us at least that much.

Religions that explicitly teach violence aside, from a purely theoretical perspective it only makes sense to think that if one believes in divine justice, from which even death is no escape, then one is more likely to be concerned about his or her own good behavior. If people do bad things in contradiction to a system that teaches otherwise, then it must be the case that something else is driving them. I would suggest that something more subjective is at the bottom of human aggression — something at the very heart of humanity. As one sage has said, human depravity is one of the most empirically verifiable of all the doctrines of Christianity.

If we removed religion, people would simply find alternate grounds for oppression. There would always be substitute causes, movements, and justifications for evil persons to employ in their service. People have an incorrigible need to feel justified in their actions — even hardened criminals will make excuses. Religion is simply one very powerful justification to be leveraged. Removing the "excuse" of religion will not magically make bad people into saints. It would be as reasonable to believe that removing gangster rap and heavy metal will leave us with responsible and well-adjusted teenagers.

Some might argue that Europe has become largely secularized and it is doing just fine. Well, that returns to one's definition of "fine." When the news delivers stories of moral absurdities — stories that could make even an atheist cringe — they often will originate in one of the European bastions of secularism. Some notable examples would be: sex vendors at sporting events, a woman marrying a dolphin, the mainstreaming of pornography, problems of child pornography rings, lesser standards for what qualifies as child pornography, welfare recipients being forced to take available jobs in the sex industry, involuntary euthanasia, porn stars in politics, football (soccer) riots, and the breakdown of the traditional family. (Of course, I am begging the question to think that an atheist will take issue with such things. But for those who merely shrug at my list, it proves my point that it is indeed consistent with atheism; and for those who are troubled by it, it proves my point regarding the diversity of atheism.) Additionally, when it is said that Europe has become secularized it does not necessarily mean that it has become atheistic; it has simply become more diverse and "spiritual" but less inclined toward organized Christianity.

But even if all religious people died tomorrow in some great pluralistic rapture, I would expect that the world would not immediately descend into a pre-modern barbarian chaos. Modern atheists are so fat with the moral capital of their Christian heritage that they could probably live for decades before suffering bankruptcy. And most are either in denial or have quite forgotten that if there is no God anything is permissible. Well, anything that you can get away with at least. In a world without purpose and standards beyond personal happiness, what taboos can stand?

Is it really true that it would be the end of evil if we made an end of religion? As I've argued, it would only be the end of evil in the name of religion and the end of our grounds for naming anything evil. Evil would remain, but would be called by a different name, and it would be celebrated, tolerated, medicated, or carefully regulated — but never judged.

False Dichotomies of the Emerging Church

2007-06-01T13:00:00.000-05:00

I am published!

I was recently notified that my comment on a blog post by Myron B. Penner titled "Postmodern Apologetics" had made its way into a book being compiled from the various materials on that same website. The site's name, which will probably be the book title as well, is "A New Kind of Conversation." It is (or was) devoted to topics of concern to the Emerging Church Movement.

The short description of that movement might be "postmodernity meets Christianity." In my mind the movement roughly falls into two broad camps. One includes those who have refashioned Christianity to suit the tastes of the postmodern culture. The other is those who are attempting to contextualize the Gospel for a postmodern people. Perhaps it is simply the latest flavor of liberal versus conservative Christianity, though the liberalism in the Emerging Church is cleverly veiled behind a dense linguistic fog that is often difficult to penetrate. And I believe they prefer it that way, as to come right out and plainly state one's beliefs and disbeliefs would express the kind of dogma that they are very keen to reject.

The article to which I responded invoked my criticism in that it seemed to advocate throwing out the baby with the bathwater. In this case, the abuses of secular modernism suggested that we should rethink our ideas about propositional and objective truth claims. In its place would come telling our "story" and living it out among the unchurched. I found this and other ideas in the essay to be false dichotomies, and I said as much.

Here, then, is my response in full:

False Dichotomies

While this article offers some valid critiques of modernity, I think it does not affirm what is, in fact, biblical underlying certain ideas that have been abused by secular modernists. Many authors have offered similar critiques of modernity and classical apologetics without seeing the need or prudence of questioning its very foundations. I think that Penner's conclusions rest on a number of false dichotomies.

1) Modernity vs. postmodernity

Penner seems to be suggesting that thinking objectively and rationally means thinking without bias and presuppositions. I believe there is some equivocation on the word "objective" here. There is a difference between thinking that there is objective truth and thinking that you know it objectively (i.e., without bias or error). Postmoderns are right to question presuppositions and human fallibility, but we lose all tools of discourse if we go beyond this to conclude that no one, then, has any better-reasoned belief than another or that truth itself is a vapor. It does seem warranted to conclude that we ought to be humble regarding our fallibility, more introspective toward in our suppositions, and more rigorous in our application of reason. Penner says he "greatly values the insights of analytic philosophy and admires its rigor." But if these things get us nowhere, then what is to value; and if they do have merit, then let's use them to their fullest advantage.

2) Authority of revelation vs. reason

The problem with secular modernity was that they did not accept revelation at all. But Christian "modernists" accept it as objective truth and apply it as the foundation, frame, and fence for rational discourse. St. Paul rightly warns against vain philosophy according to human tradition, but when philosophy is grounded in those truths revealed by the Author of reason, then we are privileged to taste the "mind of Christ." And if we reject reason in relation to biblical revelation, then the very words of God become nothing but unprocessed photons striking the retina.

3) Science vs. Christianity

There seems to be a driving need to segregate the world of empirical science from the world of "faith." I think this is a response to the imagined hostility of the one to the other. However, we are now living in an age where we have the best scientific reasons ever to believe in a loving and intimate creator. The problem is not that there is no good reason to believe that science is compatible with the God of the Bible; the problem is that science has been secularized and its very definition has been changed to exclude the supernatural from consideration. Secular scientists are now more concerned with getting a certain kind of answer than with getting the right answer. The field of science has a deeply Christian legacy, and there has been a recent resurgence in Christian scholarship. There is no sense in abandoning a healthy ship.

4) Kerygmatic vs. rational and objective approaches (or, Cognitive claims vs. subjective "actuality")

But is the "kerygma" which we should share grounded in truth? When we tell our "story" is it an objectively true story, and if not, why is there any reason or passion for sharing it? If it is not based on objective truth, then we are simply peddling an interesting story and we are ascribing a mystical value to it that has no more weight than a Dr. Phil book. Our story can be both true in the objective sense, and efficacious in a subjective sense. Indeed, it has "actuality" because of the power in the truth that it contains. And when we tell that story, we are offering a series of cognitive claims. Even if a story were metaphor (like the parables), the very meaning of those metaphors is a matter of rational proposition.

5) Arguments and reason vs. love and empathy

To say that our beliefs are objectively true and advocating for them is not to say that you cannot give personal expression to these truths. In fact, those truths are the very things that impel us to love our neighbors (and enemies) and to meet them at the point of their need. How would we know how we ought to love them if not for the very things which apologists seek to defend, since one man's love (according to his own fancies) is another man's coddling?

It is true that you may win an argument but lose a soul, but every good apologist should know this. And for those who don't, the answer is not to surrender our claims to truth and the reasons for them; the answer is to refine our tactics, character, and wisdom. As Peter says, we should be ready to give a defense, but we should do this with gentleness and respect. And we should know when a good intellectual response is called for and when an outstretched hand and a willing ear are in order.

Open Letter to Bill Maher

2007-05-22T11:30:00.000-05:00

For some reason, I've suddenly begun getting a lot of hits to the blog looking for this old letter (originally posted 3/23/05). So that visitors don't have to dig to find it, I'm bumping it up to the top of the queue. By way of an update, I should mention that there was never a reply to the letter. My apologies that the Chicago Sun-Times link is no longer active.

It's finally complete and can be found here: An Open Letter to Bill Maher

At 14 pages it's a rather ambitious project. It turns out to be too long to post as a LifeWay article, as well as the problem of its sharp polemic tone (in places anyway). I think Maher has earned himself a bit of rough handling, though, after the kinds of callous, yet shallow, statements he's been throwing at us "unenlightened," "arrogant," "childish," "weak-minded" evangelicals. Read for yourself.

I've sent it on to his HBO address and to his official website feedback form. My guess is that he won't read it, much less respond. But who knows, I may have just made a new penpal.

By the way, I took my "Maher" quotes from the following sources:
MSNBC "Scarborough Country" transcript
Chicago Sun-Times
WorldNetDaily

Presuppositional Kung Fu

2007-05-10T19:20:00.000-05:00

The late presuppositional apologist Greg Bahnsen used to teach that the best way to handle an attack was not to dodge the bullets, but to disarm the attackers. Applying this to dialog and debate with non-Christians, this meant that one was to force the opponent to live consistently with his own worldview and not allow him to reach beyond it for concepts to justify his attacks and objections — to remove the weapons to which he is not rationally entitled.

In the case of atheism, these weapons would include such things as fixed laws of logic, objective morality, timeless values, human dignity, and freewill. In order to level certain objections, an unbeliever is generally dependent upon ideas such as these to make sense of his objection. For this reason, the objection itself is secondary to the very assumptions upon which it depends, and it is first incumbent upon the objector to make sense of those assumptions before his case can be considered coherent.

I recently ran across a blog with a community of atheist contributors who spent much energy in voicing their opinions on certain moral issues, particularly things which they viewed as "evil" and "immoral" as practiced by Christians or as documented in the Bible. One post particularly caught my attention, since it expressed the strong moral conviction that slavery is wrong and that the Bible, in (allegedly) advocating the practice, is to be considered immoral by association.

The natural instinct of many Christians (and a couple of responders fell in to this) is to exegete and clarify the texts, or to launch in to an explanation of God's overall purposes for certain biblical events. But Bahnsen's advice would be to eschew the moral complaint and go straight after the moral presuppositions, one of which is that there is such a thing as objective morality by which we might judge slavery wrong or consider events in Scripture as immoral.

Here is my attempt to answer this atheist using Bahnsen's recommended approach. His replies are offset in blockquotes.

~~~~~~~~~~~~

Slavery is “obviously evil” and “definitely wrong.” The Bible is “notoriously immoral.”

These kinds of statements imply a belief in objective morality, i.e., that something like slavery is wrong for all time and in all cultures. Is there a moral standard that stands outside of time and place being appealed to here, or is this simply a matter of personal or cultural preference?

Well, I think some things like slavery are wrong no matter where or when they take place, so, according to your definition, I do have objective moral standards. They just happen to be inspired by reason and compassion, not religion.

Others have historically and geographically used their “reason” to come to other conclusions than you in this and many other matters. And they place their compassions elsewhere or have it not at all. Reason and compassion do no work without guiding principles and objectives. You may as well tell me you get to El Dorado “by horse.”

What are these transcendent principals of morality to which you appeal to say that all others are simply mistaken, and how is it that you have managed to discover them where many have failed? And I wonder what other moral truths are hidden within the treasury that you are robbing to pay this debt.

I am not trumpeting myself as some kind of master philosopher or guru, or saying that I have cornered the market on virtue. If this is the impression I have given, I sincerely apologize. I am convinced, however, that slavery has always been an affront to the timeless values of human dignity and freedom. If you wish a more detailed explanation of my reasoning in this or other issues, read my other posts, and then, by all means, please ask.

I’m not reading anything in to your comments here and in other posts (and the comments of the other non-theists here) other than that there is a very strong implication of moral objectivism being exercised. All your judgments, social positions, and moral outrages depend upon some ethical grounding. You don’t have to be a master philosopher to identify where this originates in your own case.

There either is an objective moral law that stands outside of time and culture, or morality is merely a product of the human mind. You seem to be inclined toward the former, in practice, though I’m sure you can see how problematic that is for atheism. On the other hand, grounding morality upon human convention removes the fixed nature of all moral positions. Humans change, cultures change, preferences change, and individuals are unique. Making morality a human invention boils down to a matter of personal and cultural “preference.” You may think that we are making progress in fine-tuning our cultural conventions (by way of “reason”), but that is merely another admission that there are true and right objective standards toward which we can make progress.

I know that certain moral positions are just so obvious to you that it seems academic to justify them, but the very question is why we should have these incorrigible moral intuitions, where they come from, and why we “ought” to bow to them. Many atheistic philosophers, in fact, reject moral objectivism because they understand the problems I raise here. Most people, however, are blind to this issue, borrow moral capital from the theistic worldview, and merrily condemn injustices and champion their moral causes. In practice, they are just as dogmatic as any religionist that they condemn for holding to moral values with which they disagree.

And you have similar problems with the ideas of “timeless values,” “human dignity,” and “freedom” from a purely materialistic perspective. Justifying such notions has been the confounding project of atheistic philosophy for many centuries, and it is why, intellectually bankrupted by the attempt, many have surrendered in this age to a postmodern relativism. You seem not yet to have arrived there, but I believe that it is the ultimate, rational conclusion of atheism, even though it is not a livable position.

For the record, I do assert that morality is a human invention and that it can and has changed over time, often for the better. The Bible describes, for example, how it was morally acceptable at one time to put to death homosexuals, adulterers, blasphemers, fortune tellers, women who were not virgins on their wedding day, and those who worked on the Sabbath. Any sane person living in the 21st century is horrified by such outright brutality and injustice. So how do many Christians reconcile this with their concept of a loving and righteous god who is the same yesterday, today, and tomorrow? They dismiss it by saying those rules no longer apply, that Jesus and the New Testament somehow nullify all that nasty business in the Old. It was a different time, a different place. Yet this is exactly the kind of relativism that you and many other believers seem to find so problematic when it comes to secular philosophies.
I am perfectly aware that morality, as any other human endeavor, is imperfect, filled with personal and cultural biases and preferences. This doesn’t make it any less profound or legitimate than the so-called objective standards promoted by religious prophets and sacred texts; in fact, I think that recognizing the fact that morality is to some degree fluid and subject to improvement has led to many of the rights and standards we value so highly today.

You admit that morality is a “human invention,” but you say that it can change for the “better,” is subject to “improvement,” and can be “imperfect.” Better and improved and less than perfect according to what standard? You cannot move toward, or run afoul of, a position unless that position first exists to be approached.

If morality is just a human invention, then morality is just whatever happens to be defined by the humans in any given place and time. There would be no higher morality than that, only different morality. You could only say that your 21st Century Western morality is better out of a sense of chronological snobbery.

To say that the Hebrews, Romans, or Huns had not arrived at the “rights and standards we value” is to say one of two things: Either it says that each living individual or culture is the standard by which history is measured, which means that you shall be found wanting by your descendents even if they are little barbarians; or it is to say that at the time of these societies there was a fixed standard that lay wholly outside of humanity — indeed, outside of time — to which these persons failed to measure up.

You are faced with either affirming a transcendent moral principle, thus negating pure materialism, or you must admit that your own moral standards and sensibilities distill to arbitrary ethical preferences that compete with the preferences of other cultural groups and are only different, not better in any real sense. Your moral intuitions that have you horrified by certain behaviors are either shadows of a true divine Form (to use Plato’s model), or they are nothing more than fashionable moral reactions (like my wife’s “horror” at seeing white shoes after Labor Day). The fact that you feel so strongly about your moral positions and think of them as being so “sane” and modern does absolutely no philosophical work toward raising them above mere subjectivism.

That being said, it is difficult to know how to take any of your moral assessments of the Bible or any other issue. If you are merely emoting, then there is nothing further to discuss unless I choose to volley with my own feelings. But to unpack the theological issues that you raise against the Bible would require us to first share some common ground of understanding regarding morality, not to mention the concept of a God who has dominion over, and purposes for, humanity. Such things are complex and nuanced (would you expect a God to be otherwise?), and so long as one has a misty and minimalistic view of ethics and God’s sovereignty then one will have no comprehension or sympathy for anything I have to say.

In any case, I would certainly not concede a relativistic view of God’s moral will, as you have either received or perceived from other Christians willing to entertain your complaints. Perhaps I can hint at the common limitations of thinking in this area by pointing out that we have different expectations for our children vs. other people’s children, our children at school vs. at home, and our children as youths vs. as adults, even while our overall values and objectives remain constant.

~~~~~~~~~~~~

The dialog continues, but as you might expect, this person is not moved by the argument; as he essentially refuses to recognize my point, or comment further upon it, and instead merely takes offense that I consider him too "morally and intellectually deficient" to respond to. He simply wants to sit in my tree and complain about my apples without need of acknowledgement that he must trespass to do so.

Appearance of Design: Intuition or Illusion?

2007-04-30T20:00:00.000-05:00

A couple of years ago I happened to catch a musical performance on Fox News. One of the general assignment reporters, Kelly Wright, was sharing a Christian song that he had written. It was called "I Believe," and its message was captured in the very first verse.

Whenever I see a newborn baby cry
Or see the birds flying high in the sky
That lets me know there's a God somewhere

While this is hardly a convincing apologetic for the existence of God, it does harbor an extremely important point. The vast majority of people believe in some sort of Supreme Being. If you ask them why this is so, you will hear a very common answer. To the average man, it is just a matter of common sense: "Look around you; look at the world; look at the beauty and wonder of life; it all had to come from somewhere!"

Life is remarkable and complex, and the more we learn the more amazing it all becomes. The default reaction is to be captivated by it – simply note any child's wonder on a visit to the zoo or a peer into the microscope. People just seem to have this notion that life is special, and the impression of intentionality and design presses hard upon them. For many, to insist that life is a fluke of nature is as absurd as trying to convince them that Mount Rushmore was carved by wind and rain.

This is not merely an emotional response to nature, but an inference from experience as well. The only experience we have of functional complexity originates from the minds and hands of intelligent designers, like humans. It is the same principle that NASA would use to infer the existence of alien life if a mere bolt were found on Mars, and it is the underlying assumption of SETI as they look for extraterrestrial radio signals containing even simple patterns.

Such ideas about life had been the bane of atheism for the better part of history until Darwinian theory arrived to exorcise these intuitions from our consciousness. Prior to Darwin, there were various speculative theories about the origin of life, like spontaneous generation, but they had to be satisfied with being classed more as philosophy than science. Darwin gave atheism the intellectual respectability that it had long sought. One of Darwinian evolution's chief apologists, Richard Dawkins, said it well in his book, The Blind Watchmaker.

An atheist before Darwin could have said, following [David] Hume: 'I have no explanation for complex biological design. All I know is that God isn't a good explanation, so we must wait and hope that somebody comes up with a better one.' I can't help feeling that such a position, though logically sound, would have left one feeling pretty unsatisfied, and that although atheism might have been logically tenable before Darwin, Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist.

Dawkins implies that biological design begs for an explanation. He's just averse to permitting God to serve as that explanation. But unless some alternative explanation can be offered, the intuition that complex order is best explained by a designer – the essence of Intelligent Design – stands unmolested. If I discover in the morning that my fresh-cut wood has been mysteriously stacked by my shed, then I would certainly be justified in thinking that some benevolent person has intentionally done the deed. Perhaps I would be mistaken, and it is in reality the work of a tornado, but until that case can be made I would be in my rights to stick with my initial assumption.

When Richard Dawkins tells us in The Blind Watchmaker that "biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose," he outright admits to the default impression of design. However, he then goes on to explain why this is only a false impression, and that the order and purpose found in nature can actually be explained by evolutionary processes.

It may theoretically be the case that genetic variation and natural selection are the true authors of biology, but that is the alternative explanation offered in answer to the mystery of life. The theory of evolution has prevailed long enough that its supporters now believe it to be the natural and default victor. It may indeed be the reigning paradigm, but with each generation it must labor anew to suppress our intuitions. And this is why, in spite of all the academic and media hype, the purely random and materialist version of the theory continues to be rejected by the majority of the population.

I would propose, then, that the defeat of evolution would put design back onto center stage. Intelligent Design advocates are often criticized for trafficking in the flaws of evolutionary theory rather than offering positive evidence for design. But a critique of evolution is a case for Intelligent Design. As Dawkins admits, nature appears to be "designed for a purpose," and "design" implies a designer of some intelligence. If evolutionary theory fails at making the case that this appearance is merely an illusion, then we are justified in taking the appearance of design at face value. Intelligent Design lies just beneath the waxy veneer of evolution. It only remains to be seen what can truly be scratched off where there is liberty to do so.

Cosmological vs. Biological Evolution

2007-04-25T19:45:00.000-05:00

I just listened to a short radio debate between Eugenie Scott, director of the National Center for Science Education, and Hugh Ross, president of Reasons to Believe. The focus of the debate was evolution. Of course, their differences were numerous, since Eugenie is a notorious advocate for evolution, and Hugh is a well-traveled champion of various flavors of design arguments.

In the closing minutes, the two of them shared their agreement over the idea of an old universe and that galaxies, stars, and planets had formed by way of physical forces, even while they differed over the origin of biological life. Eugenie made a point of including cosmological history in her overall definition of "evolution," and one of her final remarks rested upon her liberal usage of the term. Her parting challenge to Hugh was this: "If the physical universe can evolve, why can't the biological universe?"

Now, Hugh would probably be okay with the idea that God had trumped the "natural" order of things and shaped our solar system just exactly how, when, and where He wanted it. In fact, I sometimes think that Hugh is implying this when he labors the point that our own Sun, Earth, and planetary system are exceptionally unique in their composition and arrangement. However, had Hugh been able to respond to this he probably would have pointed out the principle difference between cosmological and biological "evolution."

The origin of the universe may be a profound mystery, but the formation of galaxies and stars within this universe depend upon established laws of physics intrinsic to it. Of course, gravity is a key player in the cosmic drama, and it is a tangible force that we personally experience and can measure and test. Based on our calculations, we can predict what might be expected of galaxy and star formation, lifespan, and death, and when observing the universe we find confirmation of our understanding. The fact that light travels at a finite speed allows us to see the universe as it was at various ages, according to the distances we observe. We have, in effect, a very complete cosmological "fossil record."

So, in cosmology, there are known laws that deterministically act upon matter to shape it into certain kinds of forms, from simple to complex elements and objects. It is not a problem to imagine that God has used such secondary causes to shape our world. Even if God did not specially create our star and planet, it would appear that the forces He has ordained would yield things like them, just as we now observe other stars and planets forming. Perhaps it might be argued that there is not enough time and matter out there to yield by pure chance the very special life-sustaining attributes that our planetary system exhibits, but there are at least adequate materials and mechanisms to grant such opportunities.

Contrast this with biological evolution, which says that simple chemistry yielded life, and that simple life progressively underwent change to become complex life.

In chemistry, there are no gravity-like laws that will take chemicals lying about and form cells out of them. Even if you poured out all the complex molecules of which a simple prokaryotic cell consists they would still not self-assemble in a deterministic way. Indeed, it has been challenging enough to identify processes by which even the simplest molecules of life are formed. And it is not enough to simply propose that the right existing elements be available upon which chance might work its magic. There must be valid chemical pathways that obey the laws of physics, which can take elements through the necessary stages to produce target molecules. This is the world of roadblocks and rabbit trails in which origin-of-life researchers live.

Mainstream evolutionary theory is in slightly better shape. It at least proposes a process by which life advances. Unfortunately, that process involves, at its core, a very un-predictable and un-orderly element: mutation. These random corruptions and process failures are an exception to the functional rule of the cell, which is an otherwise law-abiding citizen. Evolution is ultimately dependent upon chance, along with the assumption that increased complexity is the preferential direction for natural selection to take. Contrary to what sci-fi movies might suggest, you cannot drop a mutagen into a vat of bacteria and yield a superbug like you can drop an apple and watch it fall. It may be argued that these random mutations are simply an indirect and roundabout process nonetheless, but that is the very questionable assertion on which the debate hangs.

Chance is a far different creature than deterministic physical law, and therein lies the difference between cosmological and biological evolution. This difference, and the chance/probability issues, have even led some to look for more common ground between the two. As Hugh Ross pointed out in his parting statement, prestigious scientists, like those at the Santa Fe Institute, have begun to propose an undiscovered law of self-organization to support the idea that the appearance of life is as inevitable as the gravitational collapse of matter into stars. If that were ever proved, then we'd certainly have a new topic to debate, but for the committed materialist it would only add one more incredibly odd and fortuitous law to the heap already begging for explanation.

Punc Eq: Hide and Seek in the Fossil Record

2007-04-18T21:05:00.000-05:00

"Geology assuredly does not reveal any such finely-graduated organic chain; and this, perhaps, is the most obvious and serious objection which can be urged against the theory. The explanation lies, as I believe, in the extreme imperfection of the geological record."
Charles Darwin, Origin of Species.

The prediction of a mounting inventory of transitional fossils was first made by Charles Darwin, who was well aware of the inadequacy of the existing fossil record to prove his theory of evolution. The optimistic task of fleshing out that fossil record was the prime directive for like-minded paleontologists for more than a century afterward. But by the second half of the 20th century it became increasingly clear that the paucity of fossil intermediates was not primarily due to the fragmentary nature of the fossil record (indeed, it was quite adequate in a variety of places); rather, it was reflective of the way that life itself had progressed.

It was after this disappointment of Darwin's largely failed prediction that the theory of Punctuated Equilibrium (courtesy of Stephen J. Gould and Niles Eldridge) was erected. This theory (PE) began with the admission that the fossil record is characterized by long periods of little or no change to species punctuated by the dramatic and sudden emergence of new species. It then added the rationale that the actual work of evolution must typically occur rapidly in isolated population groups, all this being too quick and geographically confined to grant much chance at fossil preservation.

Originally, some were skittish about the theory, because it was the first formal and tacit professional admission that the fossil record had failed to yield the hoped for intermediates, which was seen to lend aid and comfort to creationists. Even though there are notable dissenters to the theory, like Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, it is now largely accepted in some form by supporters of evolution, and is regularly employed as a rebuttal to those filing a grievance against the fossil record.

As a reply, PE is primarily an explanatory device to fill a void, not a description of a proven phenomenon. PE can never be leveraged as evidence for evolution, since claiming PE is merely putting a name to the absence of evidence and adding a companion story. However, that does not stop the theory from being rhetorical genius: "Sure there are few intermediates. Don't be naïve; that's not how evolution works. I should be surprised if you did find them in abundance!" Evolutionists will simply have to bear with those of us who are skeptical of such a reply.

Now, I'm not suggesting there is no story to go behind PE. As I've said, it relates to the supposed accelerated evolution of isolated populations, which are then released into the larger domain where they might have a chance to flourish and be captured in the fossil record. This may have a certain plausibility to it, but, unfortunately, this narrative behind the theory is itself highly problematic.

Let us now look at some of the problems inherent in the "punctuation" scenario.

1) The smaller populations would also mean fewer creatures to yield mutations, beneficial or otherwise. Consequently, you would not expect increased evolutionary opportunities in such isolated groups. Even if the smaller demographics would somehow spread the new genes more quickly, this may be a no better scenario in comparison to the increased odds afforded by a more abundant mainstream population.

2) Evolutionary change begins with fortuitous mutations upon which "natural selection" may act. Isolated populations and environmental pressures do not mean increased rates of mutation, beneficial mutations, or "beneficial" mutations in the direction that would make a difference for a given creature within its given environment (e.g., a mole doesn't need wings and a tree climber doesn't need gills). Evolutionists often speak of the environment and new ecological niches as though they invite certain mutations. This is fallacious language. Need does not cause any random event to occur with a greater frequency or to yield the desired result at any higher rate; it could only cause a fortuitous thing to be preserved if it did happen to occur. For example, my urgent need to get to work on time will not cause the traffic lights to change any faster. And if I need a 4-of-a-kind to win a poker hand it will not increase the odds that I will draw one; but if I happen to be dealt 3 kings you can bet I won't choose any of those for my discard.

3) Even if it is somehow demonstrated that such isolated populations undergo an increased rate of mutation, then this proportionally increases the chances of detrimental mutations, which are vastly more common. And since it is said that mutations are better preserved in limited populations, then this means that there is an increased chance of tainting the entire genetic stock. The same "inbreeding" that is supposed to afford a beneficial mutation the chance to catch hold in the population is perhaps more likely to take down the entire group.

4) On a related note, the inbreeding of smaller populations actually results in genetic erosion, which is just as likely to lead to extinction due to loss of the genetic diversity that permits a species to survive environmental changes. The liability of population bottlenecks such as these has actually been observed and recorded (see here, here, and here for examples).

5) Quite often, the "punctuations" in the fossil record involve a broad spectrum of plants and animals that would not even be related by ecosystem, e.g., air, land, deep water, shallow water, etc. In this case, are we to assume that numerous isolated populations were all busily working in tandem and then were at once released onto the world stage? The biggest single example of this is the Cambrian Explosion, where nearly every phylum (major body plan) suddenly appeared in the fossil record after a long reign of nothing more complex than algae, sponges, and sea cucumbers. And to make matters worse, the Cambrian fauna was primarily warm-loving, but the period immediately preceding it was icy cold, from equator to pole, which doesn't lend much ground for breeding a whole biota of tropical species.

6) The hundreds of millions of years of geological history are often appealed to as grounds for optimism toward what chance can accomplish. But if real evolution can only happen in these periodic, isolated venues, which are interspersed with long spans of stasis, then this dramatically reduces the timeframe in which chance can do its work.

7) Since each of the millions of species would have had to undergo numerous of these "punctuation" surges to reach its present level of complexity, this means that such PE laboratories would need to be occurring at countless times and places. There should then be enough separate sites that we might hope to find at least one such incubator in the geological strata. PE should be, in principle, if not in all likelihood, an empirically verifiable theory if true.

Evolution's Credibility Problem (part 3)

2007-04-11T20:43:00.000-05:00

(Part 3 in a 3 part series)

We cannot just magically say that a mutation happens to produce the code for a new protein. The mutation must happen somewhere. If it happens over the top of an existing gene, then you've lost your original gene. And no matter how impressive the new gene sequence is, if the old sequence was important you may have just killed your organism. This means that the new gene must either supersede unused gene material (assuming such a thing exists), appear within an appended section of DNA, or be an improvement in line with the gene it is replacing. All three reduce the odds of a good mutation's survival, and the latter constraint would limit the scope of novelty.

Additionally, the mutation must either create or be contained within its proper domain. This is where it gets too complicated to continue describing things in detail, but suffice it to say that a gene must have certain controlling sequences in place for it to be effectively translated. For instance, there are start and stop codons, which define the boundaries of the gene. Within this there are things like promoters and ribosomal binding sequences to be considered. And even the best gene instruction is useless unless it has the proper signal sequence defined at its start to act as a sort of mailing address so that the machinery of the cell can know where the resulting protein is to be shuttled and deployed.

So, a workable mutation not only must result in sensible coding for the protein, it must include all of the logistical elements as well. If it does not produce these or happen in a way to make use of those which exist, then it is worthless. Worse, the mutation could easily manage to overlap these controlling sequences in such a way that it not only destroys an existing gene, but also could damage a gene next door if the overlap crosses the domain boundary.

Another consideration is based on the stunning recent discovery that many genes actually overlap by frame shifting of nucleotides or by inverse coding (up to 6 possible genes could be theoretically coded in the same physical space). This means that a change to even one nucleotide in the overlapping region could damage more than one gene. Risking damage to such a code base is one thing, but producing such a thing in the first place is a whole new dimension of incredible. To come close to understanding what I mean, simply imagine creating a palindrome more than 100 letters long (which is grammatically correct), even by design! Evolutionists would have us believe that this has happened countless times by mere chance.

Something else that I would point out: when we are dealing with creatures that sexually reproduce, a favorable mutation in one of the many cells of the organism (e.g., humans have trillions) is meaningless in evolutionary terms. This is because only germ cells are passed on to the next generation. Only mutations that happen in the few eggs or sperm that result in offspring are even candidates for evolution's "descent and natural selection." This means that the higher-order creatures that sexually reproduce, have fewer offspring, and longer generation cycle times, should theoretically evolve slower. But guess what: the quiet reign of single-cell organisms, which exist in vast quantities and reproduce fast and furiously, supposedly lasted more than 2 billion years; whereas the entire history of the relatively slower, fewer, and more diverse plant and animal kingdoms has occupied only a quarter of that time. And humans, some of the slowest breeders of all, appeared in a geological flash.

But back to my lactose-handling enzyme. Even this conceptually simple protein adaptation is far more complex than I suggest. In reality, beta-galactosidase consists of 1023 amino acids and actually functions in a larger structure composed of 4 of these proteins fit together. There are very few simple jobs in the cell. The protein "machines" to do the work are often quite complex, sometimes involving numerous independently designed proteins working in cooperation where the absence or poor design of even one would completely cripple the entire machine. And the machines generally require separate helper and regulating proteins to allow them to either do any work at all or to suppress them when they are not needed.

In the case of the relatively simple beta-galactosidase, it needs at least two other proteins: a permease that permits lactose entry into the cell (not just any 'ole thing is allowed in or out), and a repressor that works to inhibit the production of beta-galactosidase when there is no lactose in the neighborhood (there's no advantage in wasting precious resources). To further complicate things, each of these three components is found in the DNA in sequential order and is packaged together as a single unit, called an "operon."

Aspects of the cell are much like a factory, and just like in a real factory no single machine does much work in isolation. For example, in the case of the bacterial flagellum, a microscopic rotary motor, there are over 40 unique proteins that are involved in its architecture, and many more that are involved in its assembly and operation. As complex as individual proteins may be, establishing their place in the economy of the cell adds greatly to this complexity and cannot be overlooked. All of biology is characterized by interdependent systems — it is the norm.

In summary, the "small," incremental steps proposed by evolutionary theorists are astonishingly non-trivial and, in practice, can be as interdependent at the molecular level as a bat's various features are at the higher morphological level. What I describe is only the beginning of the many incredible things in the world of biology that evolution claims to explain. The more we learn and the more deeply we look at nature — into the microscopic world that Darwin could not have imagined — the more numerous and profound the required work of evolution seems to become. As I've said elsewhere, "Evolution gives fat chance a full time job."

Is there no room, then, for grace toward those who are unconvinced by the evolutionary story? Skeptics should be able to reserve the right to exercise the same principle of credulity that evolutionists themselves apply elsewhere. There is no denying that circumstantial evidence exists for the theory, but the explanatory work that evolutionists are seeking to do with it needs a mighty big engine to push this load over the hill of plausibility. And the fact that the theory itself is immune to reconsideration, in spite of the constantly pounding waves of unexpected and complex new biological discoveries, only fuels suspicion that there is something more than objective science behind it.

Evolution's Credibility Problem (part 2)

2007-04-10T13:00:00.000-05:00

(Part 2 in a 3 part series)

At this point I could mention the vast range of astonishingly complex things that evolution is said to have delivered (e.g., sentient life, metamorphosis, sexual reproduction, symbiosis, convergence, molecular machines), but none of these things is really much more incredible than the sub-cellular biochemical changes on which they each depend. Since ignorance is the chief ally of credulity, let me begin with a short lesson in cellular biology.

Nearly every structure in the cell and every chemical reaction that it spawns is dependent upon one or more large molecules called "proteins" (proteins facilitating chemical reactions are called "enzymes"). These molecules are composed of chains of smaller amino acid molecules (out of a possible choice of 20 amino acids), which are folded into various functional arrangements. Only a miniscule number of all possible arrangements of amino acid chains could serve a functional purpose in organisms. The arrangement of the final protein is dependent upon the position of the individual amino acids in the chain, since the right ones need to be in place to provide the necessary cross-linkages in the folds, as well as to result in the right group of chemicals being positioned together to form reaction sites. The final form is much like a custom crafted tool that is designed for a certain task.

SIDEBAR - Most proteins contains at least 100 amino acids. Given that there are 20 possible amino acids for each position within the protein chain, the total possible combinations is 20^100. That works out to a number close to 1 with 130 zeros after it. By comparison, the number of atoms in the entire universe is only around 10^80 (1 with 80 zeros). The largest proteins contain more than 2000 amino acids.

Amino acids are assembled into these important sequences by organelles called ribosomes. How do the ribosomes know what arrangements of amino acids to link together in order to make a desirable protein? They work off of a template provided to them by messenger RNA molecules (mRNA). So, how does mRNA arrive at its templates? It gets them by transcribing them from the DNA library. The buck stops at the DNA.

DNA is an unfathomably long double-helix shaped molecular ribbon whose primary job is to store blueprints for proteins. The design instruction for every protein the organism makes is found in some subsection of the DNA. These instructional units are called genes, and they have been likened to a language, with each "letter" representing an amino acid. Each gene would then be informationally equivalent to anything from a long sentence to a page of text.

So, how does this relate to evolution? For an organism to change form or acquire some new function, from the largest to smallest scale, it will require one or more new or altered proteins to do the trick. And since protein design is dependent upon the DNA, then DNA gene sequences must be either added or modified to pull this off. Since there is no established mechanism to introduce such changes evolution is dependent upon chance corruptions or copy mistakes (mutations) to deliver these "enhancements."

Mutations are not very common occurrences, since the cell contains a host of attendant proteins whose jobs are to proofread copy results, repair incorrect gene sequences, and reconnect broken strands of DNA. However, the occasional error does happen. This is the heart and soul of the biological change upon which natural selection is said to do its work: weeding the bad changes from the good, and favoring the better designs over the merely adequate existing designs. The problem now for evolution is to come up with beneficial mutations, but even evolutionists will admit that it is far more probable that a mutation be deleterious than desirable. Establishing exactly how improbable is the playground of heroic denial.

To be honest, it is not a precise statistical problem because there are some flexibilities and things as yet unknown in the biochemistry of the cell. However, there is enough that is understood to paint a very black picture for evolutionary probabilities. Let us take as an example a fairly "simple" problem that one bacterium supposedly faced in its evolutionary march toward complexity.

E. coli's primary food source, as with most organisms, is glucose. At some point in its history it would have encountered lactose (milk sugar) and would be at an advantage if it were able to process this, especially when glucose was not available. For this trick it would need an enzyme such as beta-galactosidase (which it does indeed employ) in order to convert lactose into glucose for its direct use. For now, let us assume that evolution needs just this one thing to make a big difference in this one organism. What, then, would it take to get such a thing?

Remember, in order to construct a protein we need a gene to describe it. This means that some mutation(s) must occur to arrange a stretch of DNA nucleotides into the necessary blueprint for beta-galactosidase, or something like it. Just to be generous, let's say that it is possible to make such a protein out of just 100 amino acids. So, how many possible arrangements of the amino acids could make something to do the trick? Just one? One hundred? One million? Let's be generous and say that one trillion trillion different arrangements (one with 24 zeros after it) could make a useful protein.

The problem is that compared with the number of possible combinations for the 20 amino acids in 100 various positions, this still means that there is not enough time in all of cosmic history to arrive at one of our arrangements, even if we convert every atom in the universe into copies of genes and randomly rearrange their sequences once per second! And the issues only begin here.

Evolution's Credibility Problem (part 1)

2007-04-07T01:00:00.000-05:00

(Part 1 in a 3 part series)

"The extreme rarity of transitional forms in the fossil record persists as the trade secret of paleontology — we fancy ourselves as the only true students of life’s history, yet to preserve our favoured account of evolution by natural selection we view our data as so bad that we never see the very process we profess to study."
Gould, Stephen J., "Evolution's erratic pace", Natural History, vol. 86, May, 1977

"No wonder paleontologists shied away from evolution for so long. It never seemed to happen. Assiduous collecting up cliff faces yields zigzags, minor oscillations, and the very occasional slight accumulation of change--over millions of years, at a rate too slow to account for all the prodigious change that has occurred in evolutionary history. When we do see the introduction of evolutionary novelty, it usually shows up with a bang, and often with no firm evidence that the fossils did not evolve elsewhere! Evolution cannot forever be going on somewhere else. Yet that's how the fossil record has struck many a forlorn paleontologist looking to learn something about evolution."
Eldredge, Niles, Reinventing Darwin, 1995

"To this day, excuses for the incompleteness of the fossil record, as in the fable of the emperor's clothes, overshadow the inescapable: The expression of novelty in nature arises suddenly."
Schwartz, Jeffrey H., "Adaption and Evolution." (Book Review). History & Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 2001, Vol. 23 Issue 3/4

"Given the fact of evolution, one would expect the fossils to document a gradual steady change from ancestral forms to the descendants. But this is not what the paleontologist finds. Instead, he or she finds gaps in just about every phyletic series."
Mayr, Ernst, What Evolution Is, 2001

Critics of evolutionary theory often point to the inadequacy of the fossil record to support Darwin's claim that life has been one slow progression from a common ancestor to the diverse species we witness today. The above quotes by supporters of evolution, along with many others that could be employed, make it abundantly clear that this criticism is no idle claim. For whatever reason, the fossil record continues to offer a paucity of support for the Darwinian notion of gradual change over time. While it might theoretically still be true, this is not the place to which one must look for a primary defense of the idea.

Apparent transitional fossils — the Holy Grail of evolution — are few and far between, and the geological strata is characterized by sudden appearance of new forms followed by long periods of limited diversity within those forms (i.e., stasis). This leads one to wonder if the transitionals are elusive by nature (as Gould argued) or if they are scarce because there were no such transitions.

If one were committed to the evolutionary hypothesis, and were guided by the fossil evidence alone, then it would seem reasonable to consider the possibility that biological change did not progress in a small stepwise fashion, but instead made great leaps forward ("saltations") at key points in the history of earth. This is the "hopeful monster" scenario advanced by Berkeley geneticist Richard Goldschmidt, which received only ridicule from his peers.

Why, though, should the consideration be so foreign to evolutionary theorists that life has bridged the great functional gaps between species all in single great leaps? Isn't the evidence pointing here, and aren't scientists concerned to follow the evidence wherever it leads? Isn't saltationism even a conceptual possibility? What is the principled objection to such an idea that keeps the theory trained primarily on the gradualistic model?

I submit that it is a matter of credulity.

To accept that the numerous and unique attributes that make up a newly appeared species, genus, family, etc. can come together at once to produce such a novelty is simply beyond the ability for even the most optimistic evolutionist to believe. For example, the bat appears suddenly in the fossil record, essentially in its modern form, complete with echolocation capability, yet no one would presume to suggest that the accompanying bone length and density adjustments, skin arrangement, cardiovascular alterations, and echolocation system all came together in one freak confluence of fortuitous mutations. That is too absurd even to imagine.

Additionally, the theory that the first organism to appear on earth was a single celled creature, like bacteria, has fallen out of favor in modern times. It is now assumed that there must have been some cascading series of "proto-cells" leading up to our ultimate cellular ancestor. And why is this assumed, in spite of the lack of geological or experimental evidence to support the idea? Because now that we have come to grasp the astonishing complexity of the cell it is simply too incredible to believe that it has appeared all at once.

The ironic thing is that critics of evolutionary theory have actually been accused of a "failure of imagination." In explanation of living organisms or their biochemical systems, which are too complex and interdependent to have come about in a stepwise fashion, evolutionists often appeal to imaginative scenarios. Rather than producing fossil intermediates and reproducible chemical pathways, which might settle the question, they offer just-so stories instead. However, an abstract theoretical framework is no substitute for empirical verification, and cannot be considered more than a hypothesis until such verification is forthcoming.

But if incredulity is a valid reproach to an idea, then why can we not also apply it to the supposed smaller steps of the gradualistic theory? Is the theory automatically plausible simply because it is alleged to occur in smaller increments? Are critics so irrational if they fail to be convinced by the evolutionary story even in this form? As it turns out, Intelligent Design (ID) theorists make the point that 1) the "small" steps are not all that trivial and 2) that small steps just won't get you where you need to go in most cases.

How Can You Know if Your Religion is Right?

2007-03-31T12:05:00.000-05:00

I've been playing around on Yahoo! Answers and I thought my answer to the following question might be worth posting here.

Question:

How are you sure that your religion is right? There are many religions that all teach different things, and some people do not practice any religion at all. How can you be sure?

My Answer:

One of the most important criteria is that a religion has to make sense out of the world; it has to fit our observations and deepest intuitions about it. So, if it tells a historical tale, like the Book of Mormon does about the Americas, that had absolutely no archaeological, genetic, or documentary verification, then that would be a big strike against it. Or if it claims that the world is an illusion, like Buddhism, in spite of everything in your experience (and the actual behavior of Buddhists) indicating the contrary, then you'd have a big rational barrier to deal with. Or if, like Christian Science teaches, it insists that there is really no such thing as evil, in spite of all the horrors to be witnessed in the world, then you might conclude that the religion's founder was out of touch with the truth.

Important themes that any belief system must wrestle with are things like origins, purpose, morality, and destiny. A worldview needs to be able to answer questions like, "Where did it all come from?", "What are we?", "Why is there evil and suffering in the world?", "How should I live my life?", "Is there any meaning to life?", and "What should we be striving for?"

Many belief systems either fail to give much of an answer to all of these or they give unsatisfactory ones. For instance, paganism deals quite a bit with the world itself, but isn't much good with explaining where the whole cosmos came from in the first place. Eastern religions don't give much traction for asking the "what are we" question, since there's supposedly not really any individuals to ask it ("we" are part of the One). Many systems cannot make much sense of why humans would find themselves in such a sorry state (i.e., there's no "fall of man" type of doctrine). And the issue of morality is a vague or even meaningless concept for others.

Atheists don't get off the hook simply by rejecting religion. They've also got to answer these questions. Unfortunately, most of their answers are "don't know," some form of raw speculation, or some kind of subjective construction. For instance, what caused the Big Bang and why the laws of physics are so finely tuned for life is just an invitation to a science fiction discussion for an atheist. And trying to ground an objective ethical system without any transcendent source for moral principles is something that most astute atheistic philosophers have abandoned. And, while not really a logical strike against atheism, answering the question, "What is the meaning of life?", with something like, "There isn't really one; we make up our own meaning," is very unsatisfactory to those who believe that the universal human drive to ask the question suggests that a real answer must exist. You might just as well tell a hungry man that food is a figment of his imagination and that he go satisfy his odd craving with whatever he sees lying around that looks interesting.

The bottom line is that I think Christianity is the best historic, philosophical, scientific, and intuitive fit for the world I find myself to inhabit. The fact that some of what it teaches does not fit my preferences is no strike against it, since I also understand that truth can sometimes be inconvenient and painful, but it generally works out for the best in the long run.

Bridge to Terrible Theology

2007-03-11T12:28:00.000-05:00

I watched a very touching movie this weekend called Bridge to Terabithia. Having not read the book, and judging strictly by the previews, I expected something entirely different than what the movie turned out to offer. (* Warning, spoilers ahead *) Instead of an adventurous romp in a magical land I got a hail of life's trials and lessons as seen through the eyes of an underprivileged, sensitive, preteen boy.

While my general impression of the movie was favorable, and it rated about a 9.5 on the wife's tearometer, I would say that they tried to pack in too many issues that time did not allow to be fully developed (for example, the relationship with the father). I have few issues with the various important themes explored in the story, but I do have concerns about the brief Christian elements that were included.

Now, I know that the author of the story is purported to be a Christian, and maybe the director of this film did not portray her nuanced message properly in the screen adaptation, so I am going to react only to what I saw presented in this movie. There are primarily two scenes with Christian dialog, other than the one where it is suggested that the boy, Jesse, goes to church only on Easter, and his friend, Leslie, who has never gone to church, asks to go with him on this occasion.

The first scene has Jesse, Leslie, and Jesse's younger sister, Maybell, in the back of a pickup truck riding home after the Easter service. The conversation turns to Jesus' crucifixion. Leslie, the non-Christian, observes that she finds the story of Jesus beautiful while Jesse, who is supposedly a believer, finds it disturbing. This is an interesting comment, which might theoretically be resolved by showing Leslie to be a true and open seeker, while Jesse is apathetic to his own religious tradition. As it stands, though, it looks more like a critique of Christians in general, who are either ignorant of their own faith or are so dogmatically literal about it that they lose the "mythic" beauty of it. Of course, someone like C.S. Lewis would point out that while the Christian story is factual, it still is a tale appreciable in the same way as the best pagan mythology.

The ugly dogmatism was further emphasized when Maybell pointed out that Leslie would go to hell when she died if she didn't believe in the Bible. Jesse is forced to give his uncomfortable and unconvincing assent to this proposition. This is an unfortunately framed presentation of the Gospel message to which Leslie has just lain herself open. Instead of clarifying what this Jesus, whom she finds so interesting, has done for her, Maybell and Jesse have made it appear as though God is qualifying persons for heaven or hell on mere technicalities.

Hell is about dying from your sins, not about failure to believe a story book. While that book may document the cure for your ailment, there is far more to the remedy than simply the documentation of it (notitia, assensus, and fiducia as the Reformers said). Even so, it is the ailment that kills and not the failure to receive the cure. One might just as well say that an African explorer has died from "not taking his quinine" rather than from his malaria. Who would put that on the death certificate?

Of course, these are just nominal Christian children in this story, so one might say that their dialog was fairly realistic. Leslie's response to this, however, was not atypical of what might be heard from any given adult unbeliever. Says she, "I seriously do not think God goes around damning people to hell. He's too busy running all this!" By "this" she means the world, racing by her, which she stretches her arms wide to embrace.

"Too busy?" Does this mean He's too busy to send anyone to heaven too? Whether God does or does not damn people, this is really no objection at all. Even my young son voiced the immediate rebuttal to this idea in that very theater: "God can super-multitask!"

"Too busy!" What a small view so many people have of God. Bertrand Russell believed that God would surely not be interested in our insignificant little corner of the cosmos. Bill Maher believes that it's arrogant to think that God has the time and inclination to listen to your petty, "laundry list" prayers. Rabbi Harold Kushner (of When Bad Things Happen to Good People fame) believes that God would like to help us out but He just doesn't have that kind of power. It is no wonder that people are not compelled by the idea of God. Those who are not pleased with the god whom they have remade in their own images are unimpressed by the petty humanistic god of their own small imaginations.

This conversation ties back later in the movie when Leslie suffers a fatal accident. Jesse is devastated by the news, but more than that, he is concerned for her eternal fate. In a highly emotional scene, he shares his fear with his father who says (to the best of my recollection), "Son, I don’t know much about God’s ways, but I do know this: there is no way God would send that sweet little girl to hell."

Now, the word "sweet" may or may not have actually been said (I can't seem to confirm this), but I think it is at least implied in what Jesse's father was trying to express. And sweet she was; in fact, the whole story hinged upon Leslie's unique character and what it brought to the lives of those around her. Who in that theater would want something so awful for her? Indeed, it was bad enough that God should take her away at all.

But she was not the only child in the story, and many of them were not so sweet at all, including one other (not so) "little girl" who was the bane of Leslie and Jesse's school days. What would Jesse's father have to say about an untimely death of one of these schoolyard bullies? Is it simply being "little" that makes him so sure of Leslie's fate or is it her "sweetness?"

To be honest, Christian theologians are divided over the fate of children. This is because there is not much direct discussion about this kind of thing in Scripture. Consequently, doctrines must be inferred by means of indirect statements and the application of systematic theology. For this reason, those from different theological traditions (e.g., Arminian vs. Calvinist) have come to different conclusions on this, though it is interesting that the same conclusion is often reached from different angles. Many conclude some sort of blanket dispensation for those too young to have yet digested the concepts of sin and responsibility, i.e., before they have begun to personally own their sin-debt. And there are other compelling ideas about this, but this is not where I'd like to take this discussion.

Regardless of the beliefs pertaining to the fate of children who die, none of the Christian responses include the idea that it is simply the "sweet" (good) children who make it to heaven. If good and bad were the keys to one's destiny as a child, then why not also for the adult? If a child can be held accountable for her misdeeds, then surely an adult can as well. The problem is that biblical Christianity is very down on the idea of "earning" your salvation or simply having your goodness outweigh your badness. Even the Roman Catholic Church, which is most accused of teaching a works-based salvation, does not believe that apart from Christ you can win your way into the kingdom. Working your own way to "salvation" or "nirvana" or "higher planes" seems to be the implicit doctrine of every religion except Christianity.

In the Christian model, Christ, and the atonement for the sin you have and will commit, is the essential ingredient. Canvasing over your moral crimes with a generally pleasant demeanor and the occasional good deed does no more for you in God's eyes than it would in a judge's eyes if you were being tried for civil crimes. Just try robbing a bank and then telling the jury (assuming you are caught) that you are an otherwise good parent, spouse, and citizen, then see what that buys you.

The problem with good deeds is that you can really only count an action righteous if the consequence is positive and the motivation is right (among other considerations). But if you're not with the program, so to speak, then it's kind of hard to judge the conformity of any given act. For instance, if you think your job as a parent is to make a happy, trouble-free life for your kids, then you'll treat them differently than if you think culturing wisdom, humility, and virtue is the objective.

And if you're not "with the program," then how can your motivation be anything but deficient? If the point is to do all things for the glory of God and out of love for His moral law, then motivations generally reduce to something that look a lot like self-interest. Even when we believe we are doing charitable acts for others, which may indeed have some positive benefits, one may still question the motive for such deeds. For instance, we may be seeking to win approval from others, be investing in returned favors, earn brownie points with God, or just get an emotional high from doing such things. To repurpose an old Shakespeare quote, "There are more considerations in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are accounted for by your moral philosophy."

And what of this Leslie? Sure she refused (at least initially) to return evil in kind to her nemesis. But at one point she tells Jesse that she is nice simply because it is a unique way to cause aggravation (my paraphrase), not that we ought to "love our enemies" and let God handle the justice part. In fact, she and Jesse did eventually get their revenge, and fairly ruined the life of one bully.

And sure Leslie was a great friend to Jesse at a most difficult time in his life. But it wasn't so much that she helped him to deal with life itself as to lend him an escape from it into the imaginary land of her own making: Terabithia. Leslie may have made life a bit more pleasant for Jesse, but she did not redeem his soul or lead him to the glory of God. Indeed, God was no part of her concern at all beyond her earlier rebuke in the pickup truck.

It wasn't until after Leslie's death that Jesse finally began to show signs of stirring out of his childish slumber. The most touching scene of all was when Jesse finally reformed from viewing his younger sister as an annoying pest trying to intrude on his private adventures in Terabithia with Leslie. Jesse's redemption in this story lay in the beginnings of a departure from the self-absorption and escapism which Leslie only seemed to facilitate.

I admit that another Christian might come away from this movie with wholly different observations — it was a thematically diverse story, after all, and some abstract ideas and rich metaphors might surely be found within it (for example, one might appreciate Leslie's openness to the wonders of life beyond its flat apparent limitations and trials). I only meant to address these particular spiritual ideas contained in the story, as though they were meant to be seriously advanced by the filmmakers.

Some are gratified when Christian themes are sprinkled into a movie, thinking this to make it family-friendly or an opportunity for dialog. I would have preferred they left them entirely out of this story, and was left feeling rather uncomfortable in a theatre filled, most likely, with impressionable children and nominal Christians.

Jesus' Bones Found! Sleep in on Sunday

2007-02-28T13:00:00.000-06:00

Have you heard the news? Apparently the family tomb of Jesus has been found in a Jerusalem neighborhood (Talpiot), complete with the ossuaries and bones of His mother, brothers, Jesus Himself, His wife Mary, and His son! James Cameron, of Titanic fame, has been kind enough to produce a Discovery Channel documentary to fill us in on this remarkable find. What does this all mean? Well, if true, it means at least this much:

Dan Brown (of The Da Vinci Code) was wrong in claiming that Mary Magdalene left the crucified Jesus for France and lived and died there with her child.

John Dominic Crossan was wrong to claim that Jesus was buried in a shallow grave and eaten by dogs.

Jesus didn't really live in India and have a tomb in Kashmir after all.

The Jesus-never-existed types need to repent of their presumption and poor historical analysis.

Muhammad was wrong and Muslims are following a false prophet who claimed that Jesus didn't really die on the cross but, instead, was taken up to heaven by Allah.

The family and followers of Jesus were idiots for burying Him in Jerusalem (putting his name on the box no less), right in the heart of the conspiracy; and His Roman and Jewish enemies were incompetent fools for not finding the counter-evidence right under their own noses.

Names like Mary, Jesus, and Joseph are not really some of the most common of that era like we once believed.

The James ossuary, which Cameron ties in with this find, isn't a forgery after all, as some insist.

James Cameron is a genius and all the liberal scholars and archaeologists who thought this theory unconvincing are morons for having neglected this find since it was first brought to light in 1980.

James Tabor, who released a book about all this last year (The Jesus Dynasty), will have to surrender his view that Jesus' real father was a Roman soldier named Panthera.

If you're buried too close to someone whose DNA does not match you maternally, then you must be married to them.

Statistical calculations only need be done on the data that fits your theory. All contrary data may be ignored.

The relatives and friends of Jesus' departed family liked long hikes and funeral processions, since they preferred a tomb that was miles away from their home towns of Bethlehem, Nazareth, and Galilee.

The Acts of Phillip, which contains stories even more fantastic than the four Gospels, and which scholars have always taken to be a 4th Century work at the earliest, is actually an authoritative document from which someone like Cameron may appeal to make his case.

As St. Paul says, we Christians "are of all men most to be pitied" for believing in a raised Christ (1 Co 15:19).

Contrary to Cameron's insistence that we can still believe in the resurrection as a spiritual event and maintain our "faith," we must accept that the authors of Scripture were liars and the whole New Testament is tainted by their dishonesty.

The disciples of Jesus were psychotic fools to propagate this lie, which offered only persecution and death with no personal payoff.

If you are a Bible believing Christian, you can now sleep in on Sunday.

If you are a liberal Christian, you are not so much affected, though you should ask yourself once again just why it is you call yourself a "Christian" and how you even know what Jesus really taught given that His biographers were such conspiracists.

For some critical reviews of Cameron's titanic folly, see the following:

Christian:
Problems Multiply for Jesus Tomb Theory (Ben Witherington)
A Skeleton in God's Closet? Paul Maier Responds (Stand To Reason and Justin Taylor)
James White's rundown on this topic
Hollywood Hype: The Oscars and Jesus’ Family Tomb, What Do They Share? (Darrell Bock)
Don’t Lose Any Sleep Over Jesus’ Lost Tomb (Pulpit Magazine)
Has the tomb of Jesus been found? (CARM)
Wailing at the Tomb (Townhall.com)

Secular:
Archaeologists, scholars dispute Jesus documentary (CNN)
Is This Jesus' Tomb? (Time)
Raiders of the Lost Tomb (Newsweek)
The Jesus Hoax (Huffington Post)
Special Report: Has James Cameron Found Jesus's Tomb or Is It Just a Statistical Error? (Scientific American)

10 Questions for the Seeker

2007-02-11T15:00:00.000-06:00

There is much talk about the proverbial "spiritual seeker," which many religions zealously court and who is alleged to be on a journey toward truth. But who are these seekers? What are they looking for and what are they willing to accept as truth? And what roadmap are they willing to use to guide their paths? Here are some questions designed to stir the mind of the seeker, and to give touchstones for dialog to Christians seeking to reach them.

What is it that you are searching for? Are you looking for Truth with a capital "T" — an objective truth — or are you just looking for something that "works" for you? Will any old path do so long as it suits your taste? Are you just enjoying the "journey" or are you looking to a destination?
Are you prepared to accept a truth that causes you inconvenience, or that asserts that you are in the wrong on some of your ideas and behaviors? Do you think that it is possible to enjoy doing things that are actually wrong?
Is the truth something that can be contradicted? Do you think that other seekers who have settled on different and conflicting truths could be wrong, or that you may be wrong and they right? What role do you think reason, logic, and evidence play in determining truth? Do feelings trump these? If so, what do you do with people who believe contradictory things but "feel" the same as you about their beliefs?
If there is a true religion, do you think that it would be possible for any of its followers to be pretenders and hypocrites? Must truth be perfectly practiced in order to qualify as truth? Do we judge a religion by those who most consistently follow it or by those who violate its principles?
Do you see problems in this world? Do you think people do bad things and have bad motives? Is it possible that many people are not really looking to surrender to a higher truth?
How do you think morality and your conscience fits into this? Do your moral intuitions tell you anything about truth and the maker of this cosmos? Do you think you've ever committed any moral crimes? What is to be done with these and what do you do with your guilt?
Do you just prefer to be "spiritual" and not "religious?" Do you dislike "organized religion?" If there really is an objective truth, and others can come to know it too, is it sensible that common followers of that truth would seek out each other's company, deliberately organize, and even have spiritual elders and administrative leaders where the numbers warranted?
Have you considered that this truth could have intruded upon history? Do you think that if Truth is personal that it might have spoken and you can look for evidence of that revelation? Do you think that such a revelation would be authoritative and trustworthy, or do you suppose that it could be hopelessly muddled by human involvement?
The Judeo-Christian tradition is one of the most well-documented, historical, and ancient. Have you considered that this could be the actual point at which God has intervened in this world — is it not a prime candidate? Have you actually read the Bible (perhaps the New Testament, or just the Gospels), or even just heard an exposition of the core beliefs of historic Christianity (rather than having a narrow church experience or taking the secular stereotypes at face-value)? Have you honestly sought to have your questions or objections addressed by Christians who are best equipped to do so, such as theologians and apologists? Have you read anything near the number of books on Christianity that you have on other beliefs that you are entertaining? Did you know that there is a whole historical body of literature devoted to explaining Christianity and answering the tough questions?
Are you serious about your search or is it more of a hobby? Would you be willing to pray to this divine entity that you are seeking to help you come to the truth, whatever the cost?

"Jesus was Wrong"

2007-02-06T21:00:00.000-06:00

I watched a rather drab movie this weekend called Little Miss Sunshine. (Note to self: "acclaimed by the Academy" = "you won't like it.") The teenage boy in the movie was a disciple of Nietzsche and wore T-shirts throughout to reflect that fact. One of the T-shirts I found interesting because it expressed an idea that you just don't hear very often from critics of Christianity. It simply said, "Jesus was wrong."

While some on the radical fringe of skepticism opt for the denial of the existence of Jesus altogether, most people are quite friendly toward some historical perspective of Jesus. Of course, it is usually a desupernaturalized and purely human portrait that they prefer to see (though some of the alternate religions will take Him on a semi-divine basis). Jesus as a social reformer and moral teacher is an image that even hardened atheists can get behind. But the statement on this T-shirt is unique in that it denies all these historical reworkings of the Biblical Jesus.

To say that "Jesus was wrong" implies three things.

The first is that you don't like what He had to say. But if you are comfortable redacting the Biblical Jesus to fit your preconceptions of Him, then there is nothing with which to take issue. Is it mere coincidence that the liberal scholars often land on a portrait of "the real Jesus" to which they are partial or sympathetic? I don't believe that I've ever heard a skeptic argue for, say, a Hitleran Jesus whom the Romans did well to exterminate. This T-shirt slogan implies some curious objectivity.

Second, you think that He actually said the things which you find to be wrong. The unspoken assumption here is that what the Bible records is what Jesus actually said; and what Jesus said was just plain mistaken. What else could this statement mean? What sense would it be to say, "That which Jesus actually said, which we don't really have a proper record of anyway, is just plain wrong"? It is pretty clear that what the wearer of this T-shirt is so exercised about is the biblical portrait of Jesus. And why not be? If Jesus really made the claims that the Bible attributes to Him, and He was indeed wrong, then He was a teacher of extreme hubris. Imagine me telling you that I existed before Abraham, that no one can get to God except through me, and that I will be judging your sorry butt at the end of time! If the authors of Scripture documented Jesus' words accurately, and He actually was not God-in-the-flesh, then this boy's T-shirt is an understatement! The Jews would have been justifiably zealous to bring this heretical lunatic to trial.

Third, you think there is an objective truth about spiritual matters and that Jesus has shipwrecked Himself upon that truth. That may be a rational position for some, but this boy in the movie favored Nietzsche, who some have claimed to have lain the very groundwork for postmodern relativism. The biggest irony of all is that this boy had taken a vow of silence, and when asked why by one of his co-stars toward the beginning of the movie he merely pointed to a picture of Nietzsche. Initially, I took this to be an admirably principled stance based on the philosophy that life and all ideas are ultimately meaningless, thus it is vacuous to utter any statement at all. But then he went and negated his whole worldview by putting on that T-shirt. It would appear that the dogmatic denial of the historical Jesus trumps all need for rational coherence.

Eugenics: It's Only Natural

2007-01-28T16:00:00.000-06:00

Something's been troubling me since it first occurred to me many years back.

According to a purely naturalistic view of the cosmos (i.e., there is no God and we are merely children of nature) our moral urges can only find their origin in evolution. And evolution's only purpose — if it can be said to have a purpose at all — is the survival and reproduction of the individual and, by extension, the species. Now, even if it were argued that morality is purely a social construction, then surely the welfare of our species would figure as prominent criteria for what qualified as "good." So by whatever source, according to naturalism, one of the chief ethical concerns must be the survival, reproductive health, and, perhaps, pleasure of the human race. And since there is no outside agent to rescue and preserve us as a species, then it is in our own hands to insure our future.

What is so troubling about this so far? Well, nothing in general. Caring for humanity is certainly a Christian concern as well. The problem is that there is no reason to think that naturalism can have any higher concern than this (but this is not to say that in practice many naturalists are not, in fact, driven by more personal agendas). If there are two courses of action, one of which may seemingly lead to the demise of humanity and the other to its flourishing, what higher standard exists that would suggest that the course of survival is not the preferred route?

And here's where things get dark.

Look at the world around you; look at the condition of its people. How many people do you see suffering from illness or simple imperfections? Retardation, diabetes, muscular dystrophy, heart conditions, paraplegia, schizophrenia — these are just a few of the many conditions we find. And there are many less severe from which even more people suffer, like hypertension, obesity, poor eyesight, color blindness, and baldness. Can it not also be said that simply being unattractive is an imperfection as well?

What is the culprit of all this suffering? Is it not primarily the fault of our genes, since most of what I can list would be considered congenital, hereditary, or genetic disorders? Even where illnesses are triggered by lifestyle conditions, it is often the case that our genetic makeup predisposes us to be affected in one way or another.

Genetic disorders are sourced in mutations that affect the reproductive cells of an adult, or in genetic errors that occur in the developing embryo. Such mutations that are not lethal or sterilizing are carried on by the offspring of the affected person. Evolution is indeed occurring. Well, at least half of it. We are indeed seeing mutations, unfortunately none of which are doing us any favors. What is not happening much in the case of humans is the "natural selection" half of evolution.

The wonders of medical science is remediating the effects of more and more of these disorders, and where once a person with a serious genetic condition might have died before reproducing, today they can live a reasonably normal life. We like to think of this as a blessing, but what is it really doing to our genetic stock, our quality of life, and our economy? Couldn't it be said that if we could remove such anomalies that we could reduce the amount of human suffering and eliminate a huge financial burden from the medical, pharmaceutical, and insurance industries? Why spend all that time in research and treatment when we could just as well test fetuses (and infants) and dispose of the rejects? Why continue to allow the gene pool to be polluted?

Of course, I am not the first to point out such a concern. The genesis of Planned Parenthood and the Nazi eugenics programs where founded upon the issue, which began to germinate in the late 1800's. Hitler was not the instigator of the Nazi eugenic scourge; he was merely a product of his intellectual time and its most powerful enabler. What Hitler did, however, was to generate negative publicity for the idea of eugenics by means of his zealous application of it and his mistaken idea that the Jew was a genetically inferior race that must be cleansed.

In the nauseating wake of Hitler's pogrom, the idea of ridding ourselves of "human weeds" (to use Margaret Sanger's words) fell quickly out of vogue. While I would argue that it has remained in the ethical climate in some circles, it has dared not show itself publicly to garner an official place in medical and social policy. But as soon as the Nazi stain is erased from our collective hamster-length memories, and a kinder, gentler way to market eugenics is advanced, we will be disposing of our human refuse just the same. As one modern eugenics advocate said:

We are deteriorating genetically, and the only alternative to leaving future generations an increasingly chaotic, violent, degraded society is called "eugenics." What a dilemma! Have we no other choice than to bequeath to our children a poorer genetic legacy than the one we ourselves inherited? And what if they too live in terror of the ghost of Adolph Hitler? Where will it end?

What is to be done in a purely secular society? Isn't eugenics inevitable? Isn't it evolutionary, and aren't we supposedly creatures of evolution? Indeed, how can we rise above our natures in order to find a "higher" moral path? How could there be said to be anything higher than nature for a naturalist? But nature is a cruel matron, especially in that she taunts us with compassionate instincts that are at odds with her purposes. Mother Nature is a hustler and child abuser. She will have us kill our runts with tears in our eyes and think ourselves noble all the while.

Only Two Religions: Meditations on Religious Pluralism

2007-01-17T22:00:00.000-06:00

It has often been said that all religions teach basically the same thing, or are just different paths to the same God. This idea of religious pluralism comes both from the mouths of those who have made a career of "religious studies" and from those who simply mean to brush aside the whole question of truth in religion. The claim itself can be answered in several ways, but I think that behind this idea stands a common presumption about the nature of God and what He expects from us.

For most, this claim is simply a matter of ignorance about what the various religions actually teach, or consider to be essential truths, but when the most foundational doctrines are taken into account, irreconcilable differences immediately surface. For example, Islam says that Muhammad was the final and greatest prophet of God and that Jesus was a mere human prophet, while Christianity says that Muhammad was not speaking for God and that Jesus was actually God incarnate. Islam claims that the Christian's divine view of Jesus is a mortal sin (the sin of "shirk"), while Christians say that you must accept His deity for salvation – there is no harmonizing these views. Other examples that could be cited would be the Buddhist idea of a non-personal God (in fact, Theravada Buddhism is essentially atheistic) vs. the eminently personal God of Christianity; or the Hindu/New-Age idea of reincarnation vs. the one-life model of Christianity.

Another thing pluralists are often guilty of is being selective about what religions to include in order to make this alleged harmonization. The religions that most modern people are aware of are relatively tame (especially from a distance), but there are many diverse and eccentric religions out there, and many more that could be added if we took historical inventory. Does the pluralist mean to say that the child sacrifices of the Canaanite priests were simply an earnest effort to reach out to the same God that Christians worship with offerings of praise and thanksgiving? Is the pluralist willing to accept all religions and all sincere expressions of those religions, or are they willing to admit that God is not likely to be impressed when a "sincere" believer flies a hijacked jet into a skyscraper?

In reality, the case for pluralism is most forcefully made by those who deny the orthodoxy of any particular religion (i.e., theological liberals), and often are not, themselves, devout people. It is an outsider's claim; they do not believe that God has clearly spoken through any of these religious systems. These are the people who are not so hostile to religion that they would brazenly claim it all a fiction to be discarded. There is a somewhat commendable (though misguided) spirit of mediation at work here. Unfortunately, in the attempt to reconcile the individual faiths they only succeed in misunderstanding each, and alienating those who take them seriously and would be unwilling to yield their distinctive doctrines. The pluralist is actually proposing a new vanilla religion to which he expects the world to convert. In practice, he is simply adding yet another one into the mix.

Religious pluralism is a bit like saying that all sports are basically the same because they use a ball. But this neglects the puck, the pool, the track, and the mat. Perhaps they might be tempted to say that it is all about prevailing over competition, but that would be both too narrow (many participate for the sheer love of the game) and too broad (capitalism then becomes a "sport" as well). So, again, we come back to the idea that details and distinctions matter.

Yet, pluralism rests on the idea that there is some common element or point of unity between the various religions. So, what is the "ball" for the religious pluralist? When all the world's religions are surveyed, the common denominator of choice always seems to relate to "morality."

I think at the deepest level the pluralist's conclusion is its own theological claim about what God is like, or what He wants (assuming He exists at all). I don't think the conclusion is merely based on observed similarities in the religions being sampled. If this were so then one could claim that God just wants us all to congregate in large halls, or sing songs to Him, or chant prayers – all things found in diverse religions. I think that certain assumptions guide the selective process in what is considered to be a relevant similarity.

It is instructive both that all religions do have something to say about morality, and that the pluralist would pick this out as the key ingredient. In our postmodern age there is much debate over the existence of objective morality, but here we see affirmed the fact that the peoples of the world are all preoccupied with the idea that morality is real and essential. It is both an irony and a further testament that so many moral relativists also happen to be religious pluralists. Even atheists reveal their appreciation of morality when they – as they often do – object to the idea that you need to believe in God to live a moral life. There is something worth exploring here.

So, what do the religions of the world have to say about morality?

Buddha says to "be lamps unto yourselves; work out your salvation with diligence." The path to salvation, according to Buddhism, is through the personal pursuit of "enlightenment" facilitated by such moral guidelines as the Five Precepts and the Eightfold Path. Hindu (and New Age) salvation depends on the idea that one advances upward to the Godhead through cycles of incarnations, where one is rewarded or punished in the next life according to the good or bad deeds in this one. Islam teaches that one's good deeds must outweigh the bad ones, and credits are earned through obedient living, especially by application of the Seven Pillars of Islam. The ancient Greeks believed that the dead were judged in the underworld, and the good could ascend to the Elysian Fields while the evil descended to fiery Tartarus. In ancient Egypt, eternal life was achieved if the burden of sin and evil in one's heart weighed less than the feather of Ma'at. And the list goes on and on.

The common theme seems to be one of personal striving for self-righteousness or a level of virtue acceptable to the divine judge. While there may be differences in where that striving lands you, or who/what does the judging, there is still the hope and expectation that the goal is yours to achieve. And the religious pluralist joins them in spirit: he says that if there is a God, then surely all He wants is for us to be "good" people. But there is one religion that is not a good team player, and is often bypassed because of it.

Christianity teaches that it is true in principle that we are justified by our works, but that it is a losing proposition. If there is one thing that is clear from the testimony of history, our social experiences, and our own hearts, it is that humans are fundamentally and deeply flawed creatures. To deny this one would first have to declassify a host of sins. Additionally, even our "good" deeds are suspect when we consider factors such as motives and standards of comparison. But even assuming we have managed some righteousness pleasing to the Judge, how good is good enough? Does He grade on a curve? Maybe just 51% goodness is enough? Yet even that would be found optimistic if we examine ourselves and meditate long on the idea of perfection.

In what sense can we call the Judge "just" if He winks at so much sin? There is certainly nothing in our experience that reflects this sort of attitude toward law and crime. We are not entitled to knock off a bank for our retirement fund even if we've been law abiding for the balance of our lives. Anyone who is looking for a God of unconditional loving tolerance has not been a parent, or has neglected all lessons of child rearing. If absolute holiness is not required, or imparted to us, then heaven will be filled with a great many persons with marginal credentials, and that is no heaven at all.

Christianity is absolutely unique among the religions of the world. It turns these ideas of morality and merit on their head: salvation comes before works. It teaches that it is the height of arrogance to think that our goodness can match God's holy standard, or that He owes us anything for our petty deeds. Christianity demands that you repent not only of your sin, but of all your labors to bury it, and your presumption that you can impress God.

God has already provided the perfect righteousness in Jesus Christ; we have merely to put our trust in this provision. It is both the hardest and easiest religion to follow. Hard, in that one must first yield up the ego. Easy, in that one has but to "enter the Sabbath rest." And those moral motions, which every other religion is so keen to affirm, spring inevitably from a genuine faith.

At the end of our days when we stand before God and He asks why He should receive us, the answers will fall into two categories. On the one hand the proud will say, "I performed the rituals and festivals and prayers," or "I was basically a good person." On the other hand the humble will say, "I am unworthy and filled with sin. Even my good deeds are as filthy rags before your Holiness. I throw myself solely on your mercy." One seeks to be judged on his own merits; the other throws himself on the mercy of the court. Scripture tells us how this will play out. For those not covered by the atonement of Jesus, the books will be thrown open and everyone judged according to his works. The results leave no room for optimism.

Ultimately, there are only two religions: man's religion of self-righteousness vs. God's righteousness and His provision for sinful man. One must be surrendered to the other, and the religious pluralist says it must be the latter. This is why classical Christianity is implicitly excluded in talk of pluralism. It is the black sheep (or I should say, the spotless white lamb) in this pasture. If the distinctive doctrine of the atonement of Christ is removed from play, as liberal theology seeks to do, then Christianity becomes just another moral system founded by just another man telling us how to get to God. We may just as well recall the missionaries; there is already enough "religion" in the world.

Coin Toss Morality

2007-01-03T13:47:00.000-06:00

Awhile back I had a dialog with a cousin where we discussed the merits of different ethical systems. He is something of an agnostic, so I was keen for him to recognize morality as an objectively real concept that he must work into his thinking. To this end, I asked the leading question, "Why not just flip a coin for each moral decision?" Now, this may sound flippant (no pun intended), but I think it begins to expose one of the problems of ethical theory.

You could say, as my cousin did, that this simply removes reason from the equation and replaces it with chance. But what is it that reason can do that chance cannot? Flipping a coin certainly qualifies as an ethical system, but why is it a "bad" or "wrong" one? You can certainly use "reason" to lay down the options, manage the coin toss, and implement the resulting decision.

I think the real problem is that the outcome of a coin-toss moral decision can clearly lead to undesirable results. Think of the following situation: Your neighbor's toddler wanders over into your yard (you've left your gate open) and falls into your pool. Do you, heads, save her or, tails, wait for her parents to come retrieve the corpse? You know what to do and you don't need an ethical system to help you out. You know that the coin toss may lead to the wrong decision.

Ideally, you want your ethical system to act as a sort of formula for helping you to get to correct decisions, and it is most helpful when the situations are complex. But the entire system can come crashing down if it runs afoul of your moral intuitions. A well placed reductio ad absurdum can prove the shortcoming of the theory. For instance, you might at first hold to a utilitarian ethic that whatever promotes the happiness of the majority is what is "good," but then it could be pointed out that the torture for sport of a single human could give a large (depraved) viewing audience a large sum total of happiness. For most people, that would put an end to that moral theory (and for those who it wouldn't I haven't got much more to say here).

The point is that we seem to have preexisting moral intuitions, and we will never be satisfied with any ethical system that does not accommodate them. (Well, perhaps not entirely true, since we also have competing selfish desires that we often seek to rationalize.) I would argue that in our ethical theories we are simply trying to systematize our moral intuitions.

A chance ethical system cannot do the trick if it is true that there are right and wrong answers. If there are indeed objectively right answers to moral questions, then reason is certainly an ally, since it can help us to assess the conditions and marshal our intuitions, but it does not in itself make the answer right. Neither does an ethical system make right answers; it can only (if legitimate) help us to navigate through real passes with real reefs and currents. But you could never say that any ship of history had hit a reef unless you were first willing to admit that things such as ships and reefs actually existed. That's a very big pill to swallow for anyone committed to a purely material world, where truth and ethics extend no farther than the will and imagination of the biochemical flukes we call "humans."

The Christmas Prayer

2006-12-16T17:00:00.000-06:00

Here is my contribution to my church's Advent Devotional for 2006:

Scripture: John 1:1-14

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things came into being through Him, and apart from Him nothing came into being that has come into being. In Him was life, and the life was the Light of men. The Light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it. . . . There was the true Light which, coming into the world, enlightens every man. He was in the world, and the world was made through Him, and the world did not know Him. He came to His own, and those who were His own did not receive Him. But as many as received Him, to them He gave the right to become children of God, even to those who believe in His name, who were born, not of blood nor of the will of the flesh nor of the will of man, but of God. And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us, and we saw His glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth.

I grew up with church being a very large part of my life. Sunday services, Sunday School, Vacation Bible School, youth fellowship, and church family campouts were all part of the world in which I lived. Unfortunately, it was not until many years later that I understood that spiritual world to have been just as processed and sugar-coated as the breakfast cereals of the time. The offense of the cross and all the "divisive" doctrines of classical Christianity were largely absent from my education. The parables and moral lessons of Jesus were to be preferred, and we literally sang Kum-Ba-Ya around the campfire.

In spite of my spiritually deficient diet, I was still compelled by this Jesus, and if I would fail to pray on any other night of the year I would always break from my Christmas Eve anticipation to give thanks for Jesus. But what was I thankful for? I did not really know myself. All I really knew was that Jesus was somehow God's man. He was a great moral teacher and He had in some way "saved" the world. Being a citizen of the "world" I assumed I was covered, like everyone else, and for that I was grateful. The cross was simply a show of how much God loved me. God was "love" and not much more than that.

The more I grew and the more I discovered the distractions of the world the more attractive this picture of Jesus seemed to me. It certainly gave me no cause for restraint and caution in doing my own thing. After all, didn't God accept me just the way I was? Wasn't God all love and mercy? Didn't Jesus have my back covered? But still I prayed on Christmas Eve — my conscience convicted that I must fit Jesus into my world; my self-will determined to make it a custom fit.

It wasn't until many years later as an adult that I finally broke down and read the whole Bible for myself. While it didn't all make sense at once, it at least became clear that I had heard only part of the story. I saw that Jesus was indeed a moral teacher, but He had far higher standards than I imagined; and He cared even about my words and thoughts! I saw Him speak of God's love, but I noticed that He spoke just as much of repentance and judgment. I saw that He was certainly a man, but I saw Him command nature, forgive sin, and proclaim truth like a God. I saw the building blocks of doctrines that I had never been taught, or that only the stuffy "fundamentalists" believed — things like the bodily resurrection of the dead, the second-coming of Jesus, hell, and the Trinity.

I had been praying to a stranger.

It took some further years (which included exposure to the intellectual side of historic Christianity) for all the pieces to come together and to begin my journey in light of these truths, but I can now say that I know to whom I pray and I well know why I should be thankful for the coming of Jesus. Jesus Christ: The long awaited and prophesied Messiah; the second Adam, come to live the perfectly obedient life on our behalf; the bearer of sin for all those who would believe; judge of those who stand in their own righteousness; Lord and redeemer of those who trust and serve Him; Second Person of the Trinity; the incarnate eternal God, born into this world on Christmas Eve.

Activity:

Read the following and consider how they support the deity of Christ:

Matthew 26:63,64; 13:41
Luke 5:20-25
John 8:23,24; 8:56-59; 14:23; 20:26-28

Prayer:

Lord Jesus, forgive us for making You into what we most want You to be. Forgive us for failing to take advantage of the revelation of Yourself that You have gifted to the world. Thank You for not leaving us to our own idle imagination about You. Thank You for coming to this world and doing for us what we could not do for ourselves. Please give us the desire to know You better, and the power to follow You more faithfully. And it is in Your name that we dare to pray, Amen.

Born in the Wrong Body

2006-12-10T00:20:00.000-06:00

I have a family friend (college age now) who is a female but has always been rather androgynous, if not downright boyish, in her dress and behavior. There has never been any talk or hint (that I've perceived) of homosexual tendencies, but things have taken a dramatic turn in the last year.

Her idle thoughts of identification with the opposite sex have turned to ideas that she ought to be the other sex. And this has been exacerbated by the fact that she's had her first infatuation: with another woman. Since she insists that she's not gay she's now thinking that a sex change is the solution to her problem.

This is an unusual situation — "unnatural" from my frame of reference — and I believe she knows this. I say that because her rationale for seeking a sex change is not something so neutral as, "It's just what I feel like doing." If having a sex change is a morally neutral action, like changing a hairstyle or buying a car, then there's no need of a defense. If you've got the means and desire, just do it, and anyone who's got a grievance against it is just expressing a personal distaste.

This, however, is not the way she's handling the decision. Instead, she states a rationale — one loaded with metaphysical overtones; one that implies the working out of an ultimate justice and design. She claims that she was "born in the wrong body."

The "wrong body," imagine that! It would seem that someone or something has made a mistake. Now, she's a bright person, but I'm not sure she means for such a statement to be closely scrutinized (though the world would certainly be less shallow and vulgar if people said only what they meant); it is just a thing that people commonly say in this situation. But if she does not really mean this, then why not state the real rationale? Let's give this reason the benefit of the doubt and take it as a serious idea. What can it mean, then?

The first thing to notice is that she has said "I" was born in the wrong body. This would seem to imply a form of body-soul dualism. If an "I" can be in a wrong body, or if "I"s are inserted into bodies at all, then this implies that there is a self that is independent from such things as bodies with genders. This makes sense in a theistic worldview, which believes in such things as souls. It also makes sense in an Eastern mystical view, which holds to the transmigration of the soul from one life and body to the next. But there are two problems with this idea where she's concerned.

First, if her soul has been intentionally inserted into a body, then is it possible to claim that a mistake has been made? Just exactly who has made the mistake?

If you are a theist, then you hold to a god's involvement in the grand scheme of soul making and destiny shaping. If you are born a particular sex and you believe that God has anything at all to do with that fact, then it would seem that no matter what your particular feelings are about your state that you are spitting in your maker's face to seek a change. Now there may certainly be congenital diseases and deformities that we seek to remedy due to the nature of living in a corruptible, material (even fallen) world — this is not heaven after all — but changing a perfectly functional body into something foreign is a categorically different proposition.

If you are more Eastern in your spiritual outlook, then you hold to some form of reincarnation. This certainly makes bodies and souls a much more dynamic association, but there is still a purpose and order to it. For Hindus and New Agers, your particular circumstances are a working out of the law of Karma. Whatever blessings or trials you are faced with are simply your just desserts for the deeds of former incarnations. So, for instance, if you find yourself feeling like a man trapped in a woman's body, it might be because you were a male chauvinist in a former life. While this may give a rationale for one's situation, it does not give a reason for escaping it. Anything not addressed in this life will simply be postponed for a future date. On this model, changing one's sex seems equivalent to ending one's own life; it's like saying, "I can't take this, I want out." Buddhism's view of the soul is a bit more complex, but its view of the physical world and self as "illusion" make worrying about your body enough to want to change it a sort of denial of the whole system.

Second, this person fancies herself something of an atheist. To remain consistent with this portrait of the world she must reject the idea that there is any self apart from her physical body. She simply is what she is; there is no "wrong" or "mistake" about it, because there is no one to have made a mistake and no design or purpose to have gone awry. If nature is all that is involved here then how can you really be something that you are not? By whatever cause, the fact is that she is female and it is only her feelings about that fact which are at issue.

But your feelings about a thing mean nothing about the thing itself. They do not make reality and, in fact, are notoriously abused in the pursuit of fantasies. To say that you ought to have been a thing because you feel partial to the thing is to make reasonable many absurd ideas, like, "I feel as though I should have been a cat," or, "I am really an amputee trapped in a body with 4 limbs." By purely materialistic standards, it makes as little sense to say that you are really a cat, or an amputee, or a walnut, as it does to say that you are a different gender. It is as far away to Oz as it is to Neverland.

If what you are and what you think you are happen to be out of harmony, then there is indeed something wrong with the person. But which is more reasonable to seek to manipulate: the thing or the feelings about the thing; reality or the recognition of the reality? Why is it that feelings trump all other considerations? Neither God, nature, nor reason can stand before them. True, you may have mixed feelings for your home or car and seek to change those things, but those are the kinds of transient, external things that are made to suit personal tastes. It is only modern science that even begins to allow us to entertain the extreme idea of gender shopping.

One last point to ponder: Thinking that you really ought to be the opposite sex implies that you think that you feel like that sex. But how would one be confident in knowing what the other sex felt like? If you are not the other sex, then there is a very good chance that there is a subjective difference which you could never experience or even imagine unless you were by nature one of the gang. There may be some stereotypical behavioral elements with which you identify, or some affinity for different biological equipment, but there is a perceptual element that may never be achieved no matter how much gender dress-up and social engineering is affected. If you pave your driveway with yellow bricks and paint your house emerald green are you really in Oz, or are you just indulging a fantasy?

Cafeteria Christianity

2006-09-28T18:00:00.000-05:00

I was recently asked to review a commentary titled, "Thus Saith the Lord. No Exceptions." It was written by Leonard Pitts Jr., Pulitzer Prize winning syndicated columnist for the Miami Herald. He is also a member of the United Church of Christ, a self-consciously liberal denomination, and that fact strongly colors this particular commentary. What follows is the text of Pitts' commentary in full accompanied by my own responses.

First Baptist Church of Watertown, N.Y., fired Mary Lambert for being a woman. They say the Bible told them to do it.
Nothing against women, says the Rev. Timothy LaBouf. The church is just trying to obey 1 Timothy 2:11-14, which says in part, “A woman should learn in quietness and full submission. I do not permit a woman to teach or to have authority over a man; she must be silent.”
So, after 54 years as a Sunday school teacher at First Baptist, Lambert was given the heave-ho a couple of weeks ago. She and others have said the firing probably had as much to do with church politics as with scriptural injunctions, but let’s stick with the stated reason as given in her letter of dismissal: the Bible forbids women taking positions of authority. There is, for the record, a similar injunction in 1 Corinthians 14:34-35, which warns that it is “disgraceful” for a woman to speak in the church.

So Pitts readily admits that there is biblical justification. Unless he wants to argue that a private, voluntary organization should not have the right to set its own standards, then the most he can rightly say against this church is that it was hypocritical in letting Mary Lambert begin teaching in the first place. I could go in to the "politics" of the situation, or the theological issues, but these do not beg a response here; Pitts has chosen to entirely bypass these points and seems willing to lean on the unstated assumption that any limitation on the role of women in the church is just "disgraceful."

So the church is scripturally right. It’s just not right right.

Pitts seems to have his theology all nailed down here. I wonder what canon he's using to derive his doctrines about spiritual leadership and church politics. It is certainly not the Bible; he admits right here (rightly or wrongly) what it has to say and that he rejects that. For this reason, any further appeal he makes to the Scriptures must be suspect.

So what grounds does he have for being dogmatic about how Christians ought to believe and practice? If it is merely his own spiritual feelings, then I will have to wonder what he does with the feelings of the rest of the spiritual people of the world, many of whom have very different ideas from his own. Perhaps Pitts might be so humble as to consider that he has not felt his theology correctly.

The Lambert case intrigues me because it illustrates a point I’ve made on many occasions when people bring out Bibles to explain why gay folk deserve no civil rights. Maybe now, without the reflexive emotionalism that gay brings to cloud their view, a few more people will see the obvious: Bible literalism is impractical and impossible. Or maybe they won’t see.

Gay's deserve no civil rights? I've never heard a case made that they shouldn't be able to vote, hold office, own property, have legal protections, etc. I think what Pitts is really referring to is the "right" to marriage. But they have the same right there that everyone else has: The right to marry one person of the opposite sex. The difference is that they don't want to exercise that right; they want a new right: The right to marry someone of the same sex. But heterosexuals are denied that right as well. Just because someone has a desire for a thing does not mean they ought to have that thing. But that is another issue, which, by the way, we do not even need to appeal to the Bible to speak against.

As far as Bible "literalism" being impractical, I would beg to differ. It is only when you have persons in your community that do not agree with your theology that problems arise. This happens to be the state we are in here in America, as in the world at large (we are not ancient Israel, having made a covenant with God). For this reason, the theocracy that Pitts is so fearful of is not a "practical" reality, and most American Christians are satisfied to stick with the political vision of our founding fathers. But for some, even that is too much.

Allow me to share by way of example an e-mail I received last week from a gentleman named Al who took exception to a column I wrote condemning capital punishment. Said Al, “When one criticizes the death penalty one criticizes God’s judgment in the matter, as scripture ordains death for numerous crimes. It is not wise to criticize God.”
I shot back a note pointing out that among the crimes for which scripture ordains death are cursing your parents (Leviticus 20:9) or committing adultery (Leviticus 20:10). Did Al really believe those misdeeds should be treated as capital offenses?
“Only if one wishes to accomplish God’s will in the matter,” Al said.
I don’t mind telling you, people like him scare me.

Methinks Al's chief mistake was alluding to the Bible in answer to Pitts in the first place, as though it were some authoritative playbook in shaping his opinions. If Pitts actually believed the testimony of those who delivered the religion he presumes to correct, then he would remember that Jesus is scheduled for a return visit; and when He does, it will be the end of many things, including smart-mouthing and unfaithfulness.

What we humans should do about sin in this post-messianic era is another question, but if Scripture is to be believed, even broadly, then we at least know what God thinks about it; and the Levitical laws are but a foreshadowing of the fate of those who think of sin as nothing more than a little harmless shenanigans.

As it happens, one of America’s greatest churchmen recently weighed in on the question of Bible literalism. In a twilight-of-life interview with Newsweek, Billy Graham spoke of the way age and perspective led him to reject the absolutism of the left and right and to make his peace with the notion of God as a loving mystery. People of faith, he said, can “absolutely” disagree about the details of theology. “I’m not a literalist in the sense that every single jot and tittle (of the Bible) is from the Lord,” he said. “This is a little difference in my thinking through the years.”
It is a difference people like Al would do well to emulate.

It is what Graham has preached and lived that makes him credible to those whom Pitts would seek to correct, and I suspect that some of those doctrines that he has not begun to rethink in his twilight years would still give Pitts cause for heartburn. However, I'm sure that it is only as far as Graham's comments support Pitts' selective theology that he is much interested in him.

Or has no one else noticed how literally some Christians interpret those scriptures that give them license to condemn, yet how elastic and liberal their readings are when dealing with scriptures that convict their personal behaviors. Meaning that it’s always a little more difficult to catch people being literal about turn the other cheek, do not store up treasures on earth, do not turn away the borrower, love your enemy. Yet, you can’t go to the store without tripping over someone who wants you to know the Bible calls homosexuality an abomination.

Pitts is correct that it is easier to see and judge other people's sins than your own, but this does not mean that they are not, in fact, sins; and it may be but a demonstration of the fact that it is easier to be objective about others than about yourself. He's also right that we see in Scripture only what we prefer to see and filter out the rest. But I'm not sure how he imagines he has escaped the same mistake, especially since he's already admitted that Scripture is not to be taken too seriously. The very methodology of liberalism is to pick and choose from the Scriptures, whereas his only complaint against the conservatives can properly be that they have not taken it all into their view.

When someone like Pitts makes their decision on which biblical ideas they will keep and which to discard, what standard do you suppose they will use? If one were disposed toward promiscuity or homosexuality, do you think they would be more inclined to accept the verses that speak against these things, or the ones that speak of God's love and mercy? It is a far easier thing to believe that God holds no grudge against your behavior. But if we remove such a bias, yet retain the liberal, cafeteria approach to Scripture, the truth could turn out to be something far different than Pitts would be comfortable with.

Why is it that liberal Christians find the portions of Scripture that speak of love and charity to be the ones that have survived the misinterpretations and corruptions of the ages? Given that Scripture is equally filled with talk of God's righteousness and justice, it seems equally warranted, according to the liberal approach, to say that the verses regarding God's mercy and forgiveness are the ones that we have taken too literally! That is a fearsome idea, but what grounds does Pitts have for thinking it is the wrong one?

People obsess on the fine print, yet miss the big picture, the overarching themes of sacrifice, redemption, love.

Unfortunately, some seem to miss even the overarching themes! Words like "sacrifice" and "redemption" may be part of that big picture, but you can't just hang them out there without definition. Just what or who is this sacrifice, and what are we being redeemed from and to? It does not take too many such questions before we find ourselves looking at the "fine print" for clarification, and it doesn't take a magnifying glass to find things like sin and Christ's atonement all over the text.

In their selectivity, they are reminiscent of the Islamic fanatics who bomb and behead, citing some passage of the Quran as justification, yet conveniently ignoring a dozen other passages commanding mercy and love.

Ah, he wants to be provocative, eh? All right, how would it be if I pointed out that his kind of theological subjectivism has led to (or sustains) almost every one of the cults? "God is still speaking" to them too, ya know. Unfortunately, it's not always the same things that the UCC is hearing.

To address his point, though, Pitts rightly implies that there are passages in the Qur'an that advocate aggression against unbelievers, but he wrongly implies that the Bible is similar in kind and that a wise reader should then heed only the more genteel passages.

If the Qur'an teaches both violence and inclusiveness toward other religions, then we can only pray that Muslims practice Pitts' brand of liberalism and hear only the non-violent passages. Fortunately, Christians are not in this same dilemma. There are no applicable biblical mandates that teach aggression toward unbelievers. And the contrast could not be more stark between the spread of Islam by the sword from its outset and the spread of Christianity by the blood of the Apostolic Fathers, who were very much biblical literalists.

Those Old Testament passages that might be accused of condoning violence (e.g., the taking of the Promised Land and the penalties in the Mosaic Laws) nowhere give license beyond the scope and borders of pre-messianic Israel. Even if we were inclined to do so, and even if anyone has ever done so, there is nothing in Scripture, at least, that would support going after peaceful unbelievers with bombs and swords.

People are much less apt to be selective in the direction of mercy and love.

I disagree. Just like Pitts, the vast majority of those who select anything at all from Scripture (even atheists) select only those things that speak of "mercy and love." The biblical "literalists" include these things as well, but the difference is in the understanding of what these things mean and how they are exercised. The difference is on par with a parent who "loves" a child by giving and allowing everything versus a parent who offers boundaries and discipline with the goal of raising a healthy and mature adult.

I’ll close by observing that Exodus 35:2 requires death for those who work on the Sabbath. Were I a member of First Baptist, I might wonder where the church leaders stand on that one.
Of course, I’d be scared to ask.

Since it turns out that the historical church has worshipped on Sundays, in honor of the resurrection, and not on the Sabbath (Saturday), then Pitts should know that something new is in play. But since Pitts most likely rejects a literal resurrection, then he is probably not inclined to see Jesus as the fulfillment of the law (as He claimed to be) in any meaningful way.

The lens of the Messiah is the key to reconciling the whole of Scripture. I think that Pitts would prefer to see it as one big incoherent jumble containing interesting mythology and a few good moral lessons. The curious thing is that Pitts' UCC believes that God is in there somewhere. Were I a member of that denomination, I might wonder what kind of God it is that is so incompetent or impotent that He can't get a decent revelation to His creation. And if this truly is the kind of God we're talking about, then I wouldn't be scared to ask such presumptuous questions, since apparently He's all love and mercy without law and judgment anyway.